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Providing Content in Canada's Official Languages

Please note that the Official Languages Act requires that government publications be available in both official languages.

In order to meet some of the requirements under this Act, the Commission's transcripts will therefore be bilingual as to their covers, the listing of CRTC members and staff attending the hearings, and the table of contents.

However, the aforementioned publication is the recorded verbatim transcript and, as such, is transcribed in either of the official languages, depending on the language spoken by the participant at the hearing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

              TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

             THE CANADIAN RADIO‑TELEVISION AND

               TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

 

 

 

 

             TRANSCRIPTION DES AUDIENCES DEVANT

              LE CONSEIL DE LA RADIODIFFUSION

           ET DES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS CANADIENNES

 

 

                          SUBJECT:

 

 

 

Review of price cap framework /

Examen du cadre de plafonnement des prix

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

HELD AT:                              TENUE À:

 

Conference Centre                     Centre de conférences

Outaouais Room                        Salle Outaouais

140 Promenade du Portage              140, Promenade du Portage

Gatineau, Quebec                      Gatineau (Québec)

 

October 10, 2006                      Le 10 octobre 2006

 


 

 

 

 

Transcripts

 

In order to meet the requirements of the Official Languages

Act, transcripts of proceedings before the Commission will be

bilingual as to their covers, the listing of the CRTC members

and staff attending the public hearings, and the Table of

Contents.

 

However, the aforementioned publication is the recorded

verbatim transcript and, as such, is taped and transcribed in

either of the official languages, depending on the language

spoken by the participant at the public hearing.

 

 

 

 

Transcription

 

Afin de rencontrer les exigences de la Loi sur les langues

officielles, les procès‑verbaux pour le Conseil seront

bilingues en ce qui a trait à la page couverture, la liste des

membres et du personnel du CRTC participant à l'audience

publique ainsi que la table des matières.

 

Toutefois, la publication susmentionnée est un compte rendu

textuel des délibérations et, en tant que tel, est enregistrée

et transcrite dans l'une ou l'autre des deux langues

officielles, compte tenu de la langue utilisée par le

participant à l'audience publique.


               Canadian Radio‑television and

               Telecommunications Commission

 

            Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des

               télécommunications canadiennes

 

 

                 Transcript / Transcription

 

 

 

 

              Review of price cap framework /

          Examen du cadre de plafonnement des prix

 

 

 

 

 

BEFORE / DEVANT:

 

Richard French                    Chairperson / Président

Helen del Val                     Commissioner / Conseillère

Elizabeth Duncan                  Commissioner / Conseillère

Andrée Noël                       Commissioner / Conseillère

Stuart Langford                   Commissioner / Conseiller

 

 

 

 

ALSO PRESENT / AUSSI PRÉSENTS:

 

Marielle Giroux-Girard            Secretary / Secrétaire

Bob Noakes                        Staff Team Leader /

Chef d'équipe du personnel

Stephen Millington                Legal Counsel /

Rachelle Frenette                 Conseillers juridiques

 

 

 

 

HELD AT:                          TENUE À:

 

Conference Centre                 Centre de conférences

Outaouais Room                    Salle Outaouais

140 Promenade du Portage          140, Promenade du Portage

Gatineau, Quebec                  Gatineau (Québec)

 

October 10, 2006                  Le 10 octobre 2006

 


- iv -

 

           TABLE DES MATIÈRES / TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

                                                 PAGE / PARA

 

AFFIRMED:  PAUL ROWE                               16 /   88

AFFIRMED:  SCOTT ANDREW COLLYER

AFFIRMED:  MIRKO BIBIC

AFFIRMED:  GEORGE HARITON

AFFIRMED:  PETER DILWORTH

AFFIRMED:  DAVID PETER KRAUSE

 

Cross-examination by MTS Allstream                 17 /  109

 

Questions by the Commission                       108 /  768

 

Cross-examination by The Competitors              120 /  850

 

Questions du Conseil                              204 / 1363

 

Cross-examination by The Consumer Groups          208 / 1389


- v -

 

               EXHIBITS / PIÈCES JUSTICATIVES

 

 

No.                                              PAGE / PARA

 

MTS-1         Excerpt from Final Report of        21 /  133

the Telecommunications Policy

Review Panel

 

COMPANIES-1   Opening Statement Submitted by     301 / 2033

Bell Aliant, Bell Canada, and

Saskatchewan Telecommunications

(The Companies) in the matter of

Price Caps Regulation, Public

Notice 2006‑5, dated

10 October 2006

 

TELUS-1       Opening Statement of TELUS         302 / 2034

Communications Company dated

October 10, 2006

 

MTS-2         Excerpt of Telecom Decision        302 / 2037

CRTC 2005-27, Review of price

floor safeguards for retail

tariffed services and related

issues, dated 29 April 2005

 

MTS-3         Excerpt of Telecom Decision        302 / 2037

CRTC 2006-15, Forbearance from

the regulation of retail local

exchange services, dated

6 April 2006

 


                  Gatineau, Quebec / Gatineau, Québec

‑‑‑ Upon commencing on Tuesday, October 10, 2006 at

    0858 / L'audience débute le mardi 10 octobre 2006

    à 0858

LISTNUM 1 \l 11                LE PRÉSIDENT:  À l'ordre, s'il vous plaît.  Order, please.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12                Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

LISTNUM 1 \l 13                Bienvenue à cette audience publique.  Je suis Richard French, vice‑président des Télécommunications au CRTC.  C'est moi qui présiderai l'audience.

LISTNUM 1 \l 14                Before I begin, I would like to say that we are pleased to be here and to have this opportunity to hear your views on very important set of telecommunications issues.

LISTNUM 1 \l 15                Je vous présente les autres membres du Comité d'audition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 16                À ma gauche immédiate, Helen del Val, conseillère régionale de la Colombie‑Britannique et du Yukon; juste à côté, Stuart Langford, conseiller national.  À ma droite immédiate, Elizabeth Duncan, conseillère régionale de l'Atlantique et juste à côté, Andrée Noël, conseillère régionale du Québec.


LISTNUM 1 \l 17                We have a number of Commission staff here as well.  The front table on my left are hearing secretary, Marielle dont vous allez entendre beaucoup parler; staff leader Bob Noakes far left here; legal counsel Steven Millington and Rachelle Frenette au milieu.

LISTNUM 1 \l 18                In Telecom Public Notice CRTC2006‑5, Review of Price Cap Framework, the Commission initiated this proceeding to establish the price cap regime that will go into in 2007 in the operating territories of Aliant Telecom, Bell Canada, MTS Allstream, Saskatchewan Telecommunications and Telus Communications Company.

LISTNUM 1 \l 19                Au cours de l'audience, nous aborderons différentes grandes questions telles que les objectifs du nouveau régime de plafonnement des prix, de structure des ensembles, les restrictions relatives à l'ensemble, les composantes, la formule de plafonnement des prix, la subdivision ‑‑ la sous‑division sûrement ‑‑ des tarifs à l'intérieur d'une tranche et la nécessité de maintenir les comptes de rapports.


LISTNUM 1 \l 110               The scope of this proceeding is delineated by Public Notice 2006‑5.  In this regard, I note that in a letter addressed to all parties, dated 6 October 2006, the Commission determined that some submissions made by parties were not within the scope of this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 111               La portée de l'instance est définie donc par l'Avis public 2006‑5.  À ce titre, justement, je signale que dans une lettre qu'il a adressée à toutes les parties le 6 octobre dernier, le Conseil a établi que certains des mémoires reçus débordaient le cadre de l'instance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 112               With respect to final oral argument, we will allow parties to provide their comments by teleconference.  I would ask that you register your intention to do so with the hearing secretary who will provide you with the procedure to participate by telephone.

LISTNUM 1 \l 113               Nous vous remercions sincèrement d'être venus malgré votre emploi du temps chargé.  Je tiens à vous assurer que vos observations nous sont réellement précieuses et que nous en tiendrons compte au moment de prendre notre décision.

LISTNUM 1 \l 114               We look forward to what promises to be a very interesting and informative hearing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 115               At this point, I would like to ask the hearing secretary to address the process which we will be following today and in the following days.

LISTNUM 1 \l 116               LA SECRÉTAIRE:  Merci, monsieur le président.  Bonjour à tous.


LISTNUM 1 \l 117               As stated by the Chairman, I am Marielle Giroux‑Girard, the secretary of this hearing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 118               As indicated in the Commission's Organization and Conduct Letter dated September 27, we plan to sit from 0900 to 1730 each day.  We will take a lunch break of about an hour and a half as well as a health break at mid‑morning and mid‑afternoon.

LISTNUM 1 \l 119               It appears that the hearing will conclude no later than Friday, October 20th.  While we do not anticipate sitting into the evenings or the weekend, it may be necessary to consider these options.  We will watch our progress and you will be advised of any change to the schedule that becomes necessary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 120               La salle d'examen public est située dans la pièce Papineau près de la réception.  Elle sera ouverte à toutes les parties et au public pour la durée de l'audience.  Vous pourrez y trouver un exemplaire du dossier public de l'instance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 121               All submissions heard at this public hearing will be transcribed and will form part of the public record of this proceeding.  To assist court reporters in producing an accurate transcript, please ensure you identify yourself and that your microphone is turned on when you are speaking and when you are finished, please turn it off.


LISTNUM 1 \l 122               In addition, place cards will be provided to the witnesses prior to their testimony.  We encourage witnesses to inscribe their name on these cards.  This will assist the panel and Commission staff to properly identify various witnesses during their testimony.

LISTNUM 1 \l 123               Anyone wishing to purchase a copy of the transcript may speak with the court reporter directly.  Copies of the transcript will be available on the Commission's website and in our examination room the next working day.

LISTNUM 1 \l 124               When you are in this room, would you, please, turn off your cell phones, pagers, blackberries and other text messaging devices as they are a non welcomed distraction for participants and Commission.

Furthermore, they may cause interference on the internal communication system used by the translators and court reporters.

LISTNUM 1 \l 125               As per set out in the Organization and Conduct Letter, parties have provided me with their best estimate of the time they require for cross‑examination of each witness or panel of witnesses.

You are required to advise me as soon as possible of any changes to those estimates.


LISTNUM 1 \l 126               Parties should also inform us as soon as possible if they do not intend or no longer intend to cross‑examine a witness or a panel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 127               Nous comptons sur votre collaboration à tous et chacun pour nous aider à assurer une audience ordonnée.

LISTNUM 1 \l 128               This concludes the initial comments that I wish to make at this time.  I now call on Commission counsel, Steven Millington to address some additional procedural matters.

LISTNUM 1 \l 129               Merci.

LISTNUM 1 \l 130               MR. MILLINGTON:  Good morning everyone.  Welcome to Gatineau.

LISTNUM 1 \l 131               Before we begin the cross‑examination phase, I need to say a few words about the administration of this phase of the proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 132               At these proceedings, parties normally appear in the order set out in the Organization and Conduct Letter, although I understand that some of the parties have made arrangements to appear in a different order and I think that's MTS and Telus and if they could go on mike, please, and just set out what arrangements have been made.


LISTNUM 1 \l 133               MR. KOCH:  Thank you, counsel.  Yes, Mr. Chairman, and Commissioners, the arrangement that we made, given the unavailability of MTS Allstream panel before Thursday, the arrangement that we made was that if we were to conclude the evidence of the company's panel prior to the end of Wednesday, that Telus has kindly agreed, I think it also suits their schedule, to go ahead of MTS Allstream in the order.

LISTNUM 1 \l 134               MR. MILLINGTON:  And will that order hold for any re‑cross?

LISTNUM 1 \l 135               MR. KOCH:  I'm sorry?

LISTNUM 1 \l 136               MR. MILLINGTON:  Will that order hold for both parts of the participation then?

LISTNUM 1 \l 137               MR. KOCH:  Not for cross‑examination; just for that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 138               MR. MILLINGTON:  Just for the original?

LISTNUM 1 \l 139               MR. KOCH:  That's just for the panel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 140               MR. MILLINGTON :  Okay.  And then you'll appear in the order in the conduct for the cross then?

LISTNUM 1 \l 141               MR. KOCH:  That's the understanding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 142               MR. RYAN:  That's correct, Mr. Chairman.


LISTNUM 1 \l 143               MR. MILLINGTON:  Okay.  Thank you.  Consistent with our usual practice, traditional examination‑in‑chief by any party will not be permitted.  Rather, a party calling a witness will generally be entitled only to examine its witness briefly regarding the preparation of the evidence, any errors or any routine updates to the evidence and the witness' qualifications.

LISTNUM 1 \l 144               The order of cross‑examination is also stated in the Organization and Conduct Letter.  Generally, the panel and Commission counsel will pose questions after the parties have completed their cross‑examination of a particular representative or panel of representatives.

LISTNUM 1 \l 145               Parties will be sworn in or affirmed prior to providing testimony.  As a result, counsel are instructed to remind their witnesses that they are not permitted to discuss the content of their testimony with their counsel during that witness' period of giving evidence.  Limiting communications extends to break periods, lunch breaks, evening and weekends.

LISTNUM 1 \l 146               The order in which parties conduct their cross‑examination may be changed by agreement between the parties with advanced notice to the party being examined and to the secretary and me.


LISTNUM 1 \l 147               Our experience in the past proceedings is that there is usually no need to engage in re‑direct examination, although we recognize there may be situations where re‑direct is necessary and appropriate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 148               After cross‑examination of all witnesses being completed, we move on to the final argument phase with a maximum time allowance of 30 minutes per party.

LISTNUM 1 \l 149               Parties wishing to present final oral argument should proceed in the order set out in Attachment 1 of the Letter of Organization and Conduct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 150               Parties will also be permitted to supplement their oral argument with written submissions filed and served on all parties by the later of 26  October 2006 or the end of the oral hearing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 151               It may not be the intention of all parties to be in attendance throughout the hearing.  In this regard, I wish to stress that all parties are responsible for monitoring the progress and content of the hearing and for attending and having their witnesses available at the correct time.


LISTNUM 1 \l 152               I note that the hearing is being web cast on the Commission's website.  Parties should also be aware of the progress and content of cross‑examination which precedes their own in order to be ready with their cross‑examination at the appropriate time and to ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication of matters previously dealt with by other parties.

LISTNUM 1 \l 153               Our hearing secretary, madame Girard, has the forms providing a written or record of appearance.  If you have not already completed that form, please ask her for one and fill it out.  The information in the form will allow us to contact you, if necessary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 154               I also remind parties that they must provide copies of their responses to undertakings to both the hearing secretary and to other parties in advance of their being introduced as exhibits.

LISTNUM 1 \l 155               Wherever possible, oral or written responses or undertakings should include a reference to the transcript page at which the undertaking was given, identifying both the witness giving the undertaking and the party to whom the undertaking was given.

LISTNUM 1 \l 156               Before circulating these documents, parties should confirm with the hearing secretary the number assigned to the most recent exhibit.  Parties themselves should then number the responses to undertakings accordingly prior to distribution.


LISTNUM 1 \l 157               The hearing secretary will then enter the responses to undertakings as exhibits and an appropriate time by briefly identifying the party in question and noting the exhibit numbers assigned to various responses to undertakings.

LISTNUM 1 \l 158               Unless there is sufficient reason for not doing so, party should provide the hearing secretary and the other parties with copies of the proposed exhibits in advance.  To facilitate recognition of a particular document, parties should ensure that exhibits have titles only.

LISTNUM 1 \l 159               During the cross‑examination of a witness or panel by a party, the Hearing Secretary will track the documents put to the witness or panel of witnesses and will assign numbers accordingly.

LISTNUM 1 \l 160               Following a party's completion of the cross‑examination of the witnesses, or witness, the Hearing Secretary will enter as exhibits the documents that were in fact put to the witness by that party.  This will be done orally.

LISTNUM 1 \l 161               All parties are reminded that with respect to all documents filed at this hearing, 20 copies must be provided to the Hearing Secretary for the Commission's use.  At the same time, a copy of all such documents must be served on all other parties present that this hearing on the date the document is filed.


LISTNUM 1 \l 162               Finally, with respect to the curricula vitae of witnesses that were filed with the Commission prior to the commencement of this hearing, these documents will not be assigned an exhibit number as they already form part of the record.  During the course of the hearing, should parties provide the Commission with curricula vitae of witnesses, they will then be given an exhibit number in the manner outlined in the organization and conduct letter.

LISTNUM 1 \l 163               In order to ensure that the oral hearing may be conducted smoothly and efficiently, Commission counsel Rachelle Frenette and I will be available both prior to and during the hearing to assist legal counsel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 164               Finally, Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary and Staff Leader Bob Noakes, Commission Counsel Ms Frenette and myself, will be available throughout the hearing to assist any parties who have any questions regarding practices or procedures that we may follow.  It is often possible for Commission Counsel and counsel for the parties to resolve procedural matters off‑line and this may save hearing time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 165               Thank you very much.  Are there any preliminary matters anyone wishes to raise at this time?


‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 166               MR. MILLINGTON:  Sorry.  Is there one?

LISTNUM 1 \l 167               MR. HENRY:  Just one.  We have a written opening statement to file this morning.  I'm not sure what the procedures are for that, but perhaps we should just distribute them and get an exhibit number.

LISTNUM 1 \l 168               THE SECRETARY:  I have the 20 copies you provided me and I believe it would be presented as Exhibit No. 1 for The Companies.

LISTNUM 1 \l 169               MR. HENRY:  Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 170               MR. MILLINGTON:  Is there anything else?

LISTNUM 1 \l 171               MR. RYAN:  We equally, Mr. Chairman, have an opening statement that I understand has been made available to the Hearing Secretary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 172               MR. MILLINGTON:  Thank you, mr. Ryan.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 173               THE SECRETARY:  Mr. Henry, you may want to proceed with introducing your witnesses.

LISTNUM 1 \l 174               MR. HENRY:  Thank you, Madam Secretary.


LISTNUM 1 \l 175               Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to introduce the panel representing Bell Aliant, Bell Canada and Saskatchewan Telecommunications.

LISTNUM 1 \l 176               Sitting closest to you I believe, out of my sight, Dr. David Krause, who is Director, Economic Analysis, BCE.  He is assisted in the back row by Mr. Pierre Luc Hébert who is Senior Counsel Regulatory Law.

LISTNUM 1 \l 177               Next to Dr. Krause is Mr. Peter Dilworth, Vice President Finance, Bell Aliant.  He is assisted in the back row by Mr. Richard Pagé, Director of Business Decision Support.

LISTNUM 1 \l 178               Next to Mr. Dilworth is Mr. George Hariton of TIA Telecommunications, a consultant to Bell Canada.

LISTNUM 1 \l 179               Next to him is Mr. Mirko Bibic, Chief Regulatory Affairs, Bell Canada.  He is assisted in the back row by Jodi Bodnar, Director, Reg. Matters at Bell Canada.

LISTNUM 1 \l 180               Next to Mr. Bibic is Mr. Scott Collyer, Director of Bell Residential Services Regulatory Marketing Coordinator for Bell Canada.  He is assisted ‑‑ actually he is not assisted by anybody.  He is quite talented.

‑‑‑ Laughter / Rires


LISTNUM 1 \l 181               MR. HENRY:  Next to him is Mr. Paul Rowe, Vice President Enterprise Marketing, Bell Canada.  He is assisted in the back row by Ms Marie‑Josée Parcell who is Associate Director Marketing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 182               As you mentioned, the CVs are on the record and we filed a very slight revision this morning so I won't go through those.  Maybe I could just have a minute to situate the panel for you and the various roles of the individuals.

LISTNUM 1 \l 183               Mr. Bibic is responsible for the overall design of our proposal and may be viewed, if you like, as the Chairman of the panel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 184               Mr. Rowe and Mr. Collyer are there to provide their perspective on the business and consumer marketplace.

LISTNUM 1 \l 185               Dr. Krause and Mr. Hariton have assisted with the economic principles underlying our proposal and have also authored Appendix 8 of our evidence on deaveraging, price deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 186               Mr. Dilworth is responsible for issues related to operations finance.  Mr. Dilworth and Mr. Hariton have also collaborated on the interrogatories that were directed to us where we were asked to develop a productivity factor in the event the Commission were to prescribe one.


LISTNUM 1 \l 187               Now, if there were to be any specific questions for Bell Aliant and/or Saskatchewan Telecommunications, we would propose to call a representative for one of those companies to the stand in that event.

LISTNUM 1 \l 188               Perhaps the witnesses could be sworn, with that introduction.

AFFIRMED:  PAUL ROWE

AFFIRMED:  SCOTT ANDREW COLLYER

AFFIRMED:  MIRKO BIBIC

AFFIRMED:  GEORGE HARITON

AFFIRMED:  PETER DILWORTH

AFFIRMED:  DAVID PETER KRAUSE

LISTNUM 1 \l 189               MR. HENRY:  Gentlemen, are your qualifications correctly set out in our letter of October 5th as amended today?

LISTNUM 1 \l 190               MR. ROWE :  They are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 191               MR. COLLYER:  They are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 192               MR. BIBIC:  They are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 193               MR. HARITON:  Yes, they are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 194               MR. DILWORTH:  They are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 195               MR. KRAUSE:  They are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 196               MR. HENRY:  Mr. Bibic, were Bell's evidence and interrogatory responses prepared by you or under your direction and with the assistance of the panel members?

LISTNUM 1 \l 197               MR. BIBIC:  They were.


LISTNUM 1 \l 198               MR. HENRY:  Are they true, to the best of your knowledge and belief?

LISTNUM 1 \l 199               MR. BIBIC:  They are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1100              MR. HENRY:  Dr. Krause and Mr. Hariton, did you also prepare an economic paper attached as Appendix 8 to the evidence entitled "Issues Concerning Price Deaveraging Regulation"?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1101              MR. KRAUSE:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1102              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1103              MR. HENRY:  Is that true, to the best of your knowledge and belief?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1104              MR. KRAUSE:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1105              MR. HARITON:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1106              MR. HENRY:  Mr. Chairman, the witnesses are available for cross‑examination.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1107              THE SECRETARY:  We will now proceed with the cross‑examination phase with MTS.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1108              Mr. Koch you may wish to proceed.

CROSS‑EXAMINATION / CONTRE‑INTERROGATOIRE

LISTNUM 1 \l 1109              MR. KOCH:  Thank you, Madam Secretary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1110              Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners.  I would like to first of all apologize for being a few minutes late in arriving at the hearing.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1111              The questions I have, Mr. Collyer, since you are the only unassisted member of the panel, perhaps I will focus most of my questions on you.  Generally, I will try to, if I do want to direct my question to a specific member of the panel, I will indicate which member of the panel; otherwise it is open season on me.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1112              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Counsel, could you just formally introduce yourself, because we are not all aware of your name.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1113              MR. KOCH:  Thank you, sir.  My name is Michael Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1114              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Thanks, Michael.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1115              MR. KOCH:  I should say I did provide to the hearing secretary several exhibits, which I propose to put to the witnesses.  I did inform counsel representing the companies last night of the nature of the exhibits that I propose to put to the witnesses.  They are all documents well known to the witnesses.  So perhaps if their counsel has not provided them a physical copy, now would be an appropriate time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1116              In their usually efficient way, the company's counsel have done that already.  So I can launch right in.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1117              In the company's evidence, you refer liberally to the report of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel to support certain of the objectives you propose this Commission adopt and certain elements of the design of the new price cap period or the new price cap plan.  Is that not correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1118              MR. BIBIC:  There are references to the TPR panel report, that is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1119              MR. KOCH:  And, in fact, you seek to support several of your proposals by reference to the TPR.  Is that not correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1120              MR. BIBIC:  We do use the report to support some of our proposals.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1121              MR. KOCH:  And some of the objectives as well?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1122              MR. BIBIC:  I believe that's correct, as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1123              MR. KOCH:  It's probably an understatement to say that this panel is very familiar with the report of the TPR.  Is that not fair?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1124              MR. BIBIC:  We're familiar with it or some of us are.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1125              MR. KOCH:  I would like to refer to certain sections of the TPR report and specifically chapter 1 of that report deals with the need for change.  I take it you would agree with me, Mr. Bibic, that the panel focused on the fact that Canada was losing ground in broadband and had relatively poor wireless penetration.  Would you not agree with that, without going to the document specifically, Mr. Bibic, based on your familiarity with the report?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1126              MR. BIBIC:  Based on my familiarity, I do remember the broadband, I think that would be a yes to broadband in a sense that Canada was once second a couple of years ago in penetration per 100 inhabitants and had slipped a bit.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1127              I can't remember the wireless statement from the TPR panel report, however.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1128              MR. KOCH:  Perhaps we could go, then, to the first exhibit that I introduced, which is an excerpt from the final report of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1129              I take it Commissioners have a copy of that report before them?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1130              COMMISSIONER DUNCAN:  That's the one before them?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1131              MR. KOCH:  Yes, that's the first exhibit.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1132              THE SECRETARY:  I will distribute this exhibit and it will be registered as MTS Exhibit No. 1.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1133              MR. KOCH:  Thank you.

EXHIBIT NO. MTS‑1:  Excerpt of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel Final Report 2006

LISTNUM 1 \l 1134              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Please proceed, Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1135              MR. KOCH:  Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1136              I was asking you to confirm whether the panel had articulated a particular concern in regard to broadband and wireless.  If I could ask you to turn to page 1‑13, which is included in this excerpt.  I will read from the first paragraph at the top.  It's titled "The Canadian Telecommunications Industry Leadership Threatened."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1137              It says:


"Over the course of its work, the panel has become concerned that the Canadian telecommunications sector performance has not kept pace with its earlier achievements.  In particular, Canada has not remained at the leading edge of development and deployment in the two key growth areas of the telecommunications sector:  Broadband and wireless."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 1138              That is the reference I was making.  You would agree, then, the panel was focusing in particular on those two segments?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1139              MR. BIBIC:  In this section of the report, that is correct.  In this paragraph that you're citing, rather, that's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1140              MR. KOCH:  This section is entitled "Leadership Threatened".  They don't focus on any other particular service segment in addressing that contention that Canada's leadership is threatened, do they?  I am speaking of service segment.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1141              MR. BIBIC:  For this paragraph, that's correct.  I just don't have pages 14, 15, 16.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1142              MR. KOCH:  You don't.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1143              MR. BIBIC:  No.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1144              MR. KOCH:  But are you aware of whether they identified another market segment?  I'm suggesting to you they did not, in which they specifically identified as being where Canada's leadership is threatened?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1145              MR. HARITON:  Mr. Koch, I agree that they identified these two segments in this portion of the report.  However, I think the report as a whole did express concern about the telecommunications sector as a whole and, indeed, if you go to ‑‑ and I don't have the report at hand ‑‑ if you go to chapter 7, I think you will find that chapter 7 examines the role of telecommunications in the company as a whole and expresses concerns.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1146              So, it is not just these two factors.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1147              MR. KOCH:  So there is a general concern?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1148              MR. HARITON:  There is definitely a general concern.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1149              MR. KOCH:  And, indeed, the report expressed some concerns regarding the regulatory framework, we can agree on that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1150              MR. BIBIC:  That's correct, but I think if you look at chapter 7, it probably went beyond the regulatory framework and it looked at investment in ICTs, as they are called, information and communications technologies and other such things.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1151              MR. KOCH:  These two specific segments of the market that are identified here as being of specific concern to the panel, these are not markets in which there is retail regulation in Canada, correct, wireless and broadband?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1152              MR. BIBIC:  Did you say retail regulations?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1153              MR. KOCH:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1154              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.  I would point out, by the way, that in, for example, page 1‑22 of the same chapter, the need for change does talk about the telecommunications policy framework as well, to support Mr. Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1155              MR. KOCH:  In fairness, I put that suggestion to Mr. Hariton.  But these two specific segments that it identifies are not segments where there is retail regulation and, in fact, the panel, when it spoke to the metrics of local telephony, it actually lauded that area as an area where Canada is a leader.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1156              Perhaps you could look at page 1‑5, which I have also reproduced.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1157              MR. BIBIC:  It did mention that Canada has very low rates for local exchange wire line services as compared to our OECD peers, but did mention significant number of issues with telecommunications and policy and regulatory framework in association with wire line services for quite a number of pages.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1158              MR. KOCH:  But I want to distinguish between the regulatory framework, which, as I put to Mr. Hariton, I acknowledged that TPR did address, versus segments where specific issues or problems were raised.  You will agree with me that on page 1‑5, in discussing local telephony, the panel made two points.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1159              One regarding the ubiquity of local service.  I don't think we are having an argument here, Mr. Bibic.  They mentioned the ubiquity of local service, and they mentioned the fact, as you point out, that Canada's rates for residential users are the third lowest in an OECD study and for business users, the fourth lowest.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1160              MR. HARITON:  Chapter 1 does do that.  I think you have to remember the role of chapter 1 in this report, Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1161              Chapter 1 was attempting to set the stage or the rest of the report and was really focusing on marketing and technology and perhaps more on technology than anything else.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1162              So if you take it in that sense, I think you should think of singling out wireless and broadband as areas where there has been rapid technological change and where special concern is warranted.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1163              MR. KOCH:  Mr. Hariton ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1164              MR. BIBIC:  If I may ‑‑


LISTNUM 1 \l 1165              MR. KOCH:  No, if I may.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1166              I take it that is a "yes" to my question to acknowledge that these were the two factors that the panel pointed out in respect.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1167              MR. BIBIC:  That is what I wanted to answer, sir.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1168              I would agree that the TPR report does identify Canada as having very high wireline penetration and very low rates for local residential exchange services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1169              As far as page 1‑13 is concerned, I would agree that that page in particular points out that Canada ‑‑ in my view, I think what it says is that Canada has done quite well with respect to broadband penetration and wireless as well.  However, over the last couple of years, others have been catching up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1170              MR. KOCH:  So the segment that we are dealing with in this proceeding is largely local.  Is that a fair statement?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1171              MR. BIBIC:  Well, it's all regulated services that fall under the current price cap regime.  To a large measure, that does include local and business exchange services ‑‑ local residential and business local exchange services; sorry.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1172              MR. KOCH:  To the extent that parties are making proposals in this proceeding, including ‑‑ well, I should focus on yours ‑‑ they are not based on any finding of Canada being behind other countries in respect of ‑‑ and again, I think this is important ‑‑ not the regulatory framework.  I understand The Companies have a lot of complaints about the regulatory framework.  I'm talking about the metrics of the market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1173              There is not a concern regarding ubiquity.  There is not a concern regarding prices that is driving your proposals.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1174              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1175              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1176              MR. KOCH:  Okay; thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1177              So we get that clear, in terms of what is driving your proposals, I take it when you developed your evidence, you developed it in a way to make sure that the Commission had the benefit of what you considered to be important in terms of what your proposals were based on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1178              You tried to put in your evidence what you were relying upon and what the Commission should have regard to in either accepting or rejecting your proposals.  Correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1179              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.  Let me just clarify what I said to the immediately preceding question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1180              Certainly our proposal isn't based on any issues with the fact that Canada is one of the leaders in terms of low local residential exchange services.  However, obviously the whole proceeding is about pricing constraints and pricing flexibility.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1181              So in that respect, obviously our proposal does relate to pricing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1182              MR. KOCH:  Absolutely.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1183              Perhaps we could turn next to The Companies' proposal regarding competitor services, specifically Category 1 services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1184              I believe that is set out in paragraph 126 of your evidence.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1185              At paragraph 126 you state:

"Category 1 and Category 2 competitor services are subject to separate pricing constraints.  Under the current price cap régime Category 1 competitor services are generally priced at incremental cost plus a mark‑up of 15%."


LISTNUM 1 \l 1186              I would like to focus on these Category 1 services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1187              MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Koch, I'm going to need to catch up with you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1188              MR. KOCH:  Absolutely.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 1189              MR. BIBIC:  Okay; thanks.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1190              MR. KOCH:  What you do not indicate in your evidence ‑‑ and I recognize you say "generally" ‑‑ is that many of these services, or certainly certain of these services are in fact currently subject to a productivity offset under the current price cap régime.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1191              Is that not correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1192              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.  For certain of these services there is, I believe, a productivity offset already built into the Phase 2 studies that derive the pricing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1193              MR. KOCH:  Right.  In fact, what occurs is that for some of these Category 1 services there is a productivity offset already built into the study.  And for those, the Commission does not apply a further productivity offset.  But for others a productivity offset is applied under the current price cap régime.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1194              Is that not a fair statement?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1195              MR. BIBIC:  That is a fair statement.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1196              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1197              I don't think we have to go back to Decision 2002‑34, the last price cap decision, but you would agree with me that the Commission imposed a productivity offset on these Category 1 services due to its expectation, its articulated expectation, that there would be productivity gains in these services.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1198              MR. BIBIC:  I do know that there is a productivity offset applied to the Category 1 competitor services.  I can't, as I sit here, vouch that that is the exact reasoning behind it, to be frank.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1199              If you have it, I can certainly confirm.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1200              MR. KOCH:  Someone else on the panel may be familiar with 2002‑34.  The last time I read 2002‑34 ‑‑ it's a long document so I try not to read it too often ‑‑ is that the reason the Commission articulated for imposing the productivity offset is a stated expectation that there would be productivity gains in respect of the services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1201              Is that a fair statement?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1202              MR. HARITON:  That was my reading of the decision.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1203              MR. KOCH:  Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1204              You are proposing for these services that the rates for these services be maintained at their current levels until a proceeding has been concluded in respect of wholesale services generally.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1205              Is that not a correct statement of your position?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1206              MR. BIBIC:  That is a correct statement.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1207              MR. KOCH:  Just so that we are clear, currently certain of these Category 1 services are subject to a productivity offset.  But your position is that at least until we deal with the whole issue of wholesale services in this proceeding, that you refer to, the rates would be maintained.  So they would not be subject to that productivity offset.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1208              Is that correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1209              MR. BIBIC:  Yes.  Our proposal is that for Category 1 services we already have rates for those services.  We will have ‑‑ the Commission confirmed in a letter in the context of this proceeding not too long ago, in fact in a letter addressed to your client, I believe, that there would be a wholesale services review, which in fact Chairman Dalfen had indicated would be the case, in a recent speech earlier this spring.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1210              As well, there is the issue that the federal government tabled the draft policy directive, which if it becomes effective would mandate the Commission to undertake a wholesale services review.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1211              So our point of view for this proceeding was rather than engage in a lengthy debate about pricing of competitor services, let's continue with the treatment that we have for those services now, that we have had for four years; keep the prices where they are for Category 1; for Category 2 services, which aren't essential services, continue with the current model of having pricing examinations on a case‑by‑case basis, as necessary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1212              When that proceeding starts ‑‑ the wholesale review proceeding, that is ‑‑ we can engage in the debate about what is Category 1, what is not Category 1, what mark‑up should be, et cetera.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1213              MR. KOCH:  Thank you for that answer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1214              You indicated that we would treat them the same, or I think keep the treatment the same.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1215              The point of my question is to get you to acknowledge that actually maintaining the price for those which would otherwise be subject to the productivity offset is not keeping them the same.  In fact, you would be temporarily suspending the application of a productivity offset from those.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1216              MR. BIBIC:  I think that is fair.  If I said treat them the same, for Category 2 certainly have the same mechanism on a case‑by‑case basis for Category 2.  For Category 1, keep the rates the same in the review; the reason being, of course, that overall in our proposal we don't propose an X factor.  So we, in our judgment, decided that we would treat competitor services the same way in our proposal as we would for other services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1217              MR. KOCH:  I think that we are in agreement now that your proposed treatment ‑‑ and it is pending this proceeding ‑‑ would not be to keep the treatment the same but rather to keep the rates the same.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1218              MR. BIBIC:  For those services in Category 1 that are subject to an explicit X factor, then correct, the treatment wouldn't be exactly the same.  But for those that have the X factor built in the Phase 2 cost study, I don't think that would be correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1219              MR. KOCH:  We are just looking at those for which a productivity offset would otherwise apply, Mr. Bibic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1220              You said something interesting which I didn't see in your evidence, which is a rationale of treating them like the other services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1221              From your evidence, the only rationale that you provide to the Commission for really freezing those rates is waiting for this proceeding; that you think there is going to be ‑‑ well, there is going to be a proceeding, and you simply want to wait for that proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1222              You haven't indicated any other rationale for your proposal in respect of Category 1 services in your evidence, have you?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1223              MR. BIBIC:  I can't recall specifically.  But certainly as I sit here today on the stand, I can express to you quite clearly that what went into the thinking were both elements: the review that is upcoming and the fact that overall our proposal clearly doesn't propose an X factor.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1224              In our judgment, the proposal is to apply across all services.  So it is both reasons.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1225              MR. KOCH:  As you say, your general proposal doesn't propose an X factor, and my question doesn't quibble with that per se.  I wanted to understand in that case you had a specific rationale for not proposing an X factor, which, as I understand it, is that you believe competitive market forces are such that an X factor is not necessary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1226              Is that not correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1227              MR. BIBIC:  It is correct but incomplete.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1228              For areas which meet our competitive networks' test, which I won't go into detail on, we believe that an X factor is not required because of the fact that market forces in our view will determine what the appropriate rate level is.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1229              That is not the entire reason for areas which do not meet our own capping test, which would continue to be capped at the overall basket level with individual rate constraining elements.  There wouldn't be an X factor applied to those baskets either.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1230              That is a combination of two things.  One is we believe that in some of these areas there does exist competitive behaviour, albeit perhaps not of the kind that is facilities based.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1231              The second reason is that in our view the rates, as you pointed out from the TPR report reference, are quite low, the lowest in the world.  We felt that with the combination of a cap at the basket level, together with the individual rate element constraint of 5 percent for residential and 10 percent for business, those two constraints would ensure affordability in those areas.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1232              So it is not all about market forces, but certainly in large part it is.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1233              MR. KOCH:  You haven't applied that same analysis to competitor services.  You have simply said:  (1) wait for the proceeding; and (2) let's treat them the same way as retail.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1234              Is that a fair statement?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1235              MR. BIBIC:  Correct.  And as far as the X factor goes, there is an element of symmetry, in our view, to be applied between residential and competitor services.  And to be quite frank, we also think that competitor service pricing is quite low today as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1236              MR. KOCH:  We will leave that for the next proceeding, Mr. Bibic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1237              At paragraph 132 of your evidence you state:


"Existing approved prices for these services will continue in force until both the scope and the pricing rules for competitor services have been reviewed as a result of the policy direction and consequent changes made."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1238              The policy direction to which you are referring in your evidence, I take it that is the document released in June of this year.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1239              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1240              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1241              MR. KOCH:  You are aware that the policy direction was put out for public comment?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1242              MR. BIBIC:  Yes, I am aware of that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1243              MR. KOCH:  Are you aware of whether that policy direction has been finalized in light of that public comment?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1244              MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Koch, clearly we all know that the policy direction hasn't been finalized.  Of course, this submission that you were referring from was drafted in July and submitted on July 10th.  At the time all we had was a general reference by Chairman Dalfen that there would be a wholesale services review.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1245              Now we clearly know, because the Commission has indicated specifically in a letter to your client, that there would be a wholesale services review.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1246              So paragraph 132 has to be read in the context of what has happened since.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1247              MR. KOCH:  Paragraph 132 perhaps is put in quite definitive language about the scope and rules being reviewed as a result of the policy direction.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1248              MR. BIBIC:  Clearly policy direction is in draft form and is not yet effective, is that what you are getting at.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1249              MR. KOCH:  You don't know if and when that policy direction, or a similar policy direction in different language, might actually become effective.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1250              MR. BIBIC:  No, I don't.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1251              MR. KOCH:  In terms of the proceeding that the Commission has indicated it will undertake, you don't know precisely the scope of that proceeding, do you?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1252              MR. BIBIC:  No, I don't.  But we have Commission staff here.  Perhaps we can ask them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1253              MR. KOCH:  The beautiful thing for them is that they are not being called as witnesses.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1254              When I say you don't know, I don't know either.  I'm not being critical of your lack of knowledge.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1255              You don't know when that proceeding will be commenced precisely.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1256              MR. BIBIC:  Precisely, I do not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1257              MR. KOCH:  And I take it you would agree with me that it is reasonable to conclude or to assume that that will be a complex proceeding?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1258              MR. BIBIC:  I don't think it will be any more complex than the typical proceeding of this sort.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1259              MR. KOCH:  I think that is circular, but I will go with it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1260              So you don't know when a decision in that proceeding would be available, do you?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1261              MR. BIBIC:  No, I do not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1262              MR. KOCH:  Likewise, depending on the outcome, I take it you don't know what steps will be necessary in order to implement that decision if changes are made?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1263              MR. BIBIC:  Clearly not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1264              MR. KOCH:  In fact, it could be some time.  It could be before we get to the end of that chapter, could it not, Mr. Bibic?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1265              MR. BIBIC:  That I don't know.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1266              MR. KOCH:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1267              Based on past examples, such as the proceedings to consider CDN, it could go on for the better part of a couple of years, could it not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1268              MR. BIBIC:  Some proceedings take longer than others.  I think in recent years Commission processes have been more efficient than they were in the past, so I certainly wouldn't bank on a wholesale review proceeding taking as long as the CDN proceeding took back in 2002‑2003.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1269              MR. KOCH:  The problem is we just don't know.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1270              MR. BIBIC:  I think we have established that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1271              MR. KOCH:  I would like to move to another area, which is that of your proposal for deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1272              At pages 46 and 47 of your evidence you deal with your proposal to eliminate the prohibition.  I will give you a moment to get there, although I am going to quickly when you get there tell you to turn somewhere else.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1273              I was just trying to make sure everyone had it located.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1274              MR. BIBIC:  I'm there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1275              MR. KOCH:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1276              You refer to the expert report of Hariton and Krause as supporting the removal of the requirement for uniform prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1277              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1278              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1279              MR. KOCH:  So that report sets out the basis, can I assume, for your proposal regarding deaveraging?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1280              MR. BIBIC:  I think it would be more fair to say it sets out one of the bases for our proposals around deaveraging.  There are policy elements to our proposal with respect to the removal of the prohibition on rate deaveraging.  And as far as the economic underpinning of the proposal, we rely on the report of Mr. Hariton and Dr. Krause, as well as a report that we filed in a previous proceeding authored by Professor Donald McFetridge.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1281              MR. KOCH:  You haven't made Dr. McFetridge available to be cross‑examined here, have you?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1282              MR. BIBIC:  No, we haven't.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1283              MR. KOCH:  So there is no way if we take issue with some of the statement in his report to test that report, is there?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1284              MR. BIBIC:  He is not a witness.  I leave it up to you to make your case.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1285              MR. KOCH:  As we would like to say, that's the beauty of it, my Lord.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1286              Perhaps, then, I could direct some questions to Messrs. Krause and Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1287              Your report, Mr. Hariton and Mr. Krause, appears at Appendix 8; is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1288              MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, it does.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1289              MR. KOCH:  That might be worth turning up, as I have a number of questions on it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1290              First of all, Mr. Krause, you are an employee of Bell Canada.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1291              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1292              MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, I am the Director of Economic Analysis at Bell Canada Enterprises.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1293              MR. KOCH:  As a matter of housekeeping, since you are both listed as authors of this report, I take it this is your joint work, Mr. Hariton and Mr. Krause?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1294              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1295              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1296              Mr. Krause, given your position at Bell Canada, I take it you are not here to provide an independent objective expert opinion on these matters?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1297              MR. KRAUSE:  The report reflects my views on deaveraging, so in that context.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1298              I am here to talk about my report that I authored with Mr. Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1299              MR. KOCH:  But you are not purporting to be an independent expert, are you?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1300              MR. KRAUSE:  The analysis, the report was written while I was an employee of Bell Canada Enterprises, but the views reflect my own.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1301              MR. KOCH:  Now, can I take it the purpose of the report was to mount the economic arguments for the removal of the prohibition against deaveraging?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1302              MR. HARITON:  That is fair.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1303              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1304              In fact, you do make a recommendation for the removal of the prohibition in your report.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1305              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1306              MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1307              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1308              Now, I would like to make sure we are all on the same page as to what we are talking about when we discuss the prohibition against deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1309              At paragraph 6 of your report you quote from Commission Decision CRTC 2005‑27.  That is one of the most recent places where the Commission has reaffirmed its prohibition against deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1310              Is that correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1311              MR. HARITON:  That was the most recent instance I could fine.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1312              MR. KOCH:  I have asked the Secretary to circulate copies of a brief excerpt from that decision, so perhaps we will just take a momentary break while that is accomplished.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 1313              MR. KOCH:  At paragraph 6 you cite paragraph 301 of this decision.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1314              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1315              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1316              MR. KOCH:  I would like to read to you paragraph 300 of the decision.


"The Commission considers that its policy to preclude further rate deaveraging within a rate band provides a valuable additional safeguard to protect against targeted price reductions.  The Commission notes that, should an ILEC wish to respond to existing or anticipated competition within a rate band, it is permitted, under existing pricing rules, to reduce rates, provided that the rate reduction applies throughout the rate band and the imputation test is satisfied.  By contrast, existing rules do not permit an ILEC to target small geographic areas within a rate band, for this practice could deter entry into the local market, where the ILECs continue to be the dominant service provider."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1317              You will agree with me that one of the concerns expressed by the Commission in this paragraph is the possibility of deterring entry specifically given the ILECs dominance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1318              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1319              You don't have to agree with the Commission, Mr. Hariton, but that was ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1320              MR. HARITON:  I understand that was the concern of the paragraph.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1321              As you say, I think the concern can better be dealt with in other ways then a ban on price deaveraging.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1322              MR. KOCH:  We will come to your views in a moment.  This will go a lot more quickly if we have a very direct exchange as I was anticipating.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1323              MR. HARITON:  Absolutely.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1324              MR. KOCH:  So the Commission's concern was, again, in the context of the ability to deter entry in light of the ILECs dominance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1325              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1326              MR. HARITON:  That's what the decision says.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1327              MR. BIBIC:  Clearly that was the concern at the time, Mr. Koch, based on a record that had been put together in that proceeding in 2003 and 2004.  Certainly it is our position that the competitive environment has changed dramatically since then.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1328              MR. KOCH:  The Commission's concern ‑‑ well, why don't we go on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1329              When we talk about removing the prohibition against deaveraging, we are talking about charging customers within the same rate band but located in difference geographic areas different prices for the same services.  That's what we are talking about.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1330              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1331              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1332              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1333              We are not talking about the ability to offer promotions to new customers, are we?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1334              MR. HARITON:  We are talking about different prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1335              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1336              We are not talking about the ability to offer promotions to new customers?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1337              MR. HARITON:  I am agreeing with you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1338              MR. KOCH:  All right.  Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1339              We are not talking about the ability to offer customers volume discounts where they are taking effectively a different service than another customer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1340              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1341              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1342              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1343              In section 2 of your report ‑‑ and I don't want to leave you out of this entirely, Mr. Krause ‑‑ you discuss differential pricing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1344              I take it the point of this section is your contention that differential pricing is a normal part of the competitive process.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1345              Is that correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1346              MR. KRAUSE:  Differential pricing and price discrimination is consistent with the competitive process and pricing decisions by firms.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1347              MR. KOCH:  So I will take that as a yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1348              In paragraph 14 you refer to differential pricing as:

"... different customers paying different prices for the same product, either because of differences in demand characteristics or cost differences."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1349              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1350              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1351              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1352              Here, because we are dealing with customers within the same rate band, we are not talking about differential pricing based on presumed cost differences.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1353              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1354              MR. KRAUSE:  I think Mr. Hariton will add to this, but even within a rate band there can be some cost differences.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1355              MR. KOCH:  Right.  But generally the proposition for the rate bands was that there was a certain homogeneity, you will agree with me, in the costs across those rate bands?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1356              MR. HARITON:  Mr. Koch, I think that it would ‑‑ it's obvious to me at least that within a rate band, indeed within an exchange, you will have highly varying costs.  That can be seen quite simply.  If you have a customer who is close to a switch the loop length will be short and the cost will be low.  If you have a customer who is ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1357              MR. KOCH:  I will let you finish.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1358              MR. HARITON:  I was just simply disagreeing with your ‑‑ I will disagree with your proposal that costs are homogeneous within a band and I am willing to give you reasons why I believe that, if you want them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1359              MR. KOCH:  I don't think that's necessary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1360              MR. HARITON:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1361              MR. KOCH:  I think the point is to focus on what we are talking about here and what we are not talking about here.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1362              As I understand it, you are not talking about differentiating between customers based on presumed different cost characteristics.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1363              MR. HARITON:  I think it's important to realize that differential pricing has two aspects to it.  It can be based on differences in demand characteristics, but it can also be based on differences in cost characteristics.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1364              MR. KOCH:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1365              MR. HARITON:  So that differential pricing could be either one or the other or both.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1366              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1367              MR. HARITON:  I don't think you can separate them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1368              MR. KOCH:  But your proposal is not to differentiate based on cost.  Your proposal is to have the flexibility to differentiate geographically.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1369              Is that not the prohibition that you are addressing?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1370              MR. HARITON:  The prohibition is a much wider one.  We would like to see an end to the prohibition ‑‑ or I personally would like to see an end to the prohibition, whether it be based on costs or whether it be based on demand characteristics, whether it be based on geographic characteristics or whether it be based on other customer characteristics.  It doesn't have to be geographic.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1371              MR. KOCH:  But clearly your report deals with demand characteristics.  That is what you are focused on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1372              MR. HARITON:  The bulk of the report certainly does, but I have in mind the fact that I also get the possibility of different prices for different cost conditions.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1373              MR. KOCH:  But what you are attacking is not your ability to go to the Commission and prove that your costs are different, but, rather, your ability to price differentially regardless of geographic location and costs within the same rate band.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1374              MR. HARITON:  That is certainly one thing we are asking for.  Again, I think this is important because I think there has been a lot of confusion on this point in the past.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1375              Uniform prices can be price discrimination, a form of price discrimination.  That is very, very important, if you have customers whose costs of service differ, if there is a different cost of serving customer A and customer B.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1376              But if you are charging a uniform price to those two customers, you will get different margins for those two customers and you will get price discrimination at that point.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1377              So I think the idea that if you have a uniform price you do not have price discrimination is one which is a common misconception and one which is not true.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1378              MR. KOCH:  Moving, then, to what your report is about, which, as you recognize, the bulk of the report deals with discrimination or differential pricing based on what you contend are demand characteristics, you refer to three types of discrimination, correct:  First degree, second degree and third degree.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1379              It is the third degree price discrimination you claim is at issue here.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1380              MR. KRAUSE:  The main focus of the differential pricing proposal, I think the easiest idea to get across would be third degree price discrimination where you would be able to segment particular markets based on some sort of observable characteristic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1381              MR. KOCH:  Right.  At paragraph 17 you offer up certain examples of what you refer to as that third degree type of price discrimination.  Correct, Mr. Krause?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1382              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1383              MR. KOCH:  And the examples you use are examples of differentiating based on age, based on student status, based on a customer being new or a geographic location.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1384              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1385              MR. KOCH:  Again, at paragraph 19 you again refer to real world examples of differential pricing.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1386              MR. KRAUSE:  These are certainly examples that you see within the economy.  There are plenty of others.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1387              MR. KOCH:  Student discounts, that is not something that we are dealing with here; that is not prohibited by the deaveraging prohibition.  Correct?  It may or may not be allowed, but that is not what we are addressing here?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1388              MR. BIBIC:  No, I disagree with that, Mr. Koch.  I think the deaveraging rules, in conjunction with some of the other regulatory restrictions, would prevent Bell Canada from putting together packages available only to students, for example in September in Kingston for Queen's University, different from a package for students in Sherbrooke.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1389              So, I don't think it is fair to say that we are not talking about student discounts specifically.  They are an example.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1390              MR. KOCH:  But that is not an example of differentiating based on a geographic location, is it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1391              MR. BIBIC:  It could be.  If Bell would want to put together a different student discount package for students in Kingston as compared to students in Sherbrooke ‑‑ I am assuming they are in the same rate band ‑‑ then that would be both an element of differentiation based on the fact that the group is a student and the geographic location.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1392              MR. KOCH:  But what we are dealing with here is the geographic distinction.  Correct?  That is what the prohibition is against?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1393              MR. HARITON:  My understanding is the prohibition is against the averaging on a broader basis than geographic.  If I were to want to give different prices to people in similar geographic locations, I might be prohibited from doing that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1394              The type of prohibition that I have in mind is, in this case, can I give a different price to a new customer who has not been my customer before than to an existing customer, a customer who already is my customer.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1395              My understanding is that is the kind of thing that would be prohibited by the price deaveraging rule.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1396              MR. KOCH:  Well, a promotion would not be prohibited?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1397              MR. HARITON:  I am talking about not a promotion to a semi‑permanent price, semi‑permanent I say because no price is forever, but a price indefinitely going forward.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1398              Just to come back to your example of the university, that can easily be looked at on a geographic basis.  All you have to do is define your geographic area as university campuses and then you would have different prices for effectively students and for effectively non‑students, simply by distinguishing university campuses from all others.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1399              All these other forms of discrimination, because of the nature of telecommunications, which tends to be location specific, local telecommunications, you can translate almost all forms of price discrimination and differential pricing in all of these things into location specific, therefore geographically averaging.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1400              MR. KOCH:  I would like to clarify one thing, which is what is the flexibility that you are asking for, because my understanding was the flexibility that you were asking for was ending the prohibition against a deaveraging, which, as I understand it, and as I think as the Commission understands it, is the specific prohibition against charging different rates in different geographic areas within the same rate band.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1401              If you are now suggesting that your proposal is to be able to discriminate or differentiate charging on all the varied bases that you are now citing, then I think we should know about that because that is not what I took from your evidence.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1402              I think we are getting quite far afield and I wanted to really explore what I understood was on the table in this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1403              MR. BIBIC:  Let me clarify.  Clearly the only issue that is in scope in this proceeding is the prohibition on rate deaveraging.  But in the real world, it can't be isolated from two other restrictions which work together with the prohibition on rate deaveraging to limit our flexibility.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1404              One is the promotions rule which require promotions to be consistent across rate bands.  So, again, prohibition on rate deaveraging ties into that.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1405              The same thing with the win back rule.  The win back rule and the promotion rules are not in scope.  So in that respect, if that is what you are getting at, I completely agree with you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1406              However, when I jumped in with the student discount, it would still be an applicable example with respect to the prohibition on rate deaveraging because today an incumbent cannot, for example, put together a package that is available only to students, be they in the same rate band.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1407              In my example, if Sherbrooke is in the same rate band as Kingston, which it probably is, but I don't know for sure, we could not put together a package only for students in rate band B, for example.  So that is only because of the prohibition on rate deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1408              To clarify, certainly all that is in scope is the prohibition on rate deaveraging.  If that is what you were getting at, I agree.  But I don't agree that we are not talking necessarily about student discounts.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1409              MR. KOCH:  I think, Mr. Krause, you agree that the basic point you were trying to make was that differential pricing is common in markets characterized by competition, but the examples that you provide of differential pricing, the examples you provide in paragraph 19 such as student discounts, seniors discounts, men's versus women's rates for hair cuts and new customer discounts, these all relate to the demand conditions and not the presence of an additional competitor or not in a specific geographic area.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1410              MR. KRAUSE:  The examples that are listed in paragraph 19 are definitely demand side characteristics.  Third degree price discrimination tends to focus on your customer base and being able to segment a particular market based on an observable characteristic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1411              MR. KOCH:  At paragraph 21, you make the point that even in the case of a monopoly supplier or in a perfect competition, price discrimination is common and can lead to an increase in total surplus and, thus, benefit the economy.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1412              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1413              MR. KOCH:  And you fairly state that the one general condition required for this to occur is that total input must increase.  Correct?  Or total output, is it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1414              MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, total output, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1415              MR. KOCH:  Total output.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1416              If an ILEC is permitted to de‑average in order to meet competition, this means that a customer might purchase service from the ILEC rather than an competitor at a lower price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1417              MR. KRAUSE:  Can you restate?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1418              MR. KOCH:  One of your contentions or your arguments for removing the prohibition is that you want the flexibility as an ILEC to offer a low price where a competitor ‑‑ maybe the same price, I'm not suggesting a lower price ‑‑ where a competitor has entered.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1419              You want to be able to meet competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1420              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1421              MR. KRAUSE:  I will let the marketing people on this panel discuss that aspect, but being able to differentiate prices certainly allows you to compete where there are competitors, but it also allows you to meet the particular demand requirements that certain consumers want.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1422              MR. KOCH:  But your piece, in fairness, is replete with references to being able to compete, what the effects on competition will be if you are not permitted to de‑average.  I mean, you make an allegation of inefficient entry.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1423              What we are really talking about is your ability to lower your prices in areas ‑‑ which you say you should have the flexibility to do ‑‑ where a competitor has entered.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1424              Is that not correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1425              MR. KRAUSE:  I think you have to take some of our statements in context.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1426              If you refer back to the paragraph that you wanted us to look at earlier on, which was paragraph 301 of Telecom Decision 2005‑27, the concern there was related to unjust discrimination with respect to consumers and the other concern was what the deaveraging proposal would have on the effect in competition.  So our report focused on both the consumer side and both on the competition side.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1427              MR. KOCH:  In terms of the competition side my proposal was quite simple:  If an ILEC is permitted to de‑average in order to meet competition, this means that a customer might purchase service from the ILEC rather than the competitor.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1428              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1429              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.  I thought you said that the person would purchase from the ILEC and not from a lower cost competitor.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1430              MR. KOCH:  I am going to your contention that a general required for a benefit to the economy in imperfect competition is that output would increase.  If the ILEC were to drop its price to meet competition and get the business of the consumer rather than the competitor, that would not result in total output increasing, would it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1431              MR. KRAUSE:  In that particular circumstance it would not allow output to increase.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1432              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1433              In your report you state that the prohibition on further rate deaveraging can decrease economic efficiency within a market in three ways.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1434              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1435              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1436              MR. KOCH:  One way you cite is the risk of inefficient entry.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1437              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1438              MR. KRAUSE:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1439              MR. KOCH:  In Appendix 1 to your evidence, entitled "Competitive Landscape", you have provided a detailed description of what The Companies perceive to be the existing and emerging competitive landscape.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1440              Is that not correct, Mr. Bibic?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1441              MR. BIBIC:  It is a general overview, yes, of the competitive landscape.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1442              MR. KOCH:  It is your contention, is it not, that the competitive landscape reflects intense competition and aggressive competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1443              Does it not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1444              MR. BIBIC:  Clearly it does, in our submission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1445              MR. KOCH:  That is a landscape The Companies claim to have emerged while the prohibition against deaveraging has in fact been in place.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1446              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1447              MR. BIBIC:  The rule has been in place for quite some time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1448              MR. KOCH:  All right.  In the context of that rule you have described what you characterize as an aggressive competitive landscape.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1449              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1450              MR. BIBIC:  Could you repeat the question, please?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1451              MR. KOCH:  You have described a very aggressive competitive landscape according to The Companies' view of the world.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1452              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1453              MR. BIBIC:  Yes.  But our report, as you know, doesn't attribute ‑‑ doesn't speak about causes and effects, certainly as it relates to the prohibition on rate deaveraging.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1454              MR. KOCH:  No.  But the prohibition on rate deaveraging has not prevented that landscape that you described.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1455              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1456              MR. BIBIC:  I would disagree with that.  In my opinion ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1457              MR. KOCH:  Well, does the landscape exist?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1458              MR. BIBIC:  In my opinion, I actually believe that the prohibition on rate deaveraging has blunted the competitive vigour with which incumbents can respond to the aggressive competition, some of which is summarized in Appendix 1 of our submission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1459              So in that respect, I disagree with you, but clearly I agree that Appendix 1 describes a vigorously competitive landscape.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1460              MR. KOCH:  You say it could be better, but it is what it is.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1461              There is not one mention in that appendix of inefficient entry, is there?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1462              I reviewed it and I didn't see one mention of inefficient entry.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1463              MR. BIBIC:  I can't recall, but I certainly wouldn't dispute that.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1464              MR. KOCH:  As you told the Commissioners earlier, you sought in your evidence to put in your evidence all of the important information for the Commission to support your proposals.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1465              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1466              MR. BIBIC:  We did our best.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1467              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1468              Another concern that is cited, Mr. Krause and Mr. Hariton, in your report regarding the prohibition against deaveraging is that mark‑ups over incremental costs are especially important in an industry characterized by high fixed costs.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1469              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1470              MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1471              MR. KOCH:  The Companies have not introduced any evidence regarding their inability to recover their fixed costs, have they?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1472              It is quite a straightforward question, Mr. Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1473              MR. HARITON:  It is a straightforward question.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1474              We have not introduced evidence on the ability to recover fixed costs in the future.  We have shown that in the past.  In the future we have shown that because of line losses productivity is going to be under pressure and as a result fixed and common costs are going to be harder to recover and we do see ‑‑ at least I understand Bell sees that this is going to be a problem going forward.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1475              MR. KOCH:  All right.  But in the past under this prohibition against rate deaveraging, there has been no problem in recovering your fixed costs.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1476              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1477              MR. HARITON:  In the past there has not been.  In the past of course we have had significant market power.  That has disappeared.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1478              MR. KOCH:  That too is perhaps for another day, Mr. Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1479              MR. HARITON:  Fair enough.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1480              MR. KOCH:  The third way you contend that the prohibition against deaveraging can lead to inefficiency is you state that:

"This may decrease the incentive on the incumbents to lower their price and meet competition in specific market segments, given the large revenue losses that will occur elsewhere."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1481              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1482              MR. HARITON:  That is correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1483              MR. KOCH:  As pointed out by the Commission in the excerpt from Decision 2005‑27 that I read to you, the prohibition does not actually prevent the ILEC from lowering its price to meet competition where it faces it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1484              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1485              MR. HARITON:  It does not, as long as the price is lowered throughout a rate band.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1486              MR. KOCH:  That's right.  That's right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1487              MR. HARITON:  So that does prevent lowering prices for smaller market segments.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1488              MR. KOCH:  Well, you posit that it may be too costly to lower prices across the board and therefore it might be profit maximizing for the incumbent to retain its higher price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1489              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1490              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1491              MR. KOCH:  All right.  So under this scenario competitors will perhaps make greater market share gains where they enter than otherwise would be the case?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1492              MR. HARITON:  Yes, that is correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1493              MR. KOCH:  On the other hand, if it is less costly to lower prices across the board then to lose market share in the more competitive market, then the result will be that customers in all areas within the rate band would receive service from the incumbent at a lower price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1494              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1495              MR. HARITON:  Or the incumbent might ‑‑ here this is subject to an obligation to serve ‑‑ decide not to serve certain areas rather than lower price to those areas.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1496              MR. KOCH:  But subject to that what we are going to see is that people across the board will get lower prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1497              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1498              MR. HARITON:  The service would still have to be profitable, including contribution to fixed and overhead costs ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1499              MR. KOCH:  Right.  Right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1500              MR. HARITON:  ‑‑ at the lower price, otherwise some action will have to be taken, whether it is to cut back on the market served or whether it is to, if it's possible, pull out of the service all together, I don't know.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1501              MR. KOCH:  But we are dealing with one rate band.  We are not across the rate band.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1502              MR. HARITON:  Yes, we are dealing with one rate band.  The difficulty is that if you have fixed incumbent costs and you drop your prices to marginal cost to meet your competitor, it may be that your business in that band is no longer viable.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1503              MR. KOCH:  So two possible results if the prohibition is continued, you have agreed with me, is that either everyone gets service for less, subject to the concerns that you have raised, and Mr. Hariton, or in fact competitors gain ground.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1504              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1505              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.  And customers who are still served by the incumbent would still pay the higher price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1506              MR. KOCH:  Let's look at what would happen if the prohibition were in fact discontinued, as you recommend, and the incumbent were allowed to de‑average.  One of the effects is the incumbent would be able to meet competition in the more competitive market by lowering its price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1507              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1508              MR. HARITON:  That is correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1509              MR. KOCH:  But at the same time, with the rule against deaveraging gone, there would be nothing stopping the incumbent from raising prices in other markets where it faces little or no competition in order to pay for the revenue that it would lose in the competitive markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1510              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1511              MR. HARITON:  No, I don't agree with that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1512              In places where the incumbent does not face sufficient competitive forces, I understand that the prices would stay capped or regulated in some form and that therefore there would be the usual constraints on price increases.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1513              So in fact you do have the constraints in the places where competition is not strong enough to control prices.  That would be regulatory.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1514              MR. KOCH:  So regulation would be relied upon to constrain.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1515              MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1516              MR. KOCH:  At page 14 of your report you caution against protecting competitive firms.  At the bottom of that page I think your quote is:

"The preoccupation with fairness to competitors has sometimes been at the expense of efficiency and productivity."


LISTNUM 1 \l 1517              MR. HARITON:  I'm sorry, this is paragraph 14?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1518              MR. KOCH:  Paragraph 49.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1519              MR. HARITON:  Paragraph 49; sorry.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1520              MR. KOCH:  At the foot of page 14.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1521              MR. HARITON:  Yes, I have it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1522              MR. KOCH:  Where do you get this suggestion that the Commission's prohibition against deaveraging is aimed at protecting competitor firms or with the preoccupation of fairness to competitors?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1523              What do you rely upon for those types of statements, Mr. Krause and Mr. Hariton?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1524              MR. HARITON:  My impression comes from reading a number of decisions, including the second price cap decision which spoke of a balance between three different stakeholders: the incumbents, the competitors and the customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1525              Also from the decision which you were kind enough to hand out to us, which is 2005‑27, at paragraph 300, where the Commission said:


"Here the existing rules do not permit an ILEC to target small geographic areas within a rate band for this practice could deter entry into the local market where ILECs continue to be the dominant service provider."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1526              MR. KOCH:  Do you interpret that as a preoccupation of fairness to competitors as opposed to a preoccupation of the Commission to actually ensure that competition is not deterred and that customers not be subject to the ILEC's continued dominance?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1527              MR. HARITON:  I have combined that with the previous statement of fairness to competitors, which was one of the three objectives of the second price cap plan to say that what we are looking at is fair competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1528              While I see entry here, there is no further description of entry.  The word I would have wanted to see was "efficient" entry.  If the word "efficient" entry had been here, I would have been at peace.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1529              MR. KOCH:  So because you are not happy that the word "efficient" is left out of this formulation, you have chosen to characterize the Commission as preoccupied with fairness to competitors rather than interested in the interests of customers and the rates that they pay ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1530              MR. HARITON:  No.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1531              MR. KOCH:  ‑‑ and the pace of competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1532              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1533              MR. HARITON:  No, I disagree, Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1534              As I say, I go back to the principles enunciated in the objectives for the second price cap régime.  I don't have it in front of me, but I believe one of those was balancing the interests of the stakeholders, which were explicitly the incumbents, the competitors and customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1535              MR. KOCH:  So a three‑way balancing of interests of those stakeholders you characterize as a preoccupation with fairness to competitors.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1536              MR. HARITON:  Not an exclusive.  That was one of the three ‑‑ one of five objectives.  But that is certainly one of them, and to that extent it does seem to have been on the Commission's mind.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1537              The other thing which perhaps I should ‑‑ well, let's leave it at that for now.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1538              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1539              Mr. Chairman, I am in your hands.  I was about to move to a new area.  I don't know what time you were anticipating for the morning break.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1540              I am happy to continue.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1541              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Mr. Koch, I will take you up on your suggestion.  We will commence at a quarter to 11:00.

‑‑‑ Upon recessing at 1025 / Suspension à 1025

‑‑‑ Upon resuming at 1044 / Reprise à 1044

LISTNUM 1 \l 1542              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Mr. Koch, please proceed.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1543              MR. KOCH:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1544              I would like to turn now to another element of your proposal, which is the proposal to uncap.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1545              A major new element of your proposal is to uncap services in areas where there is a competitor present.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1546              MR. BIBIC:  That's correct.  I just would add that it is a particular type of competitor, a facilities‑based competitor.  So, for example, an access independent over‑the‑top provider being present in a particular area wouldn't qualify for uncapping.  Therefore, in that sense it's a conservative test in our view.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1547              MR. KOCH:  We will get into some of the details of the test in a moment, Mr. Bibic.  Thanks for that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1548              You refer to this as the competitive presence test.  Correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1549              MR. BIBIC:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1550              MR. KOCH:  As I understand your proposal, your test for a competitive presence is met, as you say, if there is a facilities‑based competitor in an exchange?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1551              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1552              MR. KOCH:  Clearly, you include within that concept a competitor operating entirely on its own transmission facilities?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1553              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.  So, for example, Vidéotron operating on its cable platform, Rogers operating on its cable platform, Cogeco and Shaw would be the most obvious ones.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1554              MR. KOCH:  And you also include within that concept a competitor that relies heavily on unbundled network elements, including local loops.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1555              MR. BIBIC:  I am not sure why you added the word "heavily," but we do rely on competitors who rely on unbundled local loops.  So, on the residential side, for example, the former Call‑Net, now Rogers Telecom, would be one.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1556              MR. KOCH:  You also include within the concept a competitor offering service via fixed wireless.  Is that correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1557              MR. BIBIC:  I believe that's correct, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1558              MR. KOCH:  But not mobile wireless?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1559              MR. BIBIC:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1560              MR. KOCH:  In terms of just fixed wireless, whether they are offering service within an exchange, what part of the radio equipment would be in the exchange for you to consider that they are offering service in the exchange?  Could it be that we have a fixed wireless network where the network is primarily in one exchange but the radio extends to, for example, a building on the border of the next exchange?  Would that building to which the core network extends be considered to then bring that other exchange within the competitive presence test?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1561              MR. ROWE:   Mr. Koch, it is really about where the customer is that is the key element of our proposal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1562              MR. KOCH:  In that example the answer would be yes?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1563              MR. ROWE:  Yes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1564              MR. KOCH:  In terms of the extent of facilities or extent of presence of a competitor in an exchange to meet your test, I take it, as I understand your proposal, if we took the first example of a facilities‑based competitor operating on their own network, if for example their network extended to even one building in an adjacent exchange, that adjacent exchange, for the purpose of your test, would meet the competitive presence test.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1565              MR. BIBIC:  I don't think that's correct.  We are talking about particular individual exchanges, so I am not sure where the adjacent exchange comes in to our test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1566              If, in the exchange under question, there is a facilities‑based competitor operating there with its own end‑to‑end facilities, then under our proposal, that service, in this case for example it might be residential local service offered by a cable company in that exchange, then our residential service in that exchange would become uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1567              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Sorry to interrupt, could we get the noise problem straightened out at the back of the room?  Some people at the back are being distracted by some noise that is coming possibly out of the interpreters' booth or possibly somewhere else.  Could we please have somebody look after that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1568              Sorry, Mr. Koch.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1569              MR. KOCH:  My understanding, though, if you had a competitor, for example, a wire line competitor operating in the business market and wanted to extend its network to one building within an exchange, let's say it's a building at the border of the exchange, that exchange in which that building is located under your test would meet the competitive presence.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1570              Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1571              MR. BIBIC:  For the purposes of the service in question.  So if it were a business prime exchange service, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1572              If it were an intra‑exchange private line service, yes.  But the adjacent exchange wouldn't be uncapped unless that competitor or another competitor were in that exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1573              MR. KOCH:  Right.  Forgive me, that was my error in confusing the issue of adjacent exchanges.  I was trying to describe a likely physical situation or a possible physical situation where a competitor is in an exchange and then also extends its facilities to another exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1574              I am talking about local exchange services for purposes of these questions, Mr. Bibic.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1575              So, if it served just one building in an exchange, then that exchange would qualify for the competitive presence test for that service.  You have provided us with that information.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1576              Can you clarify, as well, I take it, then, that would be irrespective of how many customers it had in that building?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1577              MR. BIBIC:  Let me go through the elements of the test.  It's fairly important.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1578              In your example, business primary exchange service of the incumbent would be uncapped in an exchange if the facilities‑based competitor were in that exchange offering service to customers in that exchange ‑‑ in your example, the customer is in a building ‑‑ and actually had at least one customer in the exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1579              Now, the services would be uncapped throughout the exchange on the basis that once a competitor has made a decision to enter an exchange, we have seen that in most cases the networks of the competitors actually extend throughout all or most of an exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1580              In the case of competitors who rely on unbundled loops, if they are co‑located in a wire centre, every business served by that wire centre in your example becomes addressable for that competitor.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1581              That is the rationale behind our test and the three specific elements of the test:  The presence of the facility, offering of service and the securing of at least one customer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1582              MR. KOCH:  So one customer in one building in an exchange, whether that is probable or not, would qualify that exchange for uncapping.  Correct?  I think that is consistent with your answer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1583              MR. BIBIC:  In theory and on paper, yes.  The reality is that companies or competitors don't enter to secure but one customer.  So we do have to kind of take a look at the real world when you consider these things, but on principle or on paper in theory, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1584              MR. KOCH:  At paragraph 86 of your evidence ‑‑ I don't think we need to go there ‑‑ you state that where such alternative facilities are present, market forces are sufficient to constrain prices and consistent with objective 3, regulatory prescriptions are not needed in addition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1585              That is basically the rationale for the uncapping test.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1586              MR. BIBIC:  The rationale is a little bit more detailed than that.  I mean, you have reached the end point okay, but essentially what we are saying is if you look at the demand conditions, customers have a choice, have exhibited a choice under our test.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1587              In fact, in terms of business primary exchange services, the Commission has clearly ruled that competitor business primary exchange services are in the same market as those of the incumbents.  Barriers to entry are low or gone if the competitors have entered.  So we have gone through a demand side analysis, as is typical in these cases under competition theory or even in decision 94‑19, there is evidence on the record of that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1588              What we said is once you have looked at the demand side conditions, have satisfied yourselves that they are met ‑‑ and I am not going through all the detail because I know you don't want me to, but I will kind of skip over it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1589              MR. KOCH:  You are right about that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1590              MR. BIBIC:  Right.  Once you have gone through the demand side conditions, what is left to examine is whether or not supply conditions are met and the entry of a facilities‑based competitor indicates that the supply side conditions have been met and, hence, we propose that there should be uncapping.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1591              We are not proposing forbearance here, just uncapping.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1592              MR. KOCH:  It is interesting you refer to the demand conditions.  You are saying that your rationale includes some assumptions regarding the demand conditions, but there is no element of the test that addresses demand conditions.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1593              You haven't, for example, proposed a market share threshold or anything like that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1594              MR. BIBIC:  I wouldn't jump to the end point.  We are making no assumptions about the presence of demand conditions.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1595              We have gone through the analytical framework customarily used in examinations like this, whether or not they be in competition law or under the Commission's framework in 94‑19 and other decisions, and we have put evidence on the record that, for example, take business primary exchange services, as I said, the Commission decided in decision 2006‑15 that the business primary exchange services offered by competitors are in the same market.  So that is one key factor.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1596              The other key factor is on the residential side, for example, when a cable company enters an exchange, it is offering a service that again is in the same market.  If it enters another exchange, it is entering with the same product.  So, we are making no assumptions when the cable companies, for example, are rolling across exchanges, they are offering services that are in the market, and when customers buy their services, and they are buying them in droves, especially on the residential side, and we already have a lot of evidence on the business side, just take a look at the monitoring report, that indicates that demand conditions are there, customers have choice, customers are exercising their choices.  So there are no assumptions; there is evidence.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1597              What is left, in our view, in order to trigger an uncapping decision, is the satisfaction that there is actually a facilities‑based competitor that is there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1598              MR. KOCH:  My question, though, was very simple, which was the test is based on a supply condition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1599              MR. BIBIC:  Correct.  When you have gone through the analytical framework, at the end of it, the bright line test is a supply condition test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1600              MR. KOCH:  Thank you.  The objective 3 that you reference at paragraph 86 where you say:

"Since market forces are sufficient to constrain prices, consistent with objective 3, regulatory prescriptions are not needed in addition."  (As read)


LISTNUM 1 \l 1601              The objective 3 that you reference is your objective that regulation be efficient and proportional.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1602              MR. BIBIC:  I believe objective 3 says that ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1603              MR. KOCH:  I would be happy for you to look at it if you wanted to.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1604              MR. BIBIC:  Objective 3 says where regulation is necessary, it should be efficient in proportion to its purpose and should interfere with market forces to the minimal extent possible.  You forgot the last part there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1605              MR. KOCH:  But in terms of the efficiency, you point out that the ILEC information regarding where competitors have entered remains imperfect.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1606              MR. BIBIC:  Could you repeat that?  I apologize, I didn't ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1607              MR. KOCH:  The ILECs don't have the information to be able to indicate to the Commission precisely ‑‑ I mean, you can do it on a general basis ‑‑ but precisely in which exchanges there may be a competitive presence?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1608              MR. BIBIC:  As I sit here today, I can't, but we have proposed a manner in which the Commission could go about collecting that data.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1609              In fact there are two proposals on the table.  There is the Bell proposal, which would have the competitors continue to fill out a form that is filled out by all telecom service providers, I believe, and filed quarterly with the Commission.  On the business side it would need to be amended slightly.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1610              Then through those quarterly filings, the Commission could determine where the facilities‑based competitors are present.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1611              Telus has a slightly different variation of a proposal which is it would be up to the incumbent to come forward and say, look, we have evidence that a competitor has entered a particular exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1612              Mechanically, that is how it would be done, one or the other or another mechanism that we might develop or the Commission might develop as a result of this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1613              MR. KOCH:  So either more information has to be provided by competitors, and presumably then that information would have to be in some way communicated to the ILEC.  Correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1614              MR. BIBIC:  That is not entirely correct that more information would have to be provided.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1615              On the residential side, the form that is filed already could be ‑‑ the existing form, I think it is form 213, although I am not an expert in these filings ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1616              MR. KOCH:  I don't know the number of the form either.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1617              MR. BIBIC:  Competitors already file this form 213, which would indicate where they are present in the exchange.  So that would cover the residential side.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1618              On the business side, the form would have to be modified slightly simply to indicate is the competitor providing a business primary exchange service, a digital service, an IX intra‑exchange private line service.  Other than that, simply taking the information that the business competitors already file with the Commission, but disaggregating it a little bit, that is all that would need to be done under our proposal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1619              MR. KOCH:  Under Telus' proposal you explained it would be almost a reverse onus?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1620              MR. BIBIC:  That is my understanding, but of course you will have an opportunity to ask them what their proposal is.  But I believe it involves the ILECs saying, look, I know from being in the market that the competitors have entered the exchange and here is some information to establish that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1621              MR. KOCH:  In the event that your proposal were to reign or be accepted, then there would be some information regarding services that competitors are offering that would have to be communicated to the ILEC.  Correct?  In order to make it work, for you to know where you are uncapped, you would have to know, would you not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1622              MR. BIBIC:  I think we would just do it exactly ‑‑ I imagine we could do exactly the way we do it with the IXPL, interexchange private line, forbearance system where information is filed by competitors.  The Commission reviews it and says: pay on this interexchange private line where there is a competitor and we, therefore, declare that that private line, interexchange private line rules this forborne.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1623              In this case, we would ‑‑ the decision would simply be facilities based competitors present in this exchange as a result so the particular service offered in that exchange becomes uncapped.  It would be the same thing.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1624              MR. KOCH:  Okay, but in that sentence, there is some information which is the particular service being offered in that exchange.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1625              MR. BIBIC:  Correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1626              MR. KOCH:  That would be new information provided as a result of competitors filing information to the ILECS.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1627              MR. BIBIC:  It's not new information.  It's information the Commission already collects.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1628              I have a sense we're having a debate over a point that we don't need to debate.  Perhaps I am not understanding the question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1629              MR. KOCH:  Well, this would be information that you say you don't have.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1630              MR. BIBIC:  Well, we could collect it ourselves like the way Telus is proposing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1631              MR. KOCH:  Okay, but you don't know precisely in which exchange, which services are being offered by competitors.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1632              MR. BIBIC:  In fact, we have a very good sense of where our competitors are from just operating in the marketplace, but for the purposes of the mechanics of our test, we have decided to develop a proposal where the Commission would satisfy itself that the competitor is present.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1633              MR. KOCH:  Right.  But it then has to communicate to you what service the competitor is provided, otherwise you don't know which service is uncapped.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1634              MR. BIBIC:  Well, the Commission has to rule that the service becomes uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1635              MR. KOCH:  Right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1636              MR. BIBIC:  We know where the competitors are, clearly, but the Commission would have to rule.  It's a price cap mechanism after all.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1637              MR. KOCH:  We are going around in circles, so I'll make it easier on everyone listening to us and move on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1638              Now, I take it the bottom line rationale and I know I have a tendency to go to the bottom line and you like to go up from the bottom line, is that your position is whoever market forces are sufficient to protect consumers or customers, all prices will be uncapped.  And that's, if you like, at paragraph 71 of your evidence.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1639              I don't know that we have to go there, but that's the core or rationale, is it not, that your proposal was that under your competitive presence test, market forces are sufficient to protect consumers.  Correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1640              MR. BIBIC:  The last sentence you've expressed is correct.  The previous one that went it's not "all services".  It's the services that are the subject of competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1641              MR. KOCH:  Right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1642              MR. BIBIC:  That would be uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1643              MR. KOCH:  Right.  Now, you are familiar, I expect you're well familiar, Mr. Bibic, with the test for forbearance set out in the Telecommunications Act?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1644              MR. BIBIC:  I am.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1645              MR. KOCH:  Okay.  And you're aware that under Section 34.2 the Commission is required to forbear where a service or class of services is subject to, and the language is:  "Competition sufficient to protect the interests of users."?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1646              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1647              MR. KOCH:  Okay.  Remarkably similar to your uncapping test of, or rationale, that market forces are sufficient to protect customers.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1648              MR. BIBIC:  We do believe that in areas where there are facilities based competitors, market forces are sufficient to discipline prices.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1649              MR. KOCH:  So, essentially the claim you make for the competitive presence test is the same as that under Section 34 of the Act.  Would you not agree with me?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1650              MR. BIBIC:  I am not here to debate forbearance of regulated services nor to turn this into a review in application for the local forbearance decision.  I am here to advocate Bell's position with respect to the price cab proposal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1651              So, I actually disagree that Section 34 has anything to do with this.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1652              MR. KOCH:  You will agree with me that your proposed ‑‑ well, I think you've already agreed with me that it's ‑‑ the test itself measures supply conditions and it's irrelevant to the functioning of your test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1653              In fact, how many consumers must maybe taking a particular service from a competitor in an exchange.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1654              There could be one as you explained, or there could be 300,000?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1655              MR. BIBIC:  The test as expressed in streamline form doesn't have a particular number of competitors ‑‑ of customers, excuse me.  However, there is evidence on the record which indicates the extent to which competitors both on the business and residential side have secured customers and, in some cases, hundreds of thousands customers.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1656              There is also some statistics in the Commission September 1st Decision of this year with respect to VOIP, which indicates how many connections there are for the competitors as well as projections going forward in 2007‑2008 for non‑allied VOIP services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1657              So, there is quite a lot of evidence on the record as well as in this document the CRTC reported on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1658              MR. KOCH:  But it doesn't form any part of your test?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1659              MR. BIBIC:  No.  I disagree.  It formed part of the analytical framework which lead us to proposing the test which measures or identifies the last element, which is the supply condition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1660              So, we have gone over that before, but I don't agree that it doesn't ‑‑ it completely ignores the demand side.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1661              MR. KOCH:  And certainly the test is inconsistent and I know your position that you're not here to debate forbearance, but I suggest that your test looks a lot like forbearance.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1662              The test of just whether there is a competitive presence is very different from the criteria for forbearance that the Commission established for local services in the Decision 2006‑15  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1663              MR. BIBIC:  Well, obviously, the test that we're proposing for uncapping is not the same as the test laid down by the Commission for forbearance, but the two tests, in our view, can clearly coexist together.  You know these are ‑‑ it's a different inquiry, different rules and different consequences.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1664              So for example, actually if I can borrow kind of the way it's expressed in my other competitor's submission Telus, they describe the kind of the view that there ought to be a seamless transition from full regulation to full deregulation or forbearance if you will, and in between a relaxation of the regulatory prescriptions as competition clearly is taking hold and exerting its competitive vigour.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1665              And it's in that respect that I firmly believe that the two tests can live together.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1666              So, for example, take the product market on, with our test today, all we are examining are products offered.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1667              The only thing that qualifies our services offered by facilities based competitors whereas in the local forbearance examination can take into account services offered by all competitors, including voice over IP over the top providers as well as potentially, although I don't know wireless services ‑‑  that's the subject of a separate Commission inquiry ‑‑ on a geographic side our test today has a smaller geographic area, which is the exchange, whereas the local forbearance geographic areas, the local forbearance region over which we have to lose 25 per cent, much harder to do.  So, there is a transition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1668              In terms of the threshold, all you need is one competitor for cross and exchange for uncapping whereas for local forbearance you need to lose 25 per cent share loss.  Harder to do and hence, kind of a gradual seamless transition from full regulation to forbearance and that the end result, the end result is clearly different.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1669              With forbearance, you meet the harder test, you have forbearance under our proposal.  All that's done is you lift the uncapping rules, you still have tariff approval, you still have a quality of service regime, you still have promotions rules, you still have win back rules, you still have an amputation test, you still have rules on destandardization and withdrawal.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1670              So, it's a different inquiry, different consequences and the two tests can coexist, in our view.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1671              MR. KOCH:  I certainly agree with you that there are many different aspects to the test and one of the different aspects is that your test focuses on the exchange level rather than the forbearance test which focuses on a different geographic entity.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1672              You're aware that one of the concerns the Commission had with respect to the exchange level and the forbearance context, and I don't want to engage in a circular debate with you over whether or not this is forbearance or it's not, but was that using an exchange is likely more prone to anti competitive behaviour by the ILEC.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1673              You are familiar with that, are you not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1674              MR. BIBIC:  You're referring to the local forbearance decision?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1675              MR. KOCH:  Yes.  We can go to the paragraph that ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1676              MR. BIBIC:  Bo.  It's okay.  We are submitting that geographic market would be a more appropriate market certainly although perhaps not exclusively, in our view.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1677              But, certainly for price cab purposes, I happen to disagree with the view that one should define markets as a consequence of fears about anti competitive behaviour and targeting.  That's not the purpose of a geographic market definition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1678              First you start with defining a proper market, both on the product and geographic side and then you assess the state of competition which might include the potential for anti‑competitive behaviour.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1679              As far as targeting goes, I don't think that there is any ‑‑ if I can borrow from economic theory or competition law theory, there is nothing inherently anti‑competitive at all in targeting in the sense of matching, at least matching your competitor's price in a particular area.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1680              So I guess it's a way to say that I don't agree with the geographic market analysis and local forbearance, but again I'm not here to debate that because that is for another day and that decision has been made.  What we are proposing is that the exchange is an appropriate market for uncapping purposes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1681              MR. KOCH:  So you disagree with what the Commission said about the propriety of using a local exchange, but you acknowledge it did have that concern in the forbearance context and indeed in this case you are proposing to use exactly that geographic market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1682              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1683              MR. BIBIC:  Keep in mind, Mr. Koch, that again it is very important to recognize that it is a different inquiry.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1684              Putting aside my views on the appropriateness of the geographic market definition in local forbearance, the result of the examination is quite different.  In a local forbearance examination what you are looking at is removal of the rules, including removal of the imputation test requirements.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1685              I'm not so sure how you get to that same concern in a price cap hearing where under our proposal the imputation test requirements remain and so there is not going to be a potential for pricing below cost in an anti‑competitive manner.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1686              So we are not proposing it.  It's out of scope.  The fact is, whether or not we are capped or uncapped, the imputation test rules remain, whereas in the forbearance analysis those are gone.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1687              MR. KOCH:  I would like to ask you to turn to an interrogator response that you provided to MTS Allstream.  It is the response to MTS Allstream 8 August 06‑6, it's supplemental.  I'm going to ask you to turn to page 3 of 4 of that response.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1688              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Give us the number again, please, Mr. Koch?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1689              MR. KOCH:  It is 6, MTS Allstream‑6 asked to The Companies, supplemental response.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 1690              MR. KOCH:  I want to make sure you have that, Mr. Bibic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1691              On page 3 of 4 you were asked to provide an estimate of the overall revenues of your companies that would in effect be uncapped under your proposal.  So if the competitive test that you are proposing to the Commission were to be implemented, what percentage of The Companies ‑‑ or of the revenues for the relevant services would in fact be uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1692              Is that correct?  That is your understanding of the question?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1693              MR. BIBIC:  Yes, that is my understanding of the answer to that question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1694              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1695              MR. BIBIC:  It doesn't include SaskTel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1696              MR. KOCH:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1697              MR. BIBIC:  It is focused on Ontario, Québec and the Atlantic provinces.  That is generally across residential and business primary exchange services and they are our estimates of course.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1698              MR. KOCH:  All right.  They are estimates, as you pointed out.  You don't have perfect certainty regarding the presence of competitors, but you are pretty confident that you know to what extent they have made inroads.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1699              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1700              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1701              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1702              MR. BIBIC:  I stand by these numbers, as far as estimates go certainly.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1703              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1704              And what this shows, so that we are all on the same page, is that if your test were accepted, then in Ontario and Québec ‑‑ let's deal with Bell Canada firstly ‑‑ 83 percent of the relevant residential PES revenues would be uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1705              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1706              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct, with one small qualification.  I think that 83 percent number would include Bell Canada and the Ontario and Québec exchanges that are now part of Bell Aliant.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1707              MR. KOCH:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1708              In the case of business PES we are looking at 85 percent of the revenues would be uncapped if your proposal were accepted?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1709              MR. BIBIC:  That's correct.  I mean, I don't find it surprising if you compare Ontario and Québec with the Atlantic provinces for example, certainly there has been significant competitive entry in Ontario and Québec, not everywhere, but in a large part of Ontario and Québec, and there has been very vigourous entry in the Atlantic provinces, but not throughout all of the Atlantic provinces, so you see the differences between the 83 percent and the 54 percent between Ontario and Québec and the Atlantic provinces on the other hand isn't surprising.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1710              So yes ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1711              MR. KOCH:  You are anticipating where my surprise lies.  It doesn't lie in the difference between Ontario and Québec and Atlantic Canada.  I am suggesting to you that in Ontario and Québec the effect of your proposal is that a very high percentage, 85 percent in the example of business PES, would all of a sudden become uncapped if your proposal were accepted by the Commission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1712              You have already given me your answer that you ‑‑


LISTNUM 1 \l 1713              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct, and all of the other rules would remain in place, Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1714              MR. KOCH:  ‑‑ you stand behind the numbers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1715              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1716              Now, if we combined your proposal for rate deaveraging and uncapping in exchanges where there is a competitive presence, you would achieve significant price inflexibility, would you not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1717              MR. BIBIC:  In areas that are uncapped we certainly would have an appropriate degree of pricing flexibility in order to respond to competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1718              MR. KOCH:  All right.  You would have ‑‑ well, my question was:  You don't agree with me that it would be significant if you were both able to de‑average across exchanges within a rate band and have that extent of your revenues uncapped?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1719              MR. BIBIC:  Sure, it would be significant.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1720              MR. KOCH:  Presumably it is significant, otherwise it's not worth coming here and making the proposal to the Commission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1721              I mean, first ‑‑


LISTNUM 1 \l 1722              MR. BIBIC:  I agreed that it was significant, important.  I wouldn't agree with the last part.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1723              MR. KOCH:  You would be able to price differently for the same services in two exchanges within the same rate band.  That much is accomplished by the deaveraging proposal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1724              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1725              MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1726              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1727              As we discussed earlier, you would be able to, if necessary, drop your prices in an exchange where a competitor was making inroads into your market share.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1728              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1729              MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Koch, the ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1730              MR. KOCH:  To meet.  To meet.  I'm just talking about meeting competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1731              MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Koch, going back to the previous question, I know based on the evidence on the record, as well as it was debated in the local forbearance hearing, our competitors price differently in different exchanges and different provinces, and they price according to customer needs, demands, wants, customer demographics.  We heard Cogeco talk about that.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1732              So, yes, we are asking for the flexibility to do the same to respond to our competition where we see it where there is competition in the form of facilities‑based competition, so it is conservative in that sense.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1733              MR. KOCH:  Two things are going on here.  One is, your answer with respect regarding what competitors do is not responsive to my question, but the other thing that is happening is you are again jumping ahead.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1734              I have just been asking you about the deaveraging proposal and saying:  In the case of your deaveraging proposal, if accepted ‑‑ and that doesn't hinge on the competitive presence test ‑‑ you would be able to price differently in different exchanges throughout the same rate band, and you could lower your prices to meet competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1735              You have told me, in fairness, why you might want to do that, but I'm just asking you to confirm that that would be the effect of your deaveraging proposal.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1736              MR. BIBIC:  Yes, I will confirm that subject to respecting all the other rules that remain in place, including, which we went over before, the win‑back rule, the promotions rules and the imputation test.  But subject to that, yes, we could do that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1737              MR. KOCH:  And you would not be required to drop your prices in order to, for example, in a particular city you would ‑‑ in order to drop your prices in that city you would not be required, if we got rid of the prohibition on rate deaveraging, to similarly drop your prices where competition had not made inroads.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1738              Is that correct?  That is the whole flexibility you are seeking, to be able to ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1739              MR. BIBIC:  Well, what do you mean by where competition has not taken hold?  Are you referring to areas that don't pass the competitive networks test?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1740              MR. KOCH:  I am not going yet to the competitive test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1741              MR. BIBIC:  So I'm not sure I agree with your premise though, so let's talk a little bit about it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1742              MR. KOCH:  Let's take it a step back and just say you could drop your prices to meet competition in one geographic area and there would be no requirement on you to drop them in another geographic area within the same rate band.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1743              Is that correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1744              MR. BIBIC:  Correct, there wouldn't be a requirement.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1745              For example, if we had a rate band and we lower our price in one area of the rate in order to meet that particular competitor, we may not be lowering the price at all or to same extent in another area of the rate band, depending on what the competitor or what the competitive dynamics are in that other area, but the baseline from which we start, Mr. Koch, are rates which we have already established for us are amongst the lowest in the world, have been approved by the Commission, and are just and reasonable, frankly by definition, because they have been approved.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1746              So yes, we would have that flexibility and it is all within the context of a continued regulation under the Telecom Act because we are not talking about forbearance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1747              MR. KOCH:  Not only would you not be required to drop your rate in another geographic area, but in fact under your proposal where there is a competitive presence, if there is a competitive presence in a second geographic area, your rate in that area would not be subject to a price cap.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1748              Is that correct?  You have told me all the other regulatory rules that you would still be subject to, but it would not be subject to a price cap.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1749              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1750              MR. BIBIC:  Correct.  They will be subject to two things.  It would be subject to, one, customer demand, needs or wants.  We should be focusing a little bit on the customer here too and not just competitors.  And it would be subject to what is going on competitively in the marketplace.  Again, we might have a different competitor in that other area in the rate band so we can't ignore that either.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1751              MR. KOCH:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1752              But there would be no regulatory rule restricting you from raising your price to those other customers?  There would be no price cap remaining?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1753              MR. BIBIC:  We would be uncapped as a result of the entry of a facilities‑based competitor.  If you look at the evidence that the competitors have filed in this proceeding ‑‑ and I could point it out specifically ‑‑ the competitors have indicated in interrogatory that by the time the next price cap regime rolls around the market will be quite competitive and in fact they indicate ‑‑ I think the exact words are "the prices can only go down" or "the trend is down", but I can point you to the exact words if it would be helpful.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1754              So in theory yes, but in practice we see the trend going down and that is what the competitors believe as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1755              So at a certain point in time we take the view that one has to rely on market forces to determine what the appropriate price in any given area will be.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1756              It's not unheard of.  I would point to the U.K. where they recently ‑‑ July of this year ‑‑ completely eliminated the retail price control mechanism they have, despite a finding that British Telecom has significant market power in the fixed narrow band retail services market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1757              So our proposal, in our view, isn't overly dramatic or revolutionary.  It is a reasoned proposal, borrowing from TELUS again, getting us from full regulation to deregulation in a seamless way.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1758              MR. KOCH:  To avoid the practical argument, Mr. Hariton agreed that the constraint on raising prices from ‑‑ other than the market obviously ‑‑ the constraint on raising prices in other exchanges would emanate from the price control.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1759              Is that correct?  Other than market forces, and we can disagree on how strong those market forces are.  The constraint would come otherwise from price controls.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1760              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1761              MR. BIBIC:  No.  The constraint would come from price controls where an area were not uncapped, where an area were to remain ‑‑ if an area were to remain capped because there isn't a facilities‑based competitor, then price controls would remain under our proposal in the form of a constraint on the revenues in the basket as well as the individual rate element constraint, but in areas that are subject to uncapping as a result of the presence of competition, competition will determine the appropriate pricing level and that is quite normal in competitive markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1762              MR. KOCH:  As we have seen from your interrogatory response, those areas where there would be no cap remaining represent roughly 85 percent in the case of business PES and 83 percent in the case of residential PES of Bell's revenues.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1763              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1764              MR. BIBIC:  That is because facilities‑based competitive entry has been widespread throughout Ontario and Québec.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1765              MR. KOCH:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  Those are my questions.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1766              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Thank you, Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1767              Madam la secrétaire...?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1768              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question following up on Mr. Koch's ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1769              THE CHAIRPERSON:  Please do, Commissioner Langford.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1770              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  ‑‑ first question in the second half of this morning.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1771              I just want to be clear on one thing, as this is a logical break time.  I hope I'm not interrupting anyone's flow.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1772              When Mr. Koch began after the break, approximately 45 minutes ago, to talk about this area he got into the area of the exchange and why that was an appropriate area or perhaps wasn't an appropriate area.  There is one question following on that I would like to put to you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1773              Suppose that this facilities‑based entrant which would trigger an uncapping in the exchange as you propose were a cable company, is it your position that the roll‑out of cable infrastructure mirrors precisely the exchanges of incumbent telephone companies, or duplicates, perhaps would be a better word, precisely?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1774              MR. BIBIC:  No.  No, it doesn't duplicate.  It doesn't overlap in its entirety, but what we found when we did the analysis, especially when we were here last year at this time we had done the analysis, and we found a couple of things.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1775              One, the cable companies do tend to enter on an exchange basis and they declare themselves as entering on an exchange basis and when they do enter we found that more or less, with some exceptions, they tend to cover large parts if not all of our exchanges.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1776              I would point out that to the extent that there is a mismatch between the cable network or platform and the incumbent platform in an exchange that would even magnify to a significant degree when you talk about areas larger, like the local forbearance region or the LIRs, where you not only have one potential competitor across that wide geographic swath but you can have multiple areas with much larger mismatch than across an exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1777              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  But without getting into forbearance ‑‑ I take it your position is we are not talking forbearance this morning so let's not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1778              Let me posit this example and perhaps you can give me a response to it.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1779              Let's assume we have two exchanges, we will call them "A" and "B", and they are in an urban setting.  You of course as the incumbent are in both.  They are your exchanges.  Let's assume we have Cable Co., which is heavily, perhaps ubiquitously in exchange "A" , but only slightly, for some reason, in "B".

LISTNUM 1 \l 1780              Would this test of yours apply to "B" as well as "A"?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1781              MR. BIBIC:  Our test would apply to both "A" and "B" and prices would be uncapped in both "A" and "B".  And the reason ‑‑ and I see where you are going, is that there is a larger swath or portion of "B" that doesn't have the cable competitor.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1782              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  That's right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1783              MR. BIBIC:  We would nevertheless propose that "B" be uncapped, because to the extent that the incumbent were to try to raise prices for example in "B", that would simply induce competitor entry.  Now, we might not have a situation where the cable company suddenly expands its network, but they could come in through unbundled loops.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1784              Rogers Telecom certainly does that in areas where they don't have a cable network, so any pricing action in the form of increased prices would induce entry and that is kind of the analytical framework that for example the Competition Bureau would use to analyze market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1785              As well, we can't forget that there would be a competitive choice most likely in an urban area from over‑the‑top VoIP providers because I would imagine since there are exchange there is therefore a broadband connection and so customers could subscribe to broadband and get an over‑the‑top VoIP provider.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1786              Wireless would be an option.  Again, I know that is being examined in the sense of is it in the same market, but wireless services would also be available since it is an urban market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1787              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  But the fact of the matter is that until this fictitious cable company has the time and the money to roll‑out its network through "B" under this scenario a good deal of the customers in "B" could be unprotected, at least for a while.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1788              MR. BIBIC:  Yes, in terms of fictitious Cable Co., as you put it, yes, but in actual fact, as I said earlier, with some exceptions we found that cable cos tend to cover most of our exchanges.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1789              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  You will recall in the forbearance proceeding that TELUS made a proposal which would have matched the infrastructure of cable companies as the forbearance test, the geographic forbearance test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1790              Yours doesn't do that here today.  It doesn't really match the cable company infrastructure, assuming that is what we are dealing with, as you made this particular application to uncap.  It doesn't match it as all.  What it does is match by exchange.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1791              If you want perfect fairness and a comfort level among the regulators that those residences that are not passed by the cableco would not find themselves paying higher prices in an uncapped world, why wouldn't you have just twigged this slightly and matched TELUS' earlier test rather than use the exchange test?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1792              MR. BIBIC:  I guess I will answer it with three ways or three points.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1793              The first is our exchange proposal comes from the fact ‑‑ and I apologize for repeating myself, but again they mostly cover exchanges.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1794              Two, in terms of providers who use unbundled loops once they collocate in wire centres in the exchange, they pretty much covered the entire addressable base that we have.  So there is a perfect match there.  That is point one.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1795              The second point ‑‑ in fact, I only have two.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1796              The second point is that we also factored in kind of administrative complexity of managing this.  At the end of the day what you are really looking at is uncapping the incumbent's prices.  So we thought it was more appropriate to look at it from the perspective of the incumbent's network.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1797              So the examination is on the prices of the incumbent that will be uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1798              If you did it by way of the cable company network, you are doing two things.  One is you start to have to define services and price uncapping by virtue of where the cable company is, not where we are when it is our prices that are being uncapped.  And you are ignoring the fact that there are other types of facilities‑based competitors out there, which are the unbundled loop providers as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1799              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  I am not really ignoring it.  I am just narrowing my examples down.  I am cognizant of the facts of the world.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1800              Isn't there something strange about this proposal overall?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1801              You make a proposal which says in essence there is competition in an exchange, even if it isn't throughout the whole exchange.  It is facilities‑based.  And to meet this competition we may have to lower prices.  So give us the ability to raise prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1802              I don't understand that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1803              Why is uncapping the answer to a competitive equation?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1804              MR. BIBIC:  The answer to a competitive equation, in my submission, Commissioner Langford, would be that we should rely on market forces and having regulatory rules for the sake of having regulatory rules wouldn't be I submit the most efficient or appropriate way to regulate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1805              So it stems from a view, a firmly held view, that if competitive market forces are in place, then we should rely on market forces, and we don't need the regulatory rules in place any more.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1806              Keep in mind that in areas that don't meet the test, we are certainly not advocating the removal of any of these rules.  This is what is done in other places, so it is not ‑‑ it is a good proposal, a well‑balanced proposal, but it has a basis in what has happened elsewhere as well.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1807              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  I understand that argument if you are asking for forbearance, because then you would be able to go up and down at will.  But if you are asking for uncapping as a way to meet competitive entry and competitive pressures, that seems to me to be asking for the wrong tool to remedy the wrong problem.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1808              I just don't get it.  I don't understand fundamentally why this would be the solution.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1809              I understand your desire to de‑average.  That is very clear.  But here you are saying we have competitive entry.  We may only have it because it is on an exchange basis.  It may not be a pure match.  So give us the right to raise prices at will.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1810              You can see why we might be just a little uncomfortable about those residential subscribers outside the pure match; why we might be more comfortable with the TELUS forbearance geographic test where you have to match it to the backbone of the competitor.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1811              So I don't understand it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1812              If you were saying to us look, give us the right to lower prices where there is a facilities‑based backbone that matches ours, whether or not we would agree with it, it would seem to me to make some logical sense in a competitive world.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1813              But you are saying give us the right to raise prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1814              I'm afraid when I combine that with the idea that the match of infrastructures may not be exact, I'm a bit confused as to what your proposal is all about.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1815              MR. BIBIC:  I never indicated that prices wouldn't go up, sir.  I indicated simply that we should rely on market forces.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1816              Your colleagues, for example, at Ofcom in the U.K. have grappled with the very same issue and they balanced ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1817              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  You have said that ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1818              MR. BIBIC:  It is important to answering your question, Mr. Langford.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1819              What they have balanced is concerns about significant market power on the one hand with concerns about having overbearing regulation on the other hand ‑‑ and those are their words; they are not mine ‑‑ which stifles the development of competition and innovation ‑‑ their words again, not mine.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1820              It comes down to a fundamental examination of how one should regulate where market forces are present.  That is why we are suggesting as we move from full regulation ‑‑ well, you have heard me ‑‑ as we move from full regulation to deregulation we should have a transitionary step.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1821              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  I appreciate the background and the instruction on what is going on elsewhere, but I must say I remain slightly confused.  But there will be other opportunities.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1822              Just one last question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1823              Mr. Koch was kind of putting together near the end deaveraging and this competitive presence, uncapping element, these two elements.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1824              Is this an all or nothing application or is it severable?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1825              If were to say, for example, without in any way tipping anyone's hand ‑‑ I haven't got the power to tip any hand.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1826              If we were to say hypothetically okay, we will give you your competitive presence in the exchange but we are not giving you deaveraging, would your application fall because it's all of the piece?  Or is it severable?  Can you live with part and not all?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1827              MR. BIBIC:  We have put together a proposal which we feel kind of hangs together quite well and is coherent.  It is for the Commission to decide what portions to accept.  I would hope that you accept all of it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1828              The Commission has certainly been known to accept none of our proposals or some of our proposals.  We make our best case and we put it in your hands, and we hope that you agree with us for the most part.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1829              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  So it is severable, is what you are saying.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1830              MR. BIBIC:  I can't answer that, Commissioner Langford, without a more detailed understanding of where you might go.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1831              So you are balancing on capping with deaveraging.  But what happens, for example, to:  Is it the exchange that is being accepted?  Would our proposal on the type of competitor that qualifies be accepted?  What about the X factor?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1832              It is more complicated than simply answering one or the other.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1833              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  Let me put it very specifically, because I don't want to go outside of where Mr. Koch took us.  There will be other witnesses.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1834              When you discussed with Mr. Koch the notion of deaveraging working with this test on an exchange‑by‑exchange basis, is it your position that you have to have both those elements to this application?  Or could in fact you function with one or the other but not both?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1835              MR. BIBIC:  Being a mere regulatory lawyer, I think I would probably have to ask that of people like Messrs. Cope and Sabia.  As I sit here today, I would have a hard time right now telling you which one is more important of the two ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1836              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  I'm not asking which one is more important.  Sorry to interrupt.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1837              I just want to know whether you could operate with one but not the other.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1838              MR. BIBIC:  It would be possible to operate with one and not the other, or vice versa.  We could have deaveraging without uncapping.  We could have uncapping without deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1839              The Commission could decide that and we would operate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1840              So if it wasn't a question of ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1841              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  No, no, I wasn't looking for preference.  I am simply wondering whether they were severable in that way.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1842              I know you don't desire them to be, but operationally you could do it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1843              MR. BIBIC:  I apologize for not understanding your question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1844              I believe they are operationally severable.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1845              COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  And I assure you if you didn't understand my question, the fault lies probably not at your table.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1846              Thank you very much.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1847              Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1848              THE SECRETARY:  Thank you, Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1849              I would like to invite Counsel Dunbar and Counsel Engelhart, a representative of Québecor Media, Cogeco Cable Canada, Rogers Communications and Shaw Communications, referred to as "The Competitors", to come forward, please.

CROSS‑EXAMINATION / CONTRE‑INTERROGATOIRE

LISTNUM 1 \l 1850              MR. ENGELHART:  Thank you, Mr. Chair.  I am Ken Engelhart, on behalf of The Competitors.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1851              To my left is David McKeown, and to my right is David Watt, who will be assisting me.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1852              Good morning, Mr. Bibic, Dr. Hariton and panel.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1853              The last question by Commissioner Langford was perhaps a good segue into my first question, because I want to understand operationally how it would work to have rate deaveraging but not forbearance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1854              As I understand it, you want to be able to charge different prices in different exchanges in the same band, and indeed to charge different prices to different people in the same exchange, but I want to know operationally, technically, mechanically, how that would work when you are not forborne, when you still have a tariff filing requirement.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1855              Because a tariff is a piece of paper that has a price on it, but you have a regime where you can charge everybody different prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1856              Can you explain operationally how that would work?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1857              MR. BIBIC:  I take it, when you say operationally, that you mean in the context of demonstrating compliance with tariffing rules and price cap constraints, not that Bell Canada is going to have to figure out a way to bill its customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1858              Which one?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1859              MR. ENGELHART:  The former.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1860              MR. BIBIC:  The combination of our proposal as well as answers to interrogatories addresses many elements of that question, Mr. Engelhart, and it gets very complicated.  I am by no means a compliance expert, but at a high level what we would be doing is filing tariffs with ranges, and there would be two types of ranges ‑‑ and these are proposals we have made in the context of the Rate Range Public Notice, which you are undoubtedly familiar with.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1861              So there would be a confidential rate range ‑‑ and imagine that it is $10 to $30.  That would be the confidential rate range, $10 being the minimum and $30 being the maximum.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1862              Only Bell Canada or Bell Aliant, SaskTel, would know ‑‑ the Commission and the incumbent would know that the confidential range is $10 to $30.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1863              Within that confidential range we would file a publicly known range, say $15 to $25.  So everyone else, including yourselves, would know that there is a public range, $15 to $25, which is a subset of a broader confidential range, and the incumbent could price anywhere within the $15 to $25 range without running afoul of the tariffing rules, because that would have been approved.  The flexibility would have been given to us to do that.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1864              And at the time of filing our rate range proposal we would have demonstrated that, in all respects, the proposal would have been in compliance with whatever price cap constraints would have been in place at the time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1865              So, at a high level, that's how we would suggest that we mechanize ‑‑ mechanistically, that is how it would work from a price cap point of view.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1866              MR. ENGELHART:  So your proposal for rate deaveraging in this proceeding, in a context where you are not forborne in a given area, is really dependent on the approval of your proposal in the Range of Rates Proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1867              Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1868              MR. BIBIC:  It is dependent on ‑‑ I don't want to tie it expressly to the acceptance of our very specific proposal in the Rate Range Proceeding in all of its respects, but in order to make that flexibility operational, I believe it would be dependent on the flexibility to have ranges.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1869              MR. ENGELHART:  For your VoIP offerings, the Commission has permitted you to have a range of rates, but has stated that at any given point in time there must be a rate.  So it could be anywhere between the lower bound and the upper bound, but there is a single price at any given point in time.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1870              If a range of rates proposal such as that were permitted by the Commission in the Range of Rates Proceeding, that would make your deaveraging proposal a lot more complicated, wouldn't it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1871              MR. BIBIC:  I am not sure what you mean by complicated.  That doesn't, in my view, constitute deaveraging at all.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1872              In the case of Bell Digital Voice Light, there is a range known to Bell and to the Commission, but the prohibition against deaveraging applies to that service.  So whatever the price point is that we choose for that service within the range is the price point in all parallel ‑‑ similar rate bands.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1873              With Bell Digital Voice, there is a slight differentiation ‑‑ well, it's not slight, it is important in the sense that we can de‑average between Ontario and Quebec, but that is not the type of deaveraging that we are suggesting we be given the flexibility to engage in in this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1874              MR. ENGELHART:  What if the Commission said:  As long as you are regulated, as long as you have tariffs, any given customer can only be charged a price that has been identified to us?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1875              If you did that, would it not be necessary to have a range of different tariffs or different prices for different customers, and then you would have to pick one?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1876              I will turn that around and put it into a question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1877              If the Commission made you have an explicit price, before you could charge a customer that price, would you still want to have this deaveraging flexibility, or would it become mechanically or administratively too complex?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1878              MR. BIBIC:  Could you repeat that question?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1879              I'm sorry, Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1880              MR. ENGELHART:  Sure.  If, contrary to your proposal in the Range of Rates Proceeding, the Commission said:  No, you have to identify a price ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1881              Now, that price could be in a smaller area than an exchange.  It could even be in an area as small as a house, but you have to tell us what the price is in any given area, and then charge that price in that area.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1882              If that was the rule that the Commission imposed on you, would you still want deaveraging, or would it become too administratively complex?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1883              MR. BIBIC:  I think that our proposal would be much easier to manage, from a price cap constraints compliance point of view.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1884              If you took it down to the household level, which, at one point, you said in your question, you could literally have millions of tariff filings, and I don't think it is reasonable to expect that we would be filing millions of tariffs, down to the household level, for any particular area.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1885              So the rate ranges would reduce the number of tariff filings that we would have to make, and it still could be done, as I said in my first answer to your first question, in a way that demonstrates compliance with all of the rules, including the imputation test rule and the price cap constraints.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1886              MR. ENGELHART:  Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1887              I want to turn for a moment to your long distance telephone service, by way of an example.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1888              You would agree with me that, for your long distance telephone service, Bell is completely deregulated and not subject to any rule on deaveraging?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1889              MR. BIBIC:  I don't believe we are subject to a rule on deaveraging, but we are not completely deregulated, as you know.  That is why there is a forbearance application that was filed by Bell Canada with respect to removing the basic toll constraints.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1890              MR. ENGELHART:  When I go to your website and I look at your rates for long distance service, I see that you have a number of different plans.  There is a 10 cent a minute plan, there is 5 cent a minute plan, they have different upfront payments, et cetera, but what I don't see on your website is any limitation to any geographic area.  They all seem to be available throughout your operating territory.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1891              Would you agree with me that your long distance plans are available throughout your operating territory?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1892              MR. COLLYER:  Good morning.  There isn't a geographic delimiter, per se, to your question.  Our point of differentiation on our rate plans is basically the regions or countries called, in the case of an international long distance plan, and the rates contained therein.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1893              However, what we do is develop specific plans, which we make available territory‑wide, but they may actually be in response to regional competitors.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1894              MR. ENGELHART:  So they are in response to regional competitors, but they are available territory‑wide?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1895              MR. COLLYER:  That is correct, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1896              MR. ENGELHART:  Similarly, I have been to your website to look up your ExpressVu television service.  Again, would you agree with me that this service is completely deregulated, and you are allowed to charge different rates in different geographic areas for this service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1897              MR. BIBIC:  I believe that's right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1898              MR. ENGELHART:  Again, though, when I look on your website, I see many different packages and options, but would you agree with me that they all seem to be available to all customers across Canada, and that there is no geographic deaveraging for your ExpressVu service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1899              MR. COLLYER:  There isn't geographic de‑average, per se.  Certainly what we do is, for the Quebec market we have specific programming packages that obviously speak to the language and cultural needs of the Quebec market, and New Brunswick, and areas of high francophonie.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1900              MR. ENGELHART:  But those services, at those rates, would be available for a francophone customer in Saskatoon, as well, would they not?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1901              MR. COLLYER:  That is correct, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1902              MR. ENGELHART:  I have also been to your website to look at your high‑speed internet service.  When I looked at that last week, I saw that you charge $20 a month for the first three months, and then $46.95 per month thereafter.  But, again, this rate seemed to be available everywhere where customers can obtain high‑speed DSL service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1903              Would you agree with me that you do not engage in any geographic rate deaveraging for your high‑speed service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1904              MR. COLLYER:  I wouldn't agree with that.  We actually have a specific rate for the Quebec marketplace that is different.  I believe it is $2 cheaper than it is in Ontario.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1905              MR. ENGELHART:  That would apply throughout the entire province?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1906              MR. COLLYER:  That is correct, yes, where we can provide high‑speed service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1907              MR. ENGELHART:  Could you have a look at paragraph 162 of your evidence, please?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1908              In the first sentence you say that differential pricing is widespread in competitive markets, to the point of being ubiquitous.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1909              If differential pricing is ubiquitous in competitive markets, why is it that you don't seem to engage in any sort of geographic differential pricing for your internet, long distance and satellite services, even though you are fully entitled to under the regulatory rules?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1910              MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Engelhart, you are focusing on the geographic deaveraging component, and in each case, in each example, you have asked about the geography, but our competitors in the telecommunications industry engage in differential pricing, including yourselves, including Cogeco.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1911              For example, in Ontario there is a different price than there is in Quebec, and there is flexibility there to price differently in different cities in Ontario.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1912              You know yourself, quite well, from your own company, that if you buy Maclean's magazine, it is $5 or $6 if you buy it at the newsstand, and it can go down to 62 cents if you subscribe for over a year.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1913              Those are forms of deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1914              You can look at what you do on the Rogers' home phone business, where you can get a $60 credit if you are a new customer, which is something that Bell certainly couldn't engage in.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1915              When I negotiate my automobile insurance rates, I can guarantee that I am not paying the same rate as you are paying, or as somebody else who is driving the same car and for the same amount of time as me.  It all depends on the competitor and on my statistics.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1916              It is widespread.  There is a significant amount of deaveraging that we could engage in, but that we cannot as a result of the regulatory rules.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1917              MR. ENGELHART:  You keep saying that, but what I am trying to figure out is why you in fact don't do it for high‑speed and for ExpressVu and for long distance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1918              In fact, as far as I know, we don't say that, for Maclean's magazine, there is a cheaper price for people in Kingston that is not available in Ottawa.  We don't care where you live.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1919              Yes, there is a different newsstand price and there is a different subscription price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1920              You have put your finger on it, Mr. Bibic.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1921              I am trying to figure out, if this rate deaveraging is so ubiquitous, why don't we see it in long distance?  Why don't we see different long distance price discrimination?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1922              Can you tell me where you use your ability to rate de‑average in the long distance market?  How does that manifest itself?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1923              MR. ROWE:  If I might comment on the business segment, rate deaveraging is, in fact, very common, particularly on the medium and large business side, where customers use pricing frameworks, which are published, as a starting point for discussion, and then, clearly, on the basis of their needs, their buying power, et cetera, they negotiate a price point.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1924              I think it is very common in those markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1925              MR. ENGELHART:  Maybe you have a better sales force for your business long distance service than we do, but it seems like all of our customers are hugely concerned that no one else is getting a better deal than them, and they want all sorts of "Most Favoured Customer" clauses, et cetera, put into their contracts.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1926              You don't find that for your business customers?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1927              MR. ROWE:  We find that for some business customers that have a large buying power in the marketplace, but I would comment that that's not all customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1928              MR. ENGELHART:  In the residential space, Mr. Rowe, can you tell me where in your long distance business you take advantage of your ability to rate the average?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1929              MR. ROWE:  Actually, it would be Mr. Collyer that would speak to that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1930              MR. ENGELHART:  Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1931              Mr. Collyer?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1932              MR. COLLYER:  Where we do it is in the variety of plans that we have out in the marketplace.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1933              I believe, currently, that our billing systems have 26 or 27 different rate plans that are loaded up.  Each one of them has different price points, of which the majority of the rating points to ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 1934              For example, we will take domestic.  We have various blocks of time plans, depending on what your needs are as a customer.  The more you buy, the better effective or commuted price point you get.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1935              For those customers who wish to pay as they go, we have various per minute price plans, depending on whether the customer is calling within Bell Ontario or Bell Quebec territory, to the United States, within the rest of Canada, and then, certainly, internationally.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1936              We have a variety of tiers of pricing internationally, depending on how important, particularly, route pricing is.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1937              I would say that is a relevant example.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1938              MR. BIBIC:  The fact of the matter is that our various competitors aren't rolling out across our entire territory in a homogeneous way.  That is the first point.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1939              Individual competitors themselves aren't rolling out their services in a homogeneous way from a pricing point of view.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1940              So deaveraging is more than simply the geographic dimensions.  In the case of Rogers Home Phone, the poor fellow who signed up a year ago may not have got the free phone that you're giving away right now to the new customer.  That is a form of deaveraging and, by the way, I don't think it's unfair that one customer gets a phone and not another.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1941              And who knows?  Maybe there would be a lot more innovation on the pricing point of view, would it not, for the prohibition against deaveraging.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1942              MR. ENGELHART:  Mr. Bibic, if you're patient, I will return to that Rogers customer with the phone, but right now I want to ask Mr. Collyer some more about long distance business.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1943              You've got 26 or 27 different plans.  I don't disagree with the fact that there is a lot of different plans.  Some you pay more upfront and you get a cheaper per minute rate and some you get to call free to Europe and some you get this, that and the other thing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1944              But with those 26 or 27 different plans, are there any of them where you say, well, people in Kingston can have it, but people in Sherbrooke can't have it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1945              MR. COLLYER:  No, we do not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1946              MR. ENGELHART:  Is there any of them where you say, well, Mr McEwen can have it, but Mr. Watt can't have it?

 

LISTNUM 1 \l 1947              MR. COLLYER:  No, we do not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1948              MR. ENGELHART:  They're pretty much available to anybody who wants them.  Aren't they?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1949              MR. COLLYER:  That is correct, yes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1950              MR. ENGELHART:  And similarly, for your ExpressVu satellite service, Mr. Collyer, do you  have any examples where you're using your power to rate the average in that market?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1951              MR. COLLYER:  None come to mind.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1952              MR. ENGELHART:  And how about your high speed internet market.  Can you give me any examples where you use your power to rate the average there?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1953              MR. COLLYER:  Other than the example that I previously mentioned with respect to the differential in price between the Quebec market and the Ontario market, no, I cannot.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1954              MR. ENGELHART:  Now, if you could have a look at paragraph 163 of your evidence, you say there that:

"Uniformed pricing can lead to economic inefficiency in three ways."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1955              In paragraph 163, you state in the third sentence:

"In an industry characterized by high fixed and common costs, mark‑ups of incremental costs are especially important so that all costs may be recovered and so that companies stay financially viable."


LISTNUM 1 \l 1956              You go on to say in the fifth sentence that:

"In the absence of such differential mark‑ups and hence, differential prices, recovering fixed and common costs becomes more difficult and may reduce output from levels that could otherwise be achieved."

LISTNUM 1 \l 1957              Do you think that your long distance service as high fixed and common costs?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1958              MR. HARITON:  I believe so, Mr. Engelhart.  I don't have a custody to hand, but I believe that would be true, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1959              MR. ENGELHART:  Do you believe that your failure to engage in geographic or other rate the averaging for your long distance service has threatened the financial viability of that service because of your inability to recover fixed and common costs?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1960              MR. BIBIC:  I don't know the answer to the question although rates have gone down significantly since competition.  So, there is an indication that, you know, competition doesn't lead to lower prices.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1961              So, I think the financial parameters of that business are certainly much different than they used to be, I suspect.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1962              MR. ENGELHART:  I know that, Mr. Bibic, but what I want to know is why have you not engaged in rate the averaging for your long distance service, given the importance of rate the averaging in recovering fixed and common costs and maintaining your financial viability?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1963              MR. BIBIC:  I don't agree that we haven't engaged in rate the averaging.  We have engaged in rate the averaging in the form of the very narrow way that you've defined it, but clearly there is a different price for different buckets, for different types of calls and to analogize it to ‑‑ it's not on all floors with the local service business.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1964              So, for example, the new customer versus the old customer, that's the averaging.  The averaging across to meet different competitive forces that's the averaging.  It's not simply an issue of saying, well, just because you have 20 price points, but everyone ‑‑ anybody can get anyone of those 20 price points you're not engaging in the averaging and, therefore, you would never do it in a local service business.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1965              MR. ENGELHART:  I think it is.  Let's take your local service example for a moment.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1966              You have a proposal before the Commission right now that you remove the $55.00 installation charge and charge everybody 0.80 $ more.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1967              The Commission will do with that as it does, but assume for a moment that the Commission approves it, assume for a moment that the Commission feels that that's an appropriate proposal, would there be any rule that you are aware of that would prohibit you from saying in a local telephone market every new Bell Telephone customer gets the first three months for $20.00 or $15.00 or $10.00 and thereafter pays the going rate, the current tariff rate?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1968              In other words, is there anything in the rule against the averaging that would prevent you from giving a lower rate for the first three months to all customers in the entire band?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1969              MR. BIBIC:  Of course, the win‑back rule would prevent that specific promotion, Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1970              MR. ENGELHART:  What if you didn't offer them the first three months?  What if you said, look, anybody can come just like really with your high speed service that I found on the internet?


LISTNUM 1 \l 1971              Everybody in band B who, right now, is paying $23.00 a month for telephone service gets their first three months for $18.00 and not only don't you pay the $55.00 box upfront, we're actually going to give you a bit of a break for your first three months, but it applies to everybody in band B.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1972              Is there anything in the rule against rate the averaging that would prohibit that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1973              MR. BIBIC:  I guess this line of questioning shows why you and I aren't marketers, but I don't think that would make much sense, I suspect.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1974              I mean, there is nothing preventing us from saying right now we are going to impose a limited time promotion lowering our price to everybody in band B by $3.00 for the sake of, I suppose, gaining a few new customers, so we would get around the promotion rules which say that promotions can't be designed to win back customers, but I suspect, maybe my colleagues can help me out here, that that wouldn't make much business sense.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1975              MR. ENGELHART:  My problem here, Mr. Bibic, is not as a marketer, but apparently as an advocate because I haven't explained myself very clearly.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1976              My proposal, you referenced a Rogers offer that gives a cheaper rate for new customers.  I, for referenced a Bell Sympatico high speed offer that gives a cheaper rate for new customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1977              The way both of those services work, as I understand it, is not everybody in band B, just brand new customers in band B, folks that are taking up Bell service, either because they didn't have a phone before or because they had somebody else's phone before, they now want to take your phone and just like with your ExpressVu service and just like with the Rogers service that you referred to, these new customers get a cheaper rate for three months and then, they pay the same rate that everyone else paid.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1978              Would there be anything in the rule against the averaging that would prevent you from offering that to everyone in band B?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1979              MR. BIBIC:  It could be done so long as it wasn't perceived or if the Commission was convinced that the promotion didn't involve an attempt to win back customers, then, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1980              But if it were deemed as a way to entice only new customers in an effort to violate the win‑back rules, then I believe under the promotions restrictions that couldn't be done.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1981              So, it's possible, but not guaranteed.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1982              MR. ENGELHART:  And if it wasn't a time limited offer, but in fact, a permanent change to your tariff at least until such time as your tariff was changed, would you agree with me that the promotions rules wouldn't be involved at all?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1983              MR. BIBIC:  That's correct, although competitive dynamics would certainly be involved and we would have to factor in.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1984              Mr. Rowe and Collyer can help me out here, but we would have to factor in the different competitors who we face in the different cities that all happen to be, for example, in Band B and what they are doing in their respective territories.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1985              Mr. Engelhart, you are looking at me quizzically.  We all know that Vidéotron's pricing in Band B in Québec is not the same as Rogers pricing in Band B in Ontario.  So we have to factor obviously not only regulatory rules in our marketing decisions, but the competitive environment.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1986              MR. ENGELHART:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1987              You have mentioned that Cogeco has different prices in Québec and Ontario; you have mentioned that Vidéotron has different prices in Québec than Rogers has in Ontario.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1988              Can you tell me what your competitors are doing by way of rate deaveraging that would not be cured by you have a rule that said you have to charge the same rate throughout a band in each province.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1989              Can you tell me, if that was the rule, what your competitors are doing today that would be something that you couldn't respond to.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1990              MR. BIBIC:  In other words, is your question saying:  If Bell were allowed to have different prices ‑‑ so the prices would have to be the same in Band B in Ontario, but not necessarily the same as the pricing for Band B in Québec, however the pricing for Band B in Québec would have to be the same.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1991              Is that what you are suggesting?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1992              MR. ENGELHART:  Yes, just like with Bell Digital Voice.  If that was the deaveraging rule that you had, what is it your competitors are doing today that you couldn't do?

LISTNUM 1 \l 1993              MR. BIBIC:  I can't predict where competitors will go in pricing innovation and service innovation.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1994              MR. ENGELHART:  That's why I said today.


LISTNUM 1 \l 1995              MR. BIBIC:  Well, I don't know.  I just don't know if Cogeco, for example, is pricing differently in Ontario ‑‑ I know it is pricing differently in Ontario and and Québec in some cases.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1996              I don't know if it's pricing differently within Ontario, but I do remember the representative from Cogeco indicating in a line of questioning from Chairman French that they do take into account demographics and customer demands on a market‑by‑market basis, and I believe Monsieur Despatie of Vidéotron said that at one point, too.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1997              So I, as I sit here today, don't know what my competitors are going to do.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1998              You are asking me to agree with you that regulatory rules could be put in place that give us more flexibility.  True.  I don't know if it is sufficient flexibility to respond to market forces.

LISTNUM 1 \l 1999              MR. ENGELHART:  Well, it just seems that you go around saying that it is so ubiquitous, all this rate deaveraging is ubiquitous, everybody does it.  It reminds me of my kids, you know, everyone else has a TV in their room, but then you start calling the other parents up and it turns out to be one other student.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11000             Where is all this rate deaveraging in our industry?  You have made a fair point that there are some provincial differences, but where is all this rate deaveraging?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11001             At Rogers, we tend to charge everybody the same price for Maclean's Magazine or for our local phone service, certainly within a province.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11002             So tell me what your competitors are doing out there by way of local telephone rate deaveraging today.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11003             I agree with you the future is unclear, but I'm not getting all these examples of people rate deaveraging in the businesses that we are talking about.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11004             MR. BIBIC:  I guess we have a different understanding of what "rate deaveraging" means.  All the activities that Rogers engages in where they have special promotions, albeit for a limited time I suppose, for new customers is rate deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11005             MR. ENGELHART:  Well, could you file a tariff saying ever new Bell customer for local phone service gets a VTech phone?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11006             MR. BIBIC:  That might be perceived as a win‑back offer and violate the promotions rules.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11007             MR. ENGELHART:  But it's not win‑back if it's every new customer.  The guy might be moving here from California, he might have never had a phone before and figured it was time to take the plunge.  So wouldn't you agree with me that as long as you charge that same price throughout all of Band B, that price being free VTech phone for any new customer, you could file that tariff.  That doesn't violate the rule against deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11008             MR. BIBIC:  One of the restrictions in Decision 2005‑25, which is the revised promotions decision, is that the offer must be generally available ‑‑ so yes on that count ‑‑ but cannot be limited to win‑back.  So it all depends on the Commission's perception of whether or not offering VTech phones to new customers would be tantamount to a win‑back offer, given that new customers, in most of the cases I suspect, would be coming from somewhere else.  Sure, they may be coming from outside the territory, but in many cases they will be coming from your company.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11009             MR. ENGELHART:  Well, I am really not talking about win‑back promotions, but to make this quicker let's accept that there may be a problem with the win‑back rules in the VTech phone scenario, there may be a problem in the promotions rules with the VTech phone scenario, but as you pointed out to Mr. Koch, you haven't come here to argue about those rules, you have come here to argue about the rule against deaveraging.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11010             So would you agree with me that there is nothing in the rule against deaveraging that prevents you from making the VTech phone offer to all new customers?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11011             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Engelhart, I know I'm not here to argue about things that aren't in our scope, but how can I possibly answer your question about what we can and can't do in isolation without taking into account what we really can and can't do given the overall regulatory framework.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11012             Is the rule that is preventing me from doing what you are suggesting we could do the deaveraging rule per se, the prohibition against deaveraging per se ‑‑ no ‑‑ but taken into tally the combination of the two and the potential violation of the win‑back restriction and the promotions rules would prevent us from engaging in the type of promotion you are putting to me, as well as the fact that there is actual competitive reality that the marketing people have to respond to.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11013             It is not all about regulatory, we do have to put promotions or pricing offers through the regulatory machine as well, but it is not just about that.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11014             MR. ENGELHART:  No, but Rogers doesn't say you can only get the VTech phone if you have blue eyes and blonde hair.  We don't say you can only get the VTech phone if you live on the sunny side of the street.  Everybody can get the VTech phone when they sign up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11015             So as long as you are willing to do that too, would you agree with me that the rule against rate deaveraging is not an impediment?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11016             MR. BIBIC:  Neither you nor I know where marketing offers will go and it may be that is how the market develops.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11017             Now, when Rogers offers Rogers Home Phone using its own facilities as opposed to the Rogers Telecom business it is facing one primary competitor, being Bell, as well as all the other competitors that we both face, like wireless operators and Voice over IP operators.  On the other hand, Bell Canada, across its entire territory faces a number of competitors, not all of whom have homogeneous product offerings in terms of pricing structure.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11018             MR. ENGELHART:  Let me ask you again a bit about your ExpressVu satellite service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11019             Would you agree with me that there is high fixed and common costs for that service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11020             MR. COLLYER:  Yes, we would.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11021             MR. ENGELHART:  Do you think that your failure to engage in rate deaveraging for your ExpressVu satellite service has threatened the financial viability of that service because of your inability to recover fixed and common costs?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11022             MR. BIBIC:  I don't know.  I don't know.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11023             MR. ENGELHART:  Why have you not engaged in rate deaveraging for your ExpressVu satellite service, given the importance of rate deaveraging in recovering your fixed and common costs and maintaining your financial viability?

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11024             MR. BIBIC:  Would you repeat the question, Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11025             MR. ENGELHART:  Why have you not engaged in rate deaveraging for your ExpressVu satellite service given its importance in recovering your fixed and common costs and maintaining your financial viability?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11026             MR. BIBIC:  I don't know.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11027             MR. ENGELHART:  Do you think that your Sympatico high speed service has high fixed and common costs?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11028             MR. BIBIC:  I suspect they do.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11029             MR. ENGELHART:  Do you believe that your failure to engage in geographic rate deaveraging, or any rate deaveraging, for your Sympatico high speed service has threatened the financial viability of that service because of your inability to recover fixed and common costs?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11030             MR. BIBIC:  I believe Mr. Collyer indicated that we do engage in geographic rate deaveraging for Sympatico services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11031             MR. ENGELHART:  $2.00 different in Quebec, quite so.  Is that what has saved the financial viability of that service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11032             MR. BIBIC:  That was a response to the competitive dynamic in Quebec.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11033             MR. ENGELHART:  For your local phone service, you actually can have four different rate bands: Band A, Band B, Band C and Band D.  In fact, if you get to the outer reaches of the provinces, there is E, F and G.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11034             You don't do anything like that with your Sympatico high speed service.  Why has that not made it difficult for you to recover fixed and common costs and to maintain your financial viability for Sympatico high speed service?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11035             MR. BIBIC:  I suspect that primarily the pricing for Sympatico service is that ExpressVu services are being driven by the competitive marketplace, and that is what is determining how those prices are set.  There is no restriction, deaveraging, win‑back promotions or otherwise.  So there is the flexibility there to do what is necessary to respond to the competitive marketplace.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11036             I don't think that the notion of differential pricing is that radical.  It does occur quite often without in most industries or any industry, I suspect, these types of rules.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11037             MR. ENGELHART:  You keep saying that but you can't really give me any examples.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11038             MR. BIBIC:  I gave you examples with Cogeco.  I gave you a Rogers example.  We have a Sympatico example.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11039             There are other examples even in Ottawa where different competitors are charging different prices: in the movie theatre business.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11040             MR. ENGELHART:  But in your competitive businesses, other than one $2.00 difference in Quebec for Sympatico, you don't really charge different prices in your operating territory.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11041             Isn't it starting to look like, contrary to your evidence about the ubiqitousness of rate deaveraging, that what we are really seeing is that in competitive markets there is very little rate deaveraging and that where you want to do rate deaveraging it is where you have market power?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11042             Isn't that where this evidence is starting to add up?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11043             MR. HARITON:  Perhaps I could help out a little bit, Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11044             The thing that is special about local service is that costs vary an awful lot by location, much more so than for services like long distance.  For long distance the costs are roughly the same in one location and another.  You get to a Class 4 switch, or whatever they are called these days, and off you go.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11045             In the local and access market, what you will have is within the same exchange you will have large cost differences according to whether you are close to the central office or far, whether it is a dense or lightly populated area, and so on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11046             So there the potential of price averaging to hurt you is a lot higher than it is in say a long distance market.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11047             That said, what you see in the long distance market, from what I can see, is a lot of price deaveraging through volume discounts and other plans.  In our jargon, that is second degree price discrimination.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11048             You are talking about third degree, of course.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11049             Second degree price discrimination works when you take a large quantity of some service or other, like long distance.  In a market like the local market, what you are taking is you are taking one line.  You either take it or you don't take it, and as a result second degree price discrimination is not really feasible.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11050             What you would have to do is third degree price discrimination, which is differentiated between customers based on their characteristics.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11051             I just want to make ‑‑ well, let me stop there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11052             MR. ENGELHART:  Mr. Hariton, don't the longer loops affect the costs of your Sympatico high speed service too?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11053             Dr. Hariton; sorry.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11054             MR. HARITON:  No, Mr. Hariton is correct because I don't want to mislead anybody.  My Ph.D. is in mathematics, not economics.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11055             The answer to your question is, as I understand it ‑‑ sorry?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11056             THE CHAIRPERSON:  As your former employer, I remind you it's in statistics, not in mathematics.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11057             MR. HARITON:  Much as I hate to correct you, Mr. Chairman, I believe you are mistaken.

‑‑‑ Laughter / Rires

LISTNUM 1 \l 11058             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  But it sounds like a new deaveraging way of giving your kind of Ph.D. references.  If it's on subject, you have one; if it isn't on subject, you don't.  I like it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11059             MR. HARITON:  Since I got a law degree, Mr. Langford, I try to be formal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11060             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  You try to conform?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11061             MR. HARITON:  To be formal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11062             I'm sorry about that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11063             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  You can come gowned tomorrow.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11064             MR. HARITON:  Back to your question, Mr. Engelhart, my understanding is that the loop itself is not included in the price or the cost of DSL service.  It is included in the price and cost of the basic service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11065             I know there is a few dry loops out there somewhere.  I gather there is very few of them.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11066             The vast bulk of DSL installations, what you see is a loop and the cost of the loop which has been covered through the charge.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11067             I stand to be corrected by my friend Mr. Collyer if that is not true.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11068             MR. ENGELHART:  Are we really dumb at Rogers?  We have really some customers that are miles and miles away from the central office and some that are right next door.  So they apparently have wildly different costs for local phone service.  We don't have a rule against deaveraging and yet we cheerfully charge everybody the same price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11069             Are we making a colossal blunder?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11070             MR. HARITON:  I hesitate to advise you and your marketing people, for whom I have the greatest of respect, Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11071             But it is possible ‑‑ I put it forward as a hypothesis ‑‑ that you are using Bell prices as an umbrella, and what you are doing is you are using them as a guide to where you should be going.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11072             If that is what you are doing ‑‑ and I'm not saying that is what you are doing.  But if that is what you are doing, the very fact that Bell has put in uniform prices would, in your shoes, lead me to put in uniform prices too, at the appropriate price point.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11073             After all, if my competitors' prices are there and I'm trying to enter the market, that is what I'm aiming at.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11074             That said, I think that the telephone industry has a hundred‑year history of price averaging and that, as a result, perhaps the various people in it are not attuned completely to the need for market segmentation.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11075             So I think it is helpful to look outside of the industry to see where industries that have been deregulated for a long time have wound up and how much price deaveraging we see there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11076             I think that if you look at things like railways or airlines or most other industries in our economy, that would probably be a more pertinent set of examples.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11077             MR. ENGELHART:  Unfortunately, the only examples I am really familiar with are the communications industry.  That is why I keep trying to come back to that industry, to the businesses that you are in and we are in.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11078             You are saying, Mr. Hariton, that the reason why you don't see any rate deaveraging or very little rate deaveraging in ExpressVu, long distance and high speed is because the costs of those services don't differ from person to person.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11079             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11080             MR. HARITON:  I can't speak to high speed and ExpressVu.  Let me speak to long distance where I was involved some years ago, as you know.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11081             My point is that there is a lot of deaveraging in long distance.  Volume discounts abound.  If you are not on the plan you are paying something in the order of 30 cents a minute.  If you are on a plan, you can be anywhere between 10 and 5 cents, and I believe there are customers who may well be lower with the baskets that are out there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11082             That is not dictated by cost.  That is dictated by demand conditions.  That is reflecting the fact that the price sensitivity of demand varies.  And what people are doing, both the incumbents and the competitors are pricing differently to different market segments.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11083             Now, in that case, they are allowing the market segments to self‑identify, self‑select by putting out a range of options and letting them select.  That is second degree price discrimination and that is the way that, in the long distance business, we all are able to recover our fixed costs.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11084             MR. ENGELHART:  But, Mr. Hariton, my problem is there is nothing in the rule against rate deaveraging that would prevent that.  If you wanted to say all local telephone customers in band B that sign up for a ten‑year deal get a cheaper rate, or all local telephone customers in band B that buy five lines get a volume discount, would you agree with me that there is nothing in the rule against rate deaveraging to prevent that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11085             MR. HARITON:  I am not aware of anything in the rule today to prevent that.  However ‑‑ and this is where I come back ‑‑ it may be that the way to segment the local market is different from the way to segment the long distance market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11086             The market segmentation that makes the most sense for one product may not be the market segmentation that makes the most sense for another product.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11087             MR. ENGELHART:  Mr. Chair, I don't know if the plan was to break at 12:30 or 1:00.  I can keep charging along or we can break now.  I'm in your hands.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11088             THE CHAIRPERSON:  I think it's a good idea we will meet again at 2:00 o'clock.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11089             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  Mr. Chairman, could I ask Mr. Hariton one very short follow‑up question?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11090             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Is it by qualification, sir?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11091             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  By 2:00 o'clock we are going to have lost the moment.  With your permission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11092             I am just referring to your application, to Bell's application at paragraph 85.  I just want to clarify something.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11093             You said earlier and then you said just a few minutes ago to Mr. Engelhart that there was a difference between things like long distance and local service because the costs for local and access marketing vary an awful lot.  Both times you said that, you pointed to different lengths of local loops.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11094             I just want to point to a sentence in paragraph 85 just to make sure there isn't a contradiction.  I am sure there isn't, but it is not clear to me.  It is about the middle of 85.  I will read the lead‑up sentence to it too.  You say:


"That is, once the competitor has co‑located in a central office, its access footprint extends to virtually all the residential and business customers served by that wire centre.  In the case of a facilities‑based provider, once it has built its own network, the marginal cost to providing service to premises passed by its network is negligible."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 11095             Does that sentence contradict what you said to Mr. Engelhart just moments ago about the varying costs to provide local and access based on the length of loops?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11096             MR. HARITON:  There are two aspects to the sentence that we should keep in mind.  One is that it says that once the network has been built.  The loop of course is into networks.  So that in fact the cost of the loop and, therefore, the difference in cost of the loop has already been built into the cost once we get to the stage of the analysis, if I may say so.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11097             I think the other thing is that ‑‑ I have to be careful ‑‑ the marginal cost of providing service to premises I suspect means that that would be capital costs and, again, I suspect that means relative because, as far as I am concerned, once you are there with your network, you are there, but it may well be that you have to do work on the customer premise.  In the case of a cable company, in particular, I have in mind the power sources and the batteries that have to be supplied, which I am sure are highly expensive.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11098             Does that help at all, Mr. Langford?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11099             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  Just one follow‑up.  I am just trying to differentiate between a network, kind of the basis of a network and perhaps the local loop part of a network.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11100             Let me posit Bell or Rogers building into a new suburb or even an existing one, but for some reason nobody is there.  You build into a suburb, you go from telephone post to telephone post, but you don't necessarily, in this competitive world, then run loops to each of the houses.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11101             Would that bear at all on the type of answer you gave to Mr. Engelhart?  I shouldn't say loops, but drops perhaps is the proper word.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11102             MR. HARITON:  I will turn it over to Mr. Collyer in a second.  I just wanted to say that when we talk about network, we do mean the network all the way to the house.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11103             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  Right to the house.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11104             MR. HARITON:  In our case it would include a drop wire.  In the case of a cable company, it would include the actual cable, whether it be coax.  I don't know if you have fibre, but presumably coax going into the house itself.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11105             So, the network doesn't mean the core network.  It would include the access network in the jargon of the business.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11106             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  That sentence in 85 included everything?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11107             MR. HARITON:  It would include the access network, not just the core network.  I see the reason why this may not have been clear.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11108             Mr. Collyer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11109             MR. COLLYER:   I was just going to confirm what you were going to say.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11110             COMMISSIONER LANGFORD:  Thank you for that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11111             THE CHAIRPERSON:  All right, 2:15.

‑‑‑ Upon recessing at 1236 / Suspension à 1236

‑‑‑ Upon resuming at 1413 / Reprise à 1413

LISTNUM 1 \l 11112             LE PRÉSIDENT:  Madame la secrétaire.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11113             THE SECRETARY:  We will pursue with Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11114             MR. ENGELHART:  Thank you.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11115             MR. COLLYER:  Mr. Chairman, before we continue with Mr. Engelhart, with your permission, what I would like to do is set some points for the record this morning with respect to my answers because they were incomplete.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11116             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Yes, go ahead.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11117             MR. COLLYER:  Thank you, Mr. Chair.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11118             Specific to deaveraging, we had a bit of a regroup over the lunch period, and we talked specifically to your question, Mr. Engelhart, with respect to deaveraging on our ExpressVu, Sympatico and Mobility lines of business, and also to LD.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11119             I can report back to you that we indeed do de‑average on those product lines to all of all non‑regulated products, specific to the market conditions of the regions in which they are serving.  In particular, we have a retention or save queue that is offering escalated discounts based on customer vulnerability, the number of lines of business held of the four that I mentioned, individual products held within those business lines, the value‑added services that the customer actually has there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11120             In addition, we will provide further discount based on contract length and offer specific exclusive savings plans in that situation.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11121             Further to that, on the inverse, we have again acquisition offers that again are provided for in terms of vulnerability of the customer, has escalated scales of discounts, actually three levels, dependent on whether or not the customer wishes to come back on contract or non‑contract, the number of lines of business held.  The discount can be a percentage discount, a lump sum discount.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11122             Further to that, in talking with my colleagues from Bell Alliant, both Bell Alliant and Bell Canada offer target offers specific to the MDU or multi‑dwelling unit marketplace to ExpressVu and Sympatico that would be de‑averaged from the mass offers that you might see available on Bell.ca.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11123             Finally, our colleagues at Bell Alliant do inform me that we have several examples of student offers in the market particular for Internet services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11124             I just wanted to complete my answer.  Thank you, Mr. Chair.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11125             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Thank you, Mr. Collyer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11126             MR. ENGELHART:  Thank you, Mr. Collyer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11127             Let me follow up with you on a few of those.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11128             One of the things you mentioned was a contract length discount.  Would you agree with me that the rule against deaveraging does not prevent you from offering contract length discounts for your PES service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11129             MR. COLLYER:  Currently we don't have contracts for our PES service in the residential market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11130             MR. ENGELHART:  I know, but if you did ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11131             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Engelhart, the rules don't prevent it.  The difference between these offers and what we would be able to do in the local services exchange market, the point is that not every customer that calls in suggesting they will leave Bell Canada is necessarily getting the same contract length or the same discount.  It all depends on where they are, the volume of spend, et cetera.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11132             Those are the types of things we couldn't do in the local exchange markets.  We could have or could develop a primary exchange service tariff structure which would have discounts based on one year, two years, three years, five years, like occurs in the business exchange market, but those would have to be offered across the board in a rate band which is not quite the same as what is being undertaken both on the save queue and the outbound acquisition process.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11133             MR. ENGELHART:  I think that was a very fair answer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11134             Mr. Bibic, this is really all about the save queue, isn't it?  Those are the examples that Mr. Collyer talked about.  This is about your ability, when a customer is going to a competitor or has been at a competitor, you want to offer them a bigger discount than you offer anyone else.  That is really what the rule against the averaging prevents you from doing and it is really what this aspect of your application is about, isn't it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11135             MR. BIBIC:  It could be down to the customer, yes, but it doesn't need to be down to the customer.  It could be, for example, to respond to the different pricing of the different competitors in different areas, and who is to say in the future ‑‑ neither you nor I can say ‑‑ how pricing will be structured in going forward as both incumbents and competitors are allowed to compete and are forced to innovate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11136             I suspect, without knowing with certainty, I suspect that we will see a lot more innovation on the pricing side going forward once everyone can compete the same way.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11137             MR. ENGELHART:  You keep talking about going forward, but once you are deregulated, once you get to 25 per cent and you have met the QoS requirements, then this rule against deaveraging drops away going forward, doesn't it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11138             MR. BIBIC:  In some respects it does.  I would have to think through the implications of the fact that after forbearance there is still the need to offer a stand alone primary exchange service at the same rates as are offered at the regulated moment just prior to forbearance.  So I would have to think through how that would work.  That might have an impact on deaveraging, I am not sure.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11139             Again, it is neither here nor there.  What we are arguing for is added flexibility regardless of forbearance on the deaveraging front based on the materials we put forward, including the paper of Dr. Krause and Mr. Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11140             MR. ENGELHART:  I know, but you keep talking about, well, we might not be doing that much of it now, but we might be doing more of it later.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11141             Really, what this hearing is all about is:  What do we do about deaveraging between now and when you are forborne.  That is really what this aspect of this proceeding is about, isn't it?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11142             MR. BIBIC:  Yes, and I would add that we did suggest prior to the lunch break that we weren't doing as much of the type of rate deaveraging that you were talking about prior to lunch, but it turns out that we are doing far more than we anticipated of that type deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11143             As I said earlier, there is more to rate deaveraging than your narrow definition of it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11144             MR. ROWE:  I might add, Mr. Engelhart, in the business market, rate deaveraging is an important way in which all companies market to business customers.  We literally have thousands of prices in the marketplace, particularly on our forborne services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11145             Our process and pricing structure, really, is set up in a way that customers, based on their particular needs, and some of the factors we talked about earlier, negotiate their price point.  We have standard price books.  Our sales people are allowed to discount off of those price books.  And then there is an alternative process, where they can actually receive additional discounting approval from marketing.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11146             So we, in fact, in those markets, already are actively implementing the type of process that we are talking about here.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11147             MR. ENGELHART:  I wonder if I could have you look at paragraph 165 of your evidence.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11148             You say in the third sentence:

"The uniform pricing rule and the need to recover fixed and common costs from the overall body of customers will lead the incumbents to provide a price umbrella, effectively protecting new entrants..."

‑‑ effectively protecting new entrants:

"...even when the latter are inefficient."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 11149             Do I understand that your view is that the rule against price deaveraging is attracting uneconomic or inefficient entrants to the local telephone market?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11150             MR. HARITON:  We don't know, Mr. Engelhart, until the price rule is removed, who is efficient and who is inefficient.  So it is not stated as an absolute, it is saying, even when the latter are inefficient ‑‑ and we just don't know who is efficient and who is inefficient right now.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11151             MR. ENGELHART:  But you did mention, Mr. Hariton, that you thought Rogers might be pricing to the price umbrella, as you describe in the third sentence at paragraph 165.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11152             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11153             MR. HARITON:  I did say that was a possibility.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11154             MR. ENGELHART:  Would you agree with me that Bell has different prices today in different bands, and even, to some extent, different prices in different sub‑bands?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11155             MR. HARITON:  It certainly does.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11156             MR. ENGELHART:  If Rogers was pricing to the price umbrella, why would we have one price?  Why wouldn't we distinguish between your different prices in your different bands and your different prices in your different sub‑bands?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11157             MR. HARITON:  That is part of your marketing strategy which I am not privy to.  However, I would have expected that, in this market, a company with no price deaveraging constraints would have done a lot more price deaveraging than we have seen to date.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11158             This is certainly true in a whole number of markets outside telecommunications, as I mentioned earlier.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11159             MR. ENGELHART:  I want to talk to you a bit more about these uneconomic entrants that you are worried about.  I guess I am a bit confused about these uneconomic entrants, because, as I understand it from paragraph 165, they see this price umbrella and they think:  Wow!  Let's go into that business.  Look at that price umbrella.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11160             Don't these uneconomic entrants realize that once you are deregulated you will be able to rate de‑average and the price umbrella will disappear?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11161             MR. HARITON:  I don't know their position, Mr. Engelhart.  However, I can easily see a case where an entrant might think that there is a price deaveraging rule in place now, and I can come in, and then I can hope that the deaveraging rule is going to stay in place, and I can hope that I am going to be able to point out that I need this rule to survive, so that I will be able to go in front of the regulator and say:  If the deaveraging rule is removed, is revoked, it will really affect competition and it will impair competitive forces in this market, so please keep the rule in place.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11162             That is a hypothetical scenario, of course, but it can happen.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11163             MR. ENGELHART:  It can, but if you look at the Commission's track record ‑‑ I can remember your predecessors at Bell making the same argument about contribution discounts.  They said:  Well, these things will never disappear.  There will be contribution discounts, and once the new entrants get addicted to them, they can't ever give them up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11164             Hasn't the Commission been pretty consistent about getting rid of things like contribution discounts when they say they will, and that our hypothetical uneconomic entrant should have a high degree of concern that the rule against rate deaveraging will disappear upon forbearance?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11165             MR. HARITON:  Actually, long distance is a good example, Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11166             In Decision 92‑12, the Commission explicitly created a contribution discount and explicitly had a phase‑out of five years, more or less.  The entrants, presumably, were able to read that decision along with everybody else and knew that the phase‑out was planned.  Many of them came in, nevertheless.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11167             One assumes that they had to build in the discount in one place or another.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11168             In any case, once the phase‑out was gone ‑‑ and the phase‑out actually did happen, the Commission quite rightly phased out the discount and kept its word ‑‑ we saw a lot of bankruptcies.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11169             So I think that, in retrospect, what we saw was a lot of inefficient entry, which I think was, at least in part, due to a regulatory asymmetry, and once this asymmetry was removed, the entry turned out to be inefficient and the carriers disappeared.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11170             I see no reason why you might not see the same thing happening now in the local market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11171             MR. ENGELHART:  Where is the umbrella that will disappear?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11172             Say, for example, a new entrant could enter in Ottawa or London or Toronto or ‑‑ one of those places.  Once you can adjust your prices, presumably the umbrella disappears, but where are these places that have the umbrella?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11173             What is it about those places that looks more attractive to these uneconomic entrants than the other places?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11174             MR. HARITON:  Yes.  I had started giving that answer to Mr. Koch, who decided that he didn't want to hear it, but I am glad you have asked me.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11175             One example, amongst many, that I would point out is, if I were looking at entering the market in, say, Ottawa, which is just one exchange ‑‑ well, actually, it is more than one.  It's a large exchange, plus some others.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11176             If I were planning to enter the Ottawa exchange, one possible approach would be to target high‑rise apartment buildings, because I can go to a high‑rise apartment building with a cable, or a few cables, and go into the basement of the building and, with those few cables, I would be able to serve a large number of customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11177             I would definitely avoid the type of house which sits on an acre lot near a golf course, which we have in some parts of Ottawa ‑‑ the outer parts in the west end ‑‑ where, in fact, I have to lay a lot of cable to get to a customer, whether it be a combination of the actual loop and a drop wire or whatever.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11178             As an entrant, I would say:  Bell has to price uniformly throughout this exchange, they have to price the same thing in those very expensive locations next to the golf course, and they have to price the same thing in those high‑rises, right next to the O'Connor switch.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11179             It's easier for me to go downtown where it is more profitable and not go out there where it is more costly.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11180             MR. ENGELHART:  So I can see the theory of the new entrants in Ottawa.  Is Rogers doing that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11181             MR. HARITON:  I'm not aware of your business plans, Mr. Engelhart.  I had been given to understand that you are looking at large scale entry, very large scale entry as a matter of fact.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11182             But I have seen this concern happen time and again.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11183             I don't think I am divulging any secrets when I say that about 1996 or 1997 there was quite a competitive battle for the University of Ottawa.  The University of Ottawa was on a Centrex of about 3,000 lines and the university decided to set up its own network on its campus and was able to serve it with about 50 PBX trunks because half the load from the residences really peaked at night and half the load from the admin buildings peaked in the day, so you could be quite efficient.  As a result, Bell did bid for that contract, but was not able to win it and lost the contract.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11184             Now, the same thing, as I understand it, happened for the University of Toronto, where Bell put in a tariff that was actually acceptable for the University of Toronto and the CRTC ruled it out of order because it violated the price averaging rule.  This would have been again around 1996 or 1997.  My memory is not exact.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11185             So these are the two examples I would give from 10 years ago when I was still here.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11186             MR. COLLYER:  I think to bring things a little more up‑to‑date, we certainly have examples in the greenfield or new home development market, examples where service providers have actually worked with developers to provide bundled deals to customers that are moving into new home development vis‑à‑vis special pricing, multi‑month discounts in some cases, free or bundled services for a year.  We have examples of nearly 50,000 total units in res and bus markets that would qualify under this greenfield scenario.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11187             MR. ENGELHART:  But, Mr. Collyer, these greenfield places would seem to me to be farther away from the COs, they are the big lots that Mr. Hariton is worried about.  Mr. Hariton's concern is that the uneconomic entrants will go after the apartment buildings.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11188             Aren't you describing a scenario where the new entrants are targeting the high cost areas where there is no umbrella under Mr. Hariton's definition?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11189             MR. COLLYER:  I'm actually not.  I won't profess to know the Toronto market all that well because I am from London, Ontario, but when I do on occasion take the train in to work downtown I can certainly see all along the Gardiner Expressway, and along the railroad tracks there, all kinds of MDU and condo development that basically starts at the Etobicoke border.  Those locations are equally considered to be greenfield in the parlance that I am referring to as what would be the leafy estate lot on the edge of town.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11190             MR. BIBIC:  I think, Mr. Engelhart, it is an example of competing service providers developing service packages based on kind of the narrow geography of the subdivision.  We don't believe, based on our competitive analysis, that these are rates that are available off the rack or on the websites.  Not necessarily Rogers mind you, but competing service providers.  It could be Rogers, too.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11191             MR. ENGELHART:  No.  But my question was:  Who are these guys?  Who are these uneconomic entrants who are just serving these condos and aren't serving anywhere else?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11192             Who are they, Mr. Collyer?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11193             The scenario here is that we have these new entrants who are going after that price umbrella and I understood from Mr. Hariton that the price umbrella was near the CO in the apartment buildings and you are telling me yes, there are buildings like that along the Gardiner.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11194             So who are these inefficient new entrants who are only going after those buildings?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11195             MR. BIBIC:  By last count of Bell, there are over 80 companies in Canada offering local voice services to consumers.  So amongst those 80 we postulate in our submission that there could very well be, as Mr. Hariton said, some inefficient entrants.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11196             Now, we don't believe that any of the major cable cos are inefficient entrants and, ergo, we actually don't believe that the efficient large cable companies require the protection that the prohibition against rate deaveraging affords, especially not when these are the very competitors who are deaveraging as well, for example through the greenfield entry, as Mr. Collyer put forward.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11197             MR. ENGELHART:  No, but the problem I'm having is, I understand the economic theory of the price umbrella, but it is a little bit like, you know, the Loch Ness monster, people talk about it a lot, but who has actually seen one.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11198             Who has actually seen one of these inefficient entrants who is only going after customers who have a short loop?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11199             I don't think Vonage is, I don't think Rogers or Cogeco or Vidéotron is, so who are these people that we are so worried about?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11200             MR. BIBIC:  Part of the reason we can't see them is that in large measure there are rules like this one which prevent us from meeting the competition.  If the rule were lifted, perhaps some of these 80 or so providers that are in the marketplace would show themselves to be inefficient.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11201             MR. ENGELHART:  Does Primus just target these big buildings?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11202             MR. COLLYER:  Not that I'm aware, no.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11203             MR. HARITON:  Mr. Engelhart, just perhaps this is helpful.  In the two cases of long ago that I was talking about the customers actually self‑supplied with the help of consultants and manufacturers.  Nevertheless, at the time it was our estimate that we could have done the job cheaper, at lower cost, then they could do it for themselves.  So in that case what you had was a source of competition.  It wasn't competition from outside in the sense of a carrier.  It was competition from inside self‑supply with the help of consultants and equipment manufacturers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11204             MR. ENGELHART:  So you are worried about these inefficient self‑suppliers?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11205             MR. HARITON:  That is a form of inefficiency.  I believe that both the customer and the company would be better off if the company had been allowed to lower the price to lower than that customer could have done the work for itself, but higher than the cost to the company of doing the work.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11206             So in that sense I think that it was a lose‑lose proposition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11207             MR. ENGELHART:  I wonder if you could turn to page 7 or 24 of Appendix 8, Mr. Hariton.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11208             This is something that you got into a bit with Mr. Koch.  You say ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11209             MR. HARITON:  Just give me a second, sir.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11210             MR. ENGELHART:  Sure

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11211             MR. HARITON:  I have it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11212             MR. ENGELHART:  If you look at paragraph 21 you say:


"Furthermore, even in the case of a monopoly supplier price discrimination is common and can lead to an increase in total surplus and thus benefit the economy."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11213             I guess I'm a little surprised by the words "even in the case of a monopoly supplier".

LISTNUM 1 \l 11214             Wouldn't it have been better economics to say "especially in the case of a monopoly supplier price discrimination is common"?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11215             MR. HARITON:  In my experience, you will find price discrimination both in monopoly markets and in comparative markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11216             There is actually an interesting natural case study on point which is airline deregulation in the United States.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11217             Before airline deregulation took place, essentially in the late 1970s and 1980, there was a complex airfare structure and one of the predictions or one of the hopes of the policy analysts at the time, including many economists, was that competition would simply the fare structure because the forces of competition would align prices to cost and we wouldn't get this wide variety of rates any more.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11218             Of course what happened was that the fare structure got even more complicated and we saw even more price discrimination than before, contradicting the predictions of many eminent academic economists, but not really a surprise when you think about it, because what happens is that if you have competition you have a lot more complicated market and your market segmentation becomes a lot more complicated under a monopoly regime.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11219             Under a monopoly regime you can try simpler segmentation, it might work.  In competitive markets your segmentation has to be very careful indeed.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11220             MR. ENGELHART:  Would you agree with me, Mr. Hariton, that in a perfectly competitive market there is no price discrimination whatsoever?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11221             MR. HARITON:  This is an old debate.  I know that a lot of the textbooks would say what you have just said.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11222             I would not agree.  I think that in a market which is characterized by large fixed costs, fixed relative to variable costs, those fixed costs have to be recovered somehow.  My experience is that the industry, even a perfectly competitive industry, will come to an equilibrium where the prices will include high mark‑ups for those products that are price inelastic and low mark‑ups for products that are price elastic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11223             Now, this is a hypothetical in that I don't think I have ever seen a perfectly competitive industry, but a workably competitive industry would give you this result I think.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11224             MR. ENGELHART:  How about a market like wheat, you have a world price of wheat.  Does a wheat farmer in Saskatchewan say, "I'm going to charge this guy $1.65 a bushel and this guy $1.85 a bushel?  Don't the wheat farmers see a world price of wheat and everybody gets their bushel of wheat for the same price?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11225             MR. HARITON:  Not necessarily, Mr. Engelhart.  You have to understand that wheat is not a uniform commodity, it is graded according to a number of characteristics, including the percentage of moisture, including the protein content, including, so help me, the colour of the wheat, that seems to matter, and that different buyers will purchase different grades, different combinations of these attributes.  There are a couple of more.  I'm sorry, I should have added the degree of cleanliness.  By "cleanliness" I don't mean dirt, but the percentage of screenings and other things in the wheat.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11226             And that in fact the Canadian Wheat Board, in my experience, when I was involved with them back in the 1980s, would actually try to set differential prices for differential grades.  One of the things they tried to do was ‑‑ in fact they were quite proud of it ‑‑ saying that Canadian wheat was the cleanest in the world, which was true.  But then what they would do is, they would see what minimum the customer was willing to accept and then adjust to that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11227             But there were certainly prices associated with different grades and categories of wheat which did not fully reflect the costs and I think that there was price discrimination there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11228             Now, things may have changed today, we are 25 years later.  I can only tell you of my experience around 1984‑1985.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11229             MR. ENGELHART:  So your professional opinion as an economist is that charging different prices for different grades of wheat constitutes price discrimination?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11230             MR. HARITON:  If the difference is not based on cost that would be so.  If the difference is based on cost, no.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11231             MR. ENGELHART:  The wheat farmers just ‑‑


LISTNUM 1 \l 11232             MR. HARITON:  These are not the wheat farmers, sir, this is the Canadian Wheat Board.  Sorry, I should have clarified that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11233             The wheat farmer delivers to the Board at a price dictated by the Board.  He had no choice.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11234             MR. ENGELHART:  If we are in the United States and there is no Wheat Board, is that an example of perfect competition where the wheat farmer accepts a world price for the wheat and there is no price discrimination?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11235             MR. HARITON:  I don't know the U.S. wheat markets and I don't have experience with them.  I have had a bit of experience with the Canadian one.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11236             MR. ENGELHART:  So the person that is, in your wheat example, price discriminating is not the individual wheat farmer but it is the monopoly Wheat Board that sells all the Canadian wheat.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11237             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11238             MR. HARITON:  On world markets, that's correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11239             MR. ENGELHART:  So you would agree with me that every economics textbook out there says that in a perfectly competitive market there is no price discrimination and that in a monopoly market the monopolist has an incentive to price discriminate and that the presence or absence of price discrimination is an indicator of the market power of the suppliers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11240             Would you agree with that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11241             MR. HARITON:  I haven't checked all economics textbooks so I can't speak to that, but I can certainly find you articles in learned journals that say that price discrimination is not necessarily a sign of market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11242             Just to give you an example, there is an article by Michael Levine in the Yale Journal of Regulation ‑‑ and I'm guess at the year.  I would say it would be around 2001 or 2002 ‑‑ which discusses that.  I think you will find footnotes in that article which makes this point.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11243             As I said at the beginning of my remarks, this is a controversial point.  The economics literature in general does say, as you say, that price discrimination is not consistent, that market power is a prerequisite for this.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11244             My view is that you do see it happening in competitive markets.  I don't know about perfectly competitive markets.  I don't know about many of those, but certainly in workably competitive markets.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11245             Let's try another example, once again, the airline industry, which I understand today is quite competitive but which does a lot of price discrimination.  You have two people sitting side‑by‑side paying quite different prices for what essentially is the same transport.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11246             MR. ENGELHART:  "Essentially" may be the weasel word in that sentence though.  Like if I go on Expedia.com and I say that I want to go from Toronto to Vancouver next weekend, I get about 25 different prices.  I can pick the lowest ones I want.  If Mr. McKeown goes on the website he will see the same different prices that I do.  He can pick the lowest one if he wants.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11247             Now, I will grant you there are different prices depending on whether you have cancellation ability or transferability or whether you have to book it, but those prices that are available to me are also available to Mr. McKeown on Expedia aren't they?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11248             MR. HARITON:  They sure are, Mr. Engelhart, but remember ‑‑ again, this goes back to studies I did in the 1980s of airline pricing ‑‑ the great thing there was to try to segment your market in a way that you would not have spill.  Spill would be customers who you intended to be in one market segment who somehow got around the fence you had put around that market segment and would take prices in another market segment.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11249             The two great fences that we had were advance booking of various times, it would be maybe 14 days or 28 days or something of that sort.  The other great fence was requiring a Saturday night stay over.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11250             The reason those fences were so important is that the airlines had found ‑‑ actually Boeing had found for them and the airlines had confirmed ‑‑ that the business traveller, who on the one hand was price inelastic, was not willing to stay over on a Saturday night and was not willing to book 14 days in advance; and that the leisure traveller, who tended to be very price elastic, was quite willing to stay over on a Saturday, that was part of the point of it, and was willing to make his plans ahead of time.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11251             To come back to your point, although the airlines could not identify precisely who was willing to pay and who was not, i.e. could not say you, Mr. Engelhart, was willing to pay a high price and you, Mr. McKeown, were not, nevertheless they could say "Here is a price for business travellers", you, Mr. Engelhart, and "Here is a price for leisure travellers", you, Mr. McKeown.  So they did through attributes what they could not do through personal identification.  That is a lovely example of third degree price discrimination.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11252             MR. ENGELHART:  I want you to go on a little bit in the paragraph.  You say that:

"This can lead to an increase in total surplus and thus benefit the economy."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11253             You say that:

"In order for there to be a benefit to the economy there is one general condition required for this to occur, is the total output must increase."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11254             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11255             MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11256             MR. ENGELHART:  Now, don't 99 percent of Canadians have a phone line today?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11257             MR. HARITON:  Well, the number of Canadians who have a wireline phone line is actually dropping because we are getting an increased number of households that have wireless service only.  So that in fact I don't think it is 99 percent any more.  The number 99 would include wireless or wireline or a combination of both.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11258             But there are still households who don't.  We think that wireline ‑‑ I would think that wireline is an attractive product even if you are committed to your wireless.  It is a question of at what price.  If you can bring the price down, I think some people who are wireless only might become wireless and wireline.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11259             More importantly, I think that there are some cases where you have people who do not take telephone service today who would.  I'm thinking of people like cottagers who may not find it worth their while to take a telephone at one price for their cottage but might find it worthwhile at a lower price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11260             I especially think of people who are semi‑transients.  I have two children who are university students and it is always an interesting debate as to whether they are going to take a phone because they are going to be in this one place for only a certain number of months.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11261             So There the price is important and so, indeed, it is possible to grow with the output.  Now, we have been talking about primarily line so far, between us.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11262             There is also the question of second lines.  If primary lines do have a very high penetration ratio, although not as high as it used to be, secondary lines is a market where the number grows and now it's been and, in fact, there is a lot of people who might have a second line if the price were right.  They might have a second line for a fax machine, they might have a second line for ‑‑ if you have a teenager, a teenager line.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11263             So, these are all examples of where you could still grow out, right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11264             MR. ENGELHART:  Would there be anything in the rule against rate the averaging to prevent Bell from filing a tariff for a lower price for a second line today?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11265             MR. BIBIC:  I am not sure of the answer that it could be that we might ‑‑ could develop a different price point for a second line and file it for Commission approval.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11266             The point there would be that we still wouldn't be ‑‑ the price would have to be ‑‑ if accepted, the price would have to be uniform across every second line customer in a particular band and we wouldn't necessarily be able to price that second line down or up to the value that the particular customer or groupings of customers places on it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11267             MR. ENGELHART:  So, the reason that you think that the total economy is going to be better off is because the 99 per cent of people who have wireless or wire line is going to go up to some higher level, 99 and a half or something and the 94 per cent who have wire line only, that's going to go up to some higher level like 95 or something.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11268             That's why you think that the total output will increase and that the economy as a whole will benefit?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11269             MR. HARITON:  And also, don't forget, Mr. Engelhart, there are several other things going on here.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11270             We have second lines.  I think it's important also to include ‑‑ and again, perhaps I should turn this over to my marketing friends ‑‑ but you also have the business side where certainly the number of lines is something which is very much a business decision.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11271             MR. ENGELHART:  And you mentioned the cottages before.  So you've got people right now who have a cottage and they don't have a phone and I guess these are these really long loop people who live way outside at the central office who are already getting an incredible deal and you are going to lower the price for them even further.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11272             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11273             MR. HARITON:  I haven't made a map of all cottagers, Mr. Engelhart, but I suspect some of them are not that far out at all.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11274             MR. ENGELHART:  And so, if the total output doesn't increase, if the 99 doesn't go up to 99 and a half and the 94 doesn't go up to 95 or 96, you would agree with me that the economy doesn't benefit, just Bell would benefit?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11275             MR. HARITON:  Again, if the output doesn't increase, which I find hypothetical, there could be cases where Bell would benefit as a monopoly provider, but one of the things that we have learned is that when a monopoly provider tries to do price discrimination, to benefit itself, it leaves itself more vulnerable to competition than it was before.

And so, that is a risk.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11276             So, the risk of getting more customers or more lines ‑‑ I shouldn't say more customers ‑‑ the risk of getting more lines has to be weighed against the risk of attracting more customers.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11277             And that is a risk which has to be balanced again.  I am not sure where that would come out.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11278             I would also point out ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11279             MR. ENGELHART:  I'm sorry, I am not following.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11280             I thought the way this worked was this:  you are saying that when there is a monopoly, they'll price discriminate and that would give the monopoly more surplus, but you are saying that if total output goes up, then the economy is better off.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11281             MR. HARITON:  That's right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11282             MR. ENGELHART:  So if total output doesn't go up, it's only the monopolist that benefits, not the economy?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11283             MR. HARITON:  No.  I should turn this over to Mr. Krause, but I think that the output going up is a necessary, but not a sufficient ‑‑ well, it's one condition, but Mr. Krause can explain this from a theoretical point of view better than I can.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11284             MR. KRAUSE:  Thank you very much.  The condition that total output has to increase is ‑‑ means that unambiguously total surplus will increase.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11285             Now, I think you're proposing that if total output doesn't increase, then all of the surplus goes to the firm.  In fact, that is not the case.  There will be a set of customers who could be ‑‑ could take advantage of a lower price through competition of two firms being in a particular market, in which case, consumers in that particular market will benefit as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11286             MR. ENGELHART:  But then, total output would increase?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11287             MR. KRAUSE:  Not necessarily, compared to the output change that may occur in other markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11288             MR. ENGELHART:  So, some consumers get more and some get less?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11289             MR. KRAUSE:  Not ‑‑ it depends on the particular characteristics of demand.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11290             MR. ENGELHART:  I wonder if you could look at Appendix 8, page 8 of 24, paragraphs 25 and 26.  Again, Mr. Koch went over this a bit with you and you're talking there about a firm that has two market segments:


"Market 1, they face little or no competition.  Market 2, they face an equally efficient firm B.  If they differentially price, they charge a higher rate where they have no competition and a lower rate where they have competition."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11291             You then go on to say in paragraph 26 that if they have uniform pricing, they must charge the same price in both markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11292             Then you start at the second sentence in paragraph 26, you say:

"Now, firm A has the incentive to preserve its high price in market 1, even if it means raising its price in market 2.  The loss in revenue on its existing market 1 customers from lowering price is greater than the loss in revenue from loss sales in market 2, due to an increase in price relative to the differential pricing case.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11293                  Therefore, firm A no longer has an incentive to compete vigorously in market 2."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11294             Now, you're making an assumption here, aren't you?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11295             This isn't a universal truth that the loss in revenue on its existing market 1 customers from lowering price will be greater than the loss in revenue from loss sales in market 2.  You are saying: assuming that is the case, then the firm will leave prices higher.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11296             MR. KRAUSE:  That is certainly the case.  One thing you have to keep in mind is that the price and behaviour of any particular firm is going to be based on some sort of distribution of the customer base.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11297             So, if you end up in a situation where you have smaller markets and larger markets, the pricing considerations will take those into account.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11298             MR. ENGELHART:  So, if market 2 is bigger than market 1, you would price at the market 2 level and the market 1 people would get the lower price because you have to ‑‑ you are not allowed to rate the average?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11299             MR. KRAUSE:  That is certainly a possibility.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11300             MR. ENGELHART:  So ‑‑ and I think as you indicated to Mr. Koch, if you make more money by lowering price in market 2 than by raising price in market 1, even with the rule against rate the averaging, everyone gets the lower price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11301             Is that right?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11302             MR. KRAUSE:  If the dynamics work out that looking at the two various demand conditions that, you know, you find a proper maximising when you are looking at both markets together, that lowering your price in market 2 also can lower the price of market 1, and that would be the case.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11303             And so, maybe in that case, even without the averaging rule, the incumbent firm might find it profitable to offer uniform price.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11304             MR. ENGELHART:  Now, let's stick with the averaging rule.  So, let's have a look at those market dynamics that you've just talked about.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11305             As I understand it, market 2, the incumbent faces elastic demand.  Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11306             MR. KRAUSE:  That would be correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11307             MR. ENGELHART:  And  in market 1, they face inelastic demands.  Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11308             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, that is also correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11309             MR. ENGELHART:  So, we've covered an example where you have market 2 is a lot bigger than market 1.  Let's look at an example where they are the same size.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11310             So, let's say that market 2 has 1,000 customers and market 1 has 1,000 customers and that the ARPU, the average revenue per user, for each customer is $50.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11311             Are you with me so far?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11312             MR. KRAUSE:  I think so.  I will let you keep going and I'll find out if I get off the rails.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11313             MR. ENGELHART:  Okay.  Now, there is a rule against deaveraging.  So, the incumbent can either raise prices by $5.00 in both markets or keep prices as they are in both markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11314             Are you still with me?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11315             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, I am still with you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11316             MR. ENGELHART:  So, market 1 is inelastic.  Let's assume, to make the arithmetic really simple and to make my point as powerfully as I can, that market 1 is completely inelastic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11317             Would you agree with me that by raising price by $5.00 in market 1, my incumbent now has an extra $5,000.00 in revenue in market 1?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11318             MR. KRAUSE:  You've raised it by $5.00?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11319             MR. ENGELHART:  Five dollars.  I have 1,000 customers in market 1.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11320             MR. KRAUSE:  Right, 1,000, yes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11321             MR. ENGELHART:  It's completely inelastic, so I have an extra $5,000.00 in revenue.  Would you agree with that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11322             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, I would.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11323             MR. ENGELHART:  And again to keep the arithmetic simple and to make the point powerfully, let's assume that market 2 is perfectly elastic.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11324             Would you agree with me that by raising price by $5,00 in market 2, I lose all 5,000 customers with their $50.00 of ARPU each?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11325             MR. KRAUSE:  Weren't the markets equal?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11326             MR. ENGELHART:  It's 1,000 customers with their $50.00 of ARPU.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11327             MR. KRAUSE:  That's right.  So, you had two ‑‑ if I understand this correctly, you have two markets of equal size, one that happens to be perfectly elastic for some apparent reason and one, perhaps they don't value the firm's brand, they don't like some of the aspects of it, they find easiest choice ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11328             MR. ENGELHART:  No.  In your example, there is this perfectly ‑‑ this is efficient competitor in market 2.  That's why.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11329             MR. KRAUSE:  And there is not an efficient competitor with perfectly inelastic demand, so customers are willing to pay a higher price.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11330             MR. ENGELHART:  Yes.  That's more ‑‑ it's a stark version of your own example.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11331             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11332             MR. ENGELHART:  Right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11333             MR. KRAUSE:  The demand characteristics faced by a utility maximizing consumer, they're willing to pay a higher price than having an elastic demand.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11334             MR. ENGELHART:  So, in market 2, you raise prices by $5.00.  Would you agree with me that you lose all 5,000 customers with their $50.00 of ARPU.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11335             MR. KRAUSE:  I would agree entirely because with that elastic demand, they don't want to see ‑‑ they are willing to quit buying from the firm, based on their utility maximization, that's why they have an elastic demand curve.  So, yes, you would lose all customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11336             MR. ENGELHART:  And you just don't lose the $5.00, you lose the entire revenue.  Isn't that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11337             MR. KRAUSE:  What do you mean?  What's the difference between the entire revenue and the $5.00?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11338             MR. ENGELHART:  In market 1, I raise prices by $5.00, I now have an additional $5,000.00.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11339             MR. KRAUSE:  That's right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11340             MR. ENGELHART:  In market 2, I raise price by $5.00, I lost all 1,000 customers, I now have negative ‑‑ I have lost $50,000.00 in revenue in market 2.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11341             MR. KRAUSE:  Right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11342             MR. ENGELHART:  Would you agree with that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11343             MR. KRAUSE:  $5,000.00 in market 2, $5,000.  You've gained $5,000.00 in market 1 and lost $5,000.00 market 2.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11344             MR. ENGELHART:  I have lost $50,000 in market 2, I have gained $5,000.00 in market 1.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11345             MR. KRAUSE:  Oh! sorry.  Right, because it was fifty ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11346             MR. ENGELHART:  I am net down $45,000.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11347             MR. KRAUSE:  Right, in which case, why is that type of behaviour profit maximising by the firm?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11348             MR. ENGELHART:  It's not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11349             MR. KRAUSE:  Right, but that's ‑‑.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11350             MR. ENGELHART:  If market 2 is price elastic ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11351             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11352             MR. ENGELHART:  ‑‑ and market 1 is price inelastic, isn't the profit maximising firm going to have the lower price in both markets?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11353             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, but it will do that regardless of any deaveraging rule.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11354             MR. ENGELHART:  No, sir.  If there is no deaveraging rule, it will have a higher price in market 1 and a lower price in market 2.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11355             If there is a rule against rate deaveraging where they have to either charge the higher price in both markets or the lower price in both markets, they'll charge the lower price in both markets because they are going to be more sensitive to the elastic market because in the elastic market they stand to lose a lot more revenue.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11356             MR. KRAUSE:  I understand that point now, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11357             MR. ENGELHART:  So, in your example, when you say:


"Firm A has the incentive to preserve its high price in market 1, even if it means raising its price in market 2, the loss in revenue on its existing market 1 customers from lowering price is greater than the loss in revenue from lost sales in market 2 due to the increase in price relative to the differential pricing case.  Therefore, firm A no longer has an incentive to compete vigorously in market 2."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11358             I am suggesting to you that that's a very unusual example, that what we are normally going to see is the firm pricing to the elastic market and the inelastic customers getting the benefit of those lower prices where you have a rule against deaveraging.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11359             Would you agree with that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11360             MR. KRAUSE:  Depending on the size of the markets and the demand conditions, I would.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11361             MR. ENGELHART:  Those are my questions.  Thank you.

‑‑‑ Pause / Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11362             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Commissioner Noël.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11363             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Pour revenir à des exemples plus concrets ‑‑ est‑ce que ça va si je parle en français?  Oui.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11364             MR. BIBIC:  Pas de problème.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11365             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Si dans le marché de l'Ontario vous faites face à plusieurs compétiteurs et, notamment, à Rogers et COGECO, est‑ce que ces deux entreprises‑là offrent des services dans la même bande, à votre connaissance?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11366             M. BIBIC:  À ma connaissance, conseillère Noël, oui, COGEGO opère dans... par exemple, bande B, tout de même que Rogers dans bande B surtout.  Et au Québec, on retrouve Vidéotron et COGECO qui opèrent tous les deux dans leurs propres territoires où ils ont un réseau dans la bande B, par exemple.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11367             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Et pour reprendre l'exemple de l'Ontario, est‑ce que COGEGO et Rogers offrent un service concurrentiel au point de vue de l'offre de service comme tel, mais est‑ce que les prix sont les mêmes?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11368             M. BIBIC:  Non, mais le service est certainement un... leur services sont certainement des substituts pour les nôtres.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11369             En ce qui concerne les prix, je ne crois pas que Rogers et COGEGO offrent les mêmes prix en Ontario.  Par exemple, je vois que COGEGO...  non.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11370             Leurs prix, d'après mes connaissances, ne sont pas pareils pour COGEGO et Rogers en Ontario.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11371             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Et pour Rogers.  Et vous offrez le service dans les deux empreintes : celles de Rogers et celles de COGEGO?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11372             M. BIBIC:  Absolument, oui.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11373             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Et vous l'offrez au même prix, donc vous faites... vous faites face à une concurrence qui est différente que vous soyez à Toronto ou à Cornwall, par exemple?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11374             M. BIBIC:  Vous avez raison et tout de même, on pourrait ajouter le Québec, à cette heure.  On a un autre concurrent.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11375             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Oui.  Bien, je ne voulais pas aller dans un aussi vaste territoire parce que, là, les écarts sont encore plus évidents.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11376             Alors, si je comprends bien, c'est pour pouvoir faire face aux Rogers, COGEGO et au Primus, Vonage, Yak et compagnie que vous voulez obtenir... vous nous demandez la permission de faire de la subdivision de tarif à l'intérieur d'une même bande.

C'est ça?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11377             M. BIBIC:  C'est exact.  On recherche la flexibilité de pouvoir offrir des prix dans les régions desservies par COGECO qui répond au marché dans cet endroit‑là et, en même temps, faire la même chose dans les autres endroits en Ontario qui sont desservis par Rogers où les prix ne sont pas pareils.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11378             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  À votre connaissance, est‑ce que les prix de Rogers et de COGECO, pour nommer ceux‑là, ou de Primus, sont supérieurs aux prix des compagnies de téléphone ou s'ils sont généralement inférieurs, pour le même service, pour un service équivalent?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11379             M. BIBIC:  Généralement, dans presque tous les cas, il y a peut‑être une ou deux exceptions, mais dans presque tous les cas les prix des compétiteurs sont réduits, comparé aux nôtres, ils sont plus bas.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11380             CONSEILLÈRE NOËL:  Merci.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11381             LE PRÉSIDENT:  Madame la secrétaire.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11382             LA SECRÉTAIRE:  Très bien, monsieur le président.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11383             Nous allons maintenant poursuivre avec monsieur John Lawford.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11384             Mr. Lawford, can you please come forward?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11385             Mr. Lawford is a counsel for Consumers Association of Canada and the National Anti Poverty Organization, referred to as the Consumer Groups.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11386             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Understanding the fact that we know both of you very well, I'm sure you are going to introduce yourselves.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11387             MR. LAWFORD:  Madam Secretary, actually, Mr. Michael Janigan will be leading the questioning for the Consumer Groups today.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11388             THE SECRETARY:  Thank you.

CROSS‑EXAMINATION / CONTRE‑INTERROGATOIRE

LISTNUM 1 \l 11389             MR. JANIGAN:  Good afternoon, panel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11390             MR. LAWFORD:  Good afternoon.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11391             MR. JANIGAN:  I thought I would initially start with a little bit of historical information as to how we got to this place in reviewing some of the record.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11392             I guess ignoring the extension of last year, we would term this I guess the third generation of price caps that have been imposed upon telephony services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11393             Would you agree with that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11394             MR. DUNNIGAN:  The upcoming régime?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11395             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11396             MR. DUNNIGAN:  Correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11397             MR. JANIGAN:  The initial price cap was imposed under Decision 97‑9 and commenced January 1, 1998.  In that price cap certain of The Companies' utility segment services were placed in a single basket of capped services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11398             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11399             MR. HARITON:  Perhaps I could answer that, having been there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11400             Yes, that is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11401             MR. JANIGAN:  And that single basket was divided into three sub‑baskets that were subject to additional pricing constraints.  One of these sub‑baskets was the basic residential local service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11402             MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11403             MR. JANIGAN:  In the proceeding giving rise to Decision 97‑9, Bell Canada as one of the Stentor companies advanced a position with respect to the appropriate price cap formula or index to be applied to the basket.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11404             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11405             MR. HARITON:  Yes, it is.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11406             MR. JANIGAN:  In particular, the Stentor companies urged a productivity or X factor of 2.7 at that time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11407             Would that be correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11408             MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11409             MR. JANIGAN:  The Commission subsequently adopted a productivity offset of 4.5 percent.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11410             Would that be correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11411             MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11412             MR. JANIGAN:  During the period of the price cap the ILECs, including Bell, chose to reduce rates for business customers only to meet the price cap commitments.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11413             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11414             MR. HARITON:  Subject to check.  I don't have the details, but I will accept what you are saying, subject to check.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11415             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11416             Obviously the offset that the Commission ordered at that time was almost 2 percent more than what Bell and the rest of the Stentor companies wanted.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11417             MR. HARITON:  Mathematically, that is exactly right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11418             MR. JANIGAN:  Was Bell Canada able to generate efficiency or productivity gains sufficient to meet that offset?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11419             MR. HARITON:  I don't know.  And the reason I'm saying that is that, to my knowledge, we did not calculate ‑‑ actually, let me check that for just one second.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11420             May I just check?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11421             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes, certainly.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11422             MR. HARITON:  Yes, Mr. Janigan, we did file TFP numbers in the second price cap proceeding, the one that was held in 2001, I believe, at which time we put on the record productivity numbers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11423             However, I should point out that those productivity numbers were for the company as a whole, as I recall.  They were not for the utility segment.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11424             So they do not help me to say whether the utility segment met the targets or not.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11425             MR. JANIGAN:  Clearly there was no difficulty that the company experienced in raising capital or meeting other financial parameters as a result of price cap.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11426             MR. HARITON:  I'm informed that there wasn't.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11427             MR. JANIGAN:  By the time the Commission considered the framework for the second price cap in the proceeding leading up to Decision 2002‑34, Bell Canada had consistently surpassed its earnings expectation for the utility segment?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11428             MR. HARITON:  I'm not sure that there were earnings expectations for the utility segment as such, Mr. Janigan.  I believe the company as a whole was earning ‑‑ and again, this is out of my area.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11429             Perhaps Mr. Dilworth can answer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11430             MR. DILWORTH:  I don't actually have the company's earnings in front of me over that period.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11431             MR. JANIGAN:  First of all, when I'm addressing earnings expectations, I'm looking at the allowed ROE when the rates were rolled in to the price cap.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11432             Subject to check, would you accept that, as was shown in the CRTC Companies' interrog of the 16th of March '01, 405, that Bell's return on common equity in the utility segment in the years 1998 to 2001 was 13 percent, 15 percent, 15.4 percent and 14.3 percent?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11433             MR. HENRY:  Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to intervene so early, but if we are going to go down the path of looking at earnings, I think you have already ruled that that is out of scope in this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11434             The interrogatory that Mr. Janigan is referring to was from the last case.  In the last case earnings sharing was indeed within the scope of the proceeding.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11435             Earnings regulation and earnings sharing has been ruled specifically out of the scope.  So I would hope he would narrow his questions to what is in the scope.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11436             THE CHAIRPERSON:  It will be up to Mr. Janigan to fairly shortly demonstrate the relationship between the line of questioning he is currently pursuing and the scope of the proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11437             MR. JANIGAN:  I think what we are attempting to do is look at the company under the price cap régime and how it has fared and using a barometer of how it has fared in the past to try to estimate what we might do in terms of fashioning the appropriate price cap with the appropriate productivity dividend in the future.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11438             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Recognizing that the total return is not in scope.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11439             MR. HARITON:  Yes.  You were kind enough to give us a reference to that interrogatory on Friday, I think it was.  And those numbers match the numbers that we filed with the Commission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11440             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.  In 2002‑34, Bell took the position that while the basic productivity offset was 3.5 percent ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11441             MR. HARITON:  That is correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11442             MR. JANIGAN:  ‑‑ based on a derivation from the marginal cost analysis, it opposed the inclusion of that basic productivity offset into capped services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11443             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11444             MR. HARITON:  I'm sorry, it opposed the inclusion of...?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11445             MR. JANIGAN:  Of the basic productivity offset into ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11446             MR. HARITON:  You mean the old TFP number.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11447             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11448             MR. HARITON:  Yes.  If you want, I can explain why.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11449             MR. JANIGAN:  Certainly.  Let's just get that on the record.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11450             As I understand it, the position was that local residential basic service for local basic residential service was that rates could increase with inflation, with a ceiling of 10 percent per year at the rate element level.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11451             MR. HARITON:  That would be true for business rates.  My recollection is that there was a ceiling of 5 percent for residential rates.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11452             MR. JANIGAN:  You may be correct on that, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11453             Other than that, that is correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11454             MR. HARITON:  There was an individual rate element constraint, and there were also basket constraints which were I for the basic business services, I ‑ X for other services and I ‑ X in residence services with the proviso that there be no rate decreases.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11455             If the formula had provided for rate decreases, the rates would not have moved and the difference went to a deferral account.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11456             MR. JANIGAN:  I just want to make certain I understand this point myself.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11457             Do you have Telecom Decision 2002‑34?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11458             MR. HARITON:  Thanks to some truly outstanding assistance, we do.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11459             MR. JANIGAN:  If you look at paragraph 261 of that, was that the position of the company at that time?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11460             MR. HARITON:  Would it be helpful for me to read it out, Mr. Janigan?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11461             MR. JANIGAN:  Sure.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11462             MR. HARITON:  It says:


"In non‑HCSAs, The Companies proposed that rates for residential individual line service (ncluding Touch Tone) should be allowed to increase, on average, by the rate of inflation each year.  In addition, price increases would be capped at 10% per year at the rate element level.  The Companies stated that the proposed upward pricing constraint was intended to ensure, through a price freeze in real terms, that prices for these services would remain fair."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11463             So the question is:  Was this the position of the company in 2001?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11464             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11465             MR. HARITON:  I believe so.  I believe that the Commission properly summarized the position.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11466             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11467             Once again the Commission imposed a cap on the residential local exchange and optional residential services that included a 3.5 percent offset.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11468             MR. HARITON:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11469             MR. JANIGAN:  I take it from the juxtaposition of these two, of 261 with the ultimate Commission decision, that was about 3.5 percent more than Bell wanted.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11470             MR. HARITON:  Yes, that is the calculation.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11471             MR. JANIGAN:  As we indicated, we are not looking at earnings data in this proceeding but we do have some productivity data from Bell in a number of interrogatories; the first being CRTC interrogatory 1102 of the 8th of August, updated.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11472             MR. HARITON:  Yes, Mr. Janigan.  Is there a particular page you want to refer to?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11473             MR. JANIGAN:  I'm looking at the declines in residential PES unit cost from 1998 to 2005.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11474             MR. HARITON:  That would be Table 1 on page 8?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11475             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes, that is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11476             MR. HARITON:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11477             MR. JANIGAN:  Further, there is some information also about productivity that is contained in Consumer Groups' interrogatory 4(e), albeit for the company as a whole, as I understand.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11478             MR. DILWORTH:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11479             MR. JANIGAN:  Is there any way to tell in 4(e) or to obtain, if these numbers are the numerator, what is the denominator of the total costs from which these reductions were made?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11480             MR. DILWORTH:  The cost reductions that are recorded in the Consumer Groups' interrogatory 4, part (e), relating to operations expense, do not include capital.  And the corresponding denominator would be the company's total operating expense, which is in the order of $10 billion.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11481             So that would be the appropriate denominator to look at which would give rise to reductions ranging from 3.6 percent to 6.0 percent.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11482             MR. JANIGAN:  That is for the company as a whole.  Correct?

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11483             MR. JANIGAN:  That is for the company as a whole.  Correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11484             MR. DILWORTH:  That is for the company as a whole.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11485             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11486             MR. DILWORTH:  Which would include our wireless organization, ExpressVu and a lot of the growth engines.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11487             MR. JANIGAN:  This interrog ‑‑ I am talking of Consumer Groups No. 4 ‑‑ also notes that a productivity council has been established.  It is chaired by a senior executive that includes representatives from finance, information services, information technology and other departments.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11488             Are any of you members of this august council?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11489             MR. DILWORTH:  I was a past member.  I sat on the board earlier this year.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11490             MR. JANIGAN:  It notes that the productivity council establishes targets for productivity.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11491             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11492             MR. DILWORTH:  I don't think that the productivity council establishes the targets.  The productivity council carefully manages the overall productivity program of the company to deliver what are the company's objectives.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11493             MR. JANIGAN:  Who establishes the targets?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11494             MR. DILWORTH:  As indicated elsewhere in the response ‑‑ I will have to find the reference.  I think it is earlier on in the question.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11495             The targets are a fallout of the planning process and cost reductions that would be required to deliver the required revenue and EBITDA performance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11496             MR. JANIGAN:  Are the targets that come down from the planning process to the productivity council, do these targets generally provide for reductions that are less than the rate of inflation?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11497             MR. DILWORTH:  There aren't targets that go to the productivity council.  There are a set of productivity objectives for the company and associated program that comes out of the planning process that the productivity council manages.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11498             I want to be careful about the notion that the productivity council is just handed targets to go away and deliver them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11499             The program is developed as part of the planning process where each of the organizations identify the enablers that will allow for cost reductions.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11500             MR. JANIGAN:  The bottom line in the circumstances of the plans that are given to the productivity council to manage, the bottom line must encompass some kind of overall productivity increase for the company, does it not?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11501             MR. DILWORTH:  In what we are referring to here as cost reductions in the order, as we see in the response and over the last number of years, of about $500 million on a $10 billion base.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11502             MR. JANIGAN:  Would you say that it is expected that these cost reductions will be greater than inflation?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11503             MR. DILWORTH:  That has been ‑‑ 5 percent has been greater than inflation.  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11504             MR. JANIGAN:  In this proceeding, leaving aside your proposal for uncapping services in certain areas ‑‑ actually in most areas ‑‑ your proposal ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11505             MR. HARITON:  Excuse me, Mr. Janigan, are you moving on to another area?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11506             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11507             MR. HARITON:  I would like, with your permission, to go back to one thing you said and I answered to you, if I may.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11508             MR. JANIGAN:  Sure.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11509             MR. HARITON:  You suggested that the rates of return for the utility segment over the period 1998 to 2001 were an indicator or a guide to what a proper productivity target might have been.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11510             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11511             MR. JANIGAN:  Well, certainly it would indicate how the company had fared.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11512             MR. HARITON:  How the company had fared.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11513             MR. JANIGAN:  Under the productivity price cap.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11514             MR. HARITON:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11515             MR. JANIGAN:  And to some extent was provided some indication of the ability of the company to manage productivity targets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11516             MR. HARITON:  Yes.  I just wanted to clarify that, as you know, the productivity we are looking at in this proceeding and indeed over that time was not the productivity for the entire utility segment but for a fairly narrow piece of it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11517             There are pieces of the utility segment that were reflected in the rate of return and are not reflected in the productivity targets that are being set.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11518             The major one during that time period was contribution.  Contribution was a revenue stream into the utility segment, which was not in fact subject to a productivity target and in fact not subject to the usual price cap régime.  The rates were set separately.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11519             Indeed, that basically was reflecting productivity in the long distance market and was at one time a great contributor to productivity growth for the company.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11520             There are other things which were in the utility segment, like Yellow Pages, which at the time were integral to residential primary exchange service, which are no longer there, not in the X factor, not in the capped basket.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11521             So I would be very cautious in drawing any inferences from the rates of return for the utility segment to the validity or otherwise of the X factor that was set.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11522             Thank you.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11523             MR. JANIGAN:  You may have to compare it to the return on common equity before the price cap in order to get an accurate picture?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11524             MR. HARITON:  You would actually have to compare it with the rate of return on residential PES services and business PES services, if you could ever calculate that.  That would be the right comparison.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11525             Unfortunately, I don't have the data to do that.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11526             MR. JANIGAN:  Certainly during that period of time the company fared fairly well, given that the allowed rate of return was substantially under that level.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11527             MR. HARITON:  The company fared fairly well.  Whether it fared fairly well because of productivity gains in its basic services ‑‑ business and residence PES ‑‑ or other parts of the company's operations, which is what I suspect actually happened, cannot be deduced from these numbers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11528             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11529             Coming back to your proposal in this proceeding, leaving aside the proposal for uncapping service in different areas, as I understand your proposal, it is that prices will not increase on average.  But you disagree that this implies that I equals X.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11530             I don't understand those two premises.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11531             MR. BIBIC:  Are you talking about areas which would remain capped, Mr. Janigan?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11532             MR. JANIGAN:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11533             MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11534             In fact, if I were to be equal to X based on the productivity numbers that have put forward, that would cause prices to increase.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11535             Certainly our proposal therefore isn't an I equalled to X.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11536             I see what you mean.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11537             We are proposing that prices be capped at the overall basket level.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11538             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11539             MR. BIBIC:  But it is not as a result of I equalling X on the facts.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11540             MR. JANIGAN:  If prices aren't increasing, isn't I ‑ X equal to zero?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11541             Am I missing something here?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11542             MR. BIBIC:  If we were to have an I ‑ X formula, with the X factor that we have put forward, prices would increase.  Instead, what we have said is keep prices frozen at the basket level.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11543             MR. JANIGAN:  But isn't that equivalent to the same thing as having I equal X?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11544             Am I missing something here?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11545             MR. BIBIC:  No.  Mathematically, you would end up in the same place.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11546             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11547             MR. BIBIC:  The rationale or the reasoning behind the proposal is not that I equals X.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11548             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay, I understand now.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11549             MR. BIBIC:  Sorry.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11550             MR. JANIGAN:  Dealing with the competitiveness test, your uncapping services test and attempting to compare it to the competitiveness test that you put forward in the proceeding that gave rise to Decision 2002‑34 ‑‑ I wonder if you could turn up Decision 2002‑34, paragraph 544.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11551             MR. BIBIC:  Which paragraph, sir?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11552             MR. JANIGAN:  544 in Decision 2002‑34.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11553             Do you have that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11554             MR. BIBIC:  We are there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11555             MR. JANIGAN:  This paragraph indicates that:


"The Companies proposed that the Commission should remove the upward pricing constraint, i.e., not limit rate increases, for a service once competitors could serve 30% of the market for that service and once competitors actually serve 5% of the customers in that market.  The Companies noted that these criteria are similar to the rate deregulation criteria applicable to Class 1 cable distribution undertakings.  The Companies submitted that the proposed test is a simple objective measure of the extent of competitive penetration in the relevant market."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11556             Effectively, as I understand it, this was sort of a midway pricing flexibility test that was put forward by The Companies in that proceeding that is similar in many respects to the uncapping tests put forward in this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11557             Would I be correct on that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11558             MR. BIBIC:  I would disagree with that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11559             Certainly a proposal that if accepted were to result in more flexibility along the way to forbearance, but the test in its operation is not quite the same.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11560             One focuses on market share loss back in 2001 and the addressable base of 30 percent, whereas in today's proceeding we are submitting that on a streamlined basis, as I discussed with Mr. Koch, after going through the demand side of the equation and looking at the evidence, the last bit that the Commission should satisfy itself with is that facilities‑based competition has entered.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11561             So the trigger of today's test is the supply side.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11562             MR. JANIGAN:  The trigger is different, but the result is the same.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11563             Wouldn't that be correct to say?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11564             MR. BIBIC:  Correct.  I believe that the result is the same in the sense that capping would be removed for those areas subject to the test being met; the test of course being somewhat different.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11565             MR. JANIGAN:  It seems to me that the test that was proposed or the trigger that was proposed by The Companies in the proceeding that gave rise to 2002‑34 had a considerably higher threshold than your test run capping services that you put forward today.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11566             MR. BIBIC:  In what sense?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11567             MR. JANIGAN:  Well, is there any circumstance in which the competitiveness test set out in 2002‑34 would be met and your uncapping test would not be met?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11568             MR. BIBIC:  I think we could devise certainly theoretical examples which would establish your hypothesis.  However, this is not 2001 any more.  We are into 2006.  And on the residential side, which I am sure is the area which concerns you the most, we are seeing competitors enter quite vigorously exchange by exchange and competing certainly vigorously and doing quite well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11569             As I went through with Mr. Koch this morning, I certainly view the local forbearance régime established by the Commission earlier this year as being a more difficult threshold to meet than the uncapping test that we have proposed, given kind of the transition from full regulation to forbearance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11570             It is very difficult to compare the two, given that the environments are different, is basically a shorter way of answering your question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11571             MR. JANIGAN:  In fact, there could well be circumstances where your uncapping test would be met but it would not meet the competitive test given the fact that there is a requirement that competitors serve 30 percent of the market for that service and competitors actually serve 5 percent of the customers in that market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11572             You don't have any market share test in your uncapping test, as I understand it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11573             MR. BIBIC:  I think we could come up with examples.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11574             If we were to compare what was proposed in 2001 with what is proposed today, in theory, as I said, I would agree with you that we could devise examples which would show that our test today is easier to meet than the test back then, and vice versa.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11575             I would submit that the more reasonable comparator or the better comparison is to compare full regulation with the uncapping test that we have on the table today with the local forbearance régime.  Those are all kind of taking place in 2006, given the market dynamics.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11576             MR. JANIGAN:  What I am getting at, Mr. Bibic, is that back in 2001 the Commission had before it a proposal which had a much higher threshold for you to meet pricing flexibility and refused to grant that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11577             Now we are in a circumstance where you are coming forward requesting the uncapping of services with a much easier threshold to meet.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11578             MR. BIBIC:  Again, I'm not sure it is in all cases an easier threshold to meet.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11579             I would rely again on my assertion that the competitive environment is much different today than it was in 2001, and I think the Commission recognizes that, as I read the September 1st decision.  That was certainly a signal that I got from that decision.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11580             I could refer you to a couple of passages, if you like.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11581             MR. JANIGAN:  No, that's fine, we will move on.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11582             In 2002‑34, the competitive test that was put forward by the companies was opposed by most non‑ILEC parties, including the Competition Commissioner.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11583             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11584             MR. BIBIC:  I don't know, not having been here at the time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11585             MR. JANIGAN:  The Commission, in rejecting the proposal, noted that the companies had the ability to reduce prices below the price cap constraints.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11586             Presumably, you still have that ability, do you not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11587             MR. BIBIC:  We do have that ability, subject to all of the qualifications, restrictions and provisos that we went through with Mr. Engelhart.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11588             MR. JANIGAN:  Finally, in its decision, the Commission found that it was not in the public interest.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11589             MR. BIBIC:  What was not in the public interest?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11590             MR. JANIGAN:  The competitiveness test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11591             MR. BIBIC:  I am not familiar with the reasoning, but certainly I could agree that it was not adopted.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11592             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.  At paragraph 555 ‑‑

"For these reasons, the Commission is also persuaded that approval of the test proposed by TELUS would be in the public interest."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 11593             They found earlier that the TELUS test was much the same as the ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11594             MR. BIBIC:  I have no reason to disagree with your assertion on this point.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11595             MR. JANIGAN:  Dealing with your answer to Consumer Groups Interrogatory 20, the answer seems fairly clear that you don't believe that the forbearance decision of this year ‑‑ 2006‑15 ‑‑ need be modified to accommodate your uncapping test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11596             Am I correct on that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11597             MR. BIBIC:  You are correct, for all of the reasons I gave Mr. Koch, as well.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11598             MR. JANIGAN:  Would you agree that Decision 2006‑15 essentially determined when an ILEC doesn't have market power?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11599             MR. BIBIC:  I believe that the Commission set out a framework which it indicated would satisfy it that an ILEC would no longer have significant market power sufficient for forbearance to be justified in a particular geographic area.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11600             MR. JANIGAN:  Would you agree that there cannot be sustainable competition in a market in which a firm has substantial market power?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11601             MR. KRAUSE:  I am not quite sure what you mean by "sustainable competition".

LISTNUM 1 \l 11602             MR. JANIGAN:  I would ask you to turn up Decision 2006‑15.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11603             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Janigan, there are many markets or industries where there might be an entity with significant market power.  Nevertheless, there could be competition.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11604             The question, certainly from a competition theory point of view, that one would examine is whether or not the entity with significant market power is abusing that significant market power in any given instance.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11605             And then there would be remedies under the Competition Act to address that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11606             So it is not necessarily the case that there is no competition in an industry where there might be an entity with significant market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11607             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.  So you would disagree with paragraph 19, the second bullet, which says:

"As indicated, there cannot be sustainable competition in a market in which a firm possesses substantial market power.  Market power can be demonstrated by the ability of a firm to raise or maintain prices above those that would prevail in a competitive market."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 11608             Effectively, that is what this decision examined, was it not?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11609             MR. BIBIC:  We have to recall that Decision 94‑19 was put forward in the context of an examination of forbearance.  I was answering more generally, in the case of the potential for having competition in an industry where there might be an entity with significant market power, in which case you would be most interested in whether or not there is actual abuse.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11610             Some entities derive their significant market power through superior competitive performance, and there is nothing inherently wrong with that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11611             Under the Competition Act, what you would be interested in is making sure that that entity doesn't abuse that market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11612             Now, 94‑19, to be fair, is an analysis put forward to examine whether or not there is sufficient competition to protect the interests of users under section 34 of the Act, sufficient to remove regulation in any given case.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11613             MR. JANIGAN:  But, effectively, what we are dealing with in Decision 2006‑15 is when will forbearance be granted, and that decision turns on when the ILEC will not have significant market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11614             MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.  Under the analysis of 2006‑15, that is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11615             MR. JANIGAN:  Now, your uncapping services proposal will apply to the range of rates that are being charged for services in which the ILEC continues to have significant market power because it hasn't been forborne.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11616             MR. BIBIC:  Under that analysis, that would be correct, and I do believe that the two tests could co‑exist.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11617             Again, as I have stated several times, this is about a transition, and recognizing that competitive forces are much more vigorous than they used to be.  It is not about deregulation.  Absolutely not.  It is about lightening the regulatory load, and there would be a whole host of regulatory tools which would remain available, as I went through with Mr. Koch.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11618             There are other jurisdictions where you remove retail price controls despite significant market power, because we are not talking about forbearance, you are quite right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11619             MR. JANIGAN:  In that circumstance, with the ILEC possessing significant market power, it has the ability to profitably raise prices above a competitive level for more than a transitory period of time.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11620             Isn't that an alarming prospect for a regulator to allow?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11621             MR. BIBIC:  We put together a proposal which we believe addresses that, Mr. Janigan.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11622             I think, in areas where we would be uncapped, it is because of the competitive entry that is occurring.  Prices will only go down as a result of that competition, all competitors seem to agree.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11623             In areas where we would not meet the uncapping test, we would retain capping, as you know, and at the end of the day what is really most important to assess in an economic examination like this is what the barriers to entry are, and the barriers have been shown to have been lowered significantly, and it doesn't really become a question of examining market shares alone in order to gauge or predict where prices will go when you have the competitive entry of the kind we have.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11624             MR. JANIGAN:  But, generally, a firm seeks to maximize its profits.  In circumstances where it has market power, why would it not raise prices above competitive levels if it could sustain those prices?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11625             MR. BIBIC:  I am answering these questions on the basis that there is a local forbearance framework that has been set down by the Commission, which certainly we have to operate under.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11626             I would suggest that where there is the type of competitive entry that we are seeing today, we don't have significant market power.  However, for the purposes of the Commission's decision, I actually don't think the Commission has to make that finding one way or another.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11627             In other words, I don't think the Commission needs to agree with me that if our test is met ‑‑ the one we are proposing today ‑‑ there is no significant market power, because I am not talking about forbearance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11628             Although I do believe, in my view, that if our test is met it is an indication that there is no significant market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11629             MR. JANIGAN:  But the individual who gets his rates raised because you have uncapped services or the individual who gets his rates raised because they have decided to forbear has the same result visited upon him, does he not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11630             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Janigan, I guess that I am not going to answer the question, because I don't agree with the premise that rates will raise automatically simply because there is uncapping, given the reasons behind the uncapping.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11631             I think, clearly, with the competitive entry we have had, and the pricing that we are seeing, that rates are most likely going to trend down.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11632             MR. JANIGAN:  Then you would be happy with a ceiling, would you?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11633             MR. BIBIC:  Then the question becomes, if there are sufficient market forces, do we need to regulate just in case or for the sake of regulating?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11634             There is no virtue in regulation in and of itself.  The question is:  Should there be reliance on market forces?  If so, then rely on market forces.  If not, then regulate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11635             I don't think it is good regulatory practice to simply slap on rules because there is an unwarranted fear of rates going up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11636             Again, in areas that don't meet the competitiveness test, we are not proposing uncapping.  All we are proposing is to freeze the prices.  There will be rate element constraints.  Given the productivity that we are seeing in this particular line of the business, which is actually negative, not having an I ‑ X will keep rates from rising as a result of the mechanistic I ‑ X formula.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11637             MR. JANIGAN:  First of all, the areas that you are talking about that don't meet your uncapping test, that amounts to some 17 percent of the market in Ontario and Quebec.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11638             Am I correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11639             MR. BIBIC:  We can talk about the number of exchanges, if you like, as well, but on a revenue basis, yes, in Ontario and Quebec.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11640             The reason, quite obviously, is that there has been widespread cable co‑entry.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11641             If you focus on the maritimes, the Atlantic provinces ‑‑ we are here representing Bell Aliant as well ‑‑ the number is down in the 50 percents.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11642             Again, that is not surprising.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11643             MR. JANIGAN:  But wasn't this what we discussed last fall in the forbearance case, where we were attempting to determine what level of competition was sufficient to protect consumers and allow you to forbear?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11644             We have the decision on this, and now we have another test that is going to come forward, the net effect of which is to expose customers to, potentially, the same kind of difficulties with respect to raising prices as a forbearance decision would be with respect to rates.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11645             MR. BIBIC:  Again, the premise is there.  You have inserted your premise in the question about rates rising, with which I disagree.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11646             I also don't think that we are debating the same issues that we were debating in the Local Forbearance Decision.  I am aware that the Consumer Groups penned a letter last week suggesting that that was what we were doing, but the Commission didn't agree with that submission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11647             We have made a proposal that fits well within the scope of this proceeding.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11648             MR. JANIGAN:  Once these rates are uncapped, presumably, there is no price ceiling.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11649             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11650             MR. BIBIC:  That is correct in theory.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11651             MR. JANIGAN:  Decision 2006‑15 imposed a price ceiling for standalone residential PES after forbearance.  So if the service was eventually forborne, there was a price ceiling that was to be enforced.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11652             How does that work in the circumstance of your uncapped services?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11653             MR. BIBIC:  Rates will continue to be regulated, and, as I postulated, given the competitive vigour of the various competitors we are facing, rates will only go down.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11654             I suppose that the standalone Primary Exchange Service pricing constraints dictated by the Local Forbearance Decision would apply to the lower rates then in the market, the lower rates which competition would have dictated.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11655             MR. JANIGAN:  Why wouldn't customers be entitled to a standalone PES rate after uncapping the same way as they would be after forbearance?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11656             MR. BIBIC:  I apologize, Mr. Janigan, I was conferring with Mr. Hariton.  Could you repeat the question?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11657             MR. JANIGAN:  Why wouldn't the standalone PES rates be subject to a price ceiling after uncapping in the same way as they would be after forbearance?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11658             MR. BIBIC:  The same reasoning I gave earlier.  If one believes in market forces ‑‑ and, certainly, I think it would be good regulatory practice to let the market dictate prices, once there is competitive entry, and that will determine where rates are.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11659             I do recognize that the Commission's decision has a constraint on standalone Primary Exchange Service after forbearance, and I believe I have answered that question.  It, too, can work in tandem.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11660             The rates which remain regulated after uncapping would become the rates which would be applicable after forbearance, for the purposes of the standalone pricing constraint.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11661             I am reacting to your question.  I could think about it more, but ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11662             MR. JANIGAN:  You would be removing the price ceiling, and then you would be putting the price ceiling on after the forbearance test had been met.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11663             It is sort of like a right without a remedy, isn't it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11664             MR. BIBIC:  The Commission's ruling is, once there is forbearance, the price immediately prior to forbearance becomes the standalone price for Primary Exchange Service, and that could continue to co‑exist.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11665             I don't see the issue.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11666             MR. JANIGAN:  If forbearance involves a more stringent test for determining competition, and in that circumstance they determined that there should be a price ceiling, being the pre‑existing price, I don't understand why, in the case of your uncapping test, the same kind of price ceiling wouldn't apply.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11667             MR. BIBIC:  You can make that submission.  I believe I have answered your question, to the best of my ability.  I have given you a view as to why that need not be the case.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11668             MR. JANIGAN:  This would be an opportune time, Mr. Chair, if you are thinking of taking an afternoon break.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11669             THE CHAIRPERSON:  We will get together again at 4:15 p.m.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11670             Thank you, Mr. Janigan.

‑‑‑ Upon recessing at 1555 / Suspension à 1555

‑‑‑ Upon resuming at 1614 / Reprise à 1614

LISTNUM 1 \l 11671             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Mr. Janigan, it is my understanding that you will take another 45 minutes to an hour, so it would be our intention to ask whatever additional questions my colleagues may have at that point, and then adjourn until tomorrow morning.  In other words, we won't be asking any other panels of questions or any other cross today except for Mr. Janigan and any other questions we have here.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11672             MR. JANIGAN:  Panel, in your submission on page 3 in paragraph 8 it is noted that:

"Where services are subject to market forces sufficient to protect customers, no regulatory limits need be put in place."  (As read)


LISTNUM 1 \l 11673             We have been over your proposal for uncapping the local PSTN services that is discussed in paragraph 101 of your submission, which is to uncap services within an exchange wherever customers for these services have available at least one facilities‑based alternative or an alternative from a carrier using unbundled elements.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11674             Have I got that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11675             MR. BIBIC:  You do for residential primary exchange service and business primary exchange service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11676             MR. JANIGAN:  If a market area has five alternative providers, are the market forces identical to a market area with one alternative provider?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11677             MR. KRAUSE:  If you are looking at a relatively homogenous product where you have two firms, the incentives to keep undercutting each other and gaining market share will be very similar to whether or not you have three, four or five firms.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11678             MR. JANIGAN:  And if a market area is served by one alternative provider, which is facilities‑based, are market forces identical to a market area served by one alternative provider that relies on unbundled elements?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11679             MR. BIBIC:  It could be, yes, for the same reasons.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11680             MR. JANIGAN:  The uncapping test that you have described is based on an availability test, as I understand it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11681             MR. BIBIC:  I don't understand what you mean by that.  If you can clarify, please.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11682             MR. JANIGAN:  Whether or not customers for these services have available at least one facilities‑based alternative or an alternative from a carrier using unbundled elements, one of these two kinds of services have to be available?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11683             MR. BIBIC:  That's right, one of those two types of providers needs to be supplying service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11684             MR. JANIGAN:  Can this test be passed if only some customers within the exchange have the alternative available?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11685             MR. BIBIC:  That is very similar, I believe, to Commissioner Langford's question, and the answer would be yes.  I mean, without repeating my more lengthy answer to Commissioner Langford's question, I would rely on the same reasoning.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11686             MR. JANIGAN:  Can this test be passed if the alternative provider only sells services in bundles, whereas the company's services are available on an a la carte basis?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11687             MR. BIBIC:  We developed our proposal based on the fact that every single one of our competitors is offering a stand alone primary exchange service as well as admittedly they are bundling quite vigorously, but each one of the competitors that we see today that would qualify for our uncapping test do offer stand alone primary exchange service, and we certainly were aware of that when we developed the test.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11688             MR. JANIGAN:  It would be a stand alone test that you would be looking for?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11689             MR. BIBIC:  I hadn't thought of it but that would be fair, I think.  I will think about it some more over night, but, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11690             MR. JANIGAN:  Don't.

‑‑‑ Laughter

LISTNUM 1 \l 11691             MR. JANIGAN:  Can this test be passed if the alternative provider does not offer services at prices which are comparable to the prices for the company's services?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11692             MR. BIBIC:  No, our test doesn't include a comparison of prices.  I mean, in all cases, as I mentioned to Commissioner Noel, in all cases competitors' prices are below our prices.  The competition will dictate where those prices end up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11693             Of course, our test does incorporate the notion that customers actually have to subscribe.  So, if they are subscribing, it is because they perceive the competitor to be providing a competitive product.  So, explicitly, no, our test doesn't include a comparison of prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11694             MR. JANIGAN:  For customers residing within the exchange with the uncapped rates, would the companies have the ability to raise rates without limit other than what the market will bear?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11695             MR. BIBIC:  Same.  As I indicated before, I don't think in those circumstances actually we would have market power to allow us to raise prices to an unlimited degree, as your question supposes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11696             MR. JANIGAN:  There is no actual limit, and I take it there is no need for approval for any rate increase?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11697             MR. BIBIC:  Technically, no.  We would file our tariff, though.  That is certainly the case.  All the other regulatory rules would be in place.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11698             Again, I find the question to be very theoretical, but to answer a theoretical question, the answer would be yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11699             MR. JANIGAN:  Similarly, you have the ability to reduce rates without limit subject to the imputation test?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11700             MR. BIBIC:  Subject to the imputation test and respecting the other regulatory rules.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11701             MR. JANIGAN:  Will the companies be able to withdraw services without Commission approval?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11702             MR. BIBIC:  No.  Services would remain regulated and will be subject to the Commission's process on service withdrawal and destandardization as the case may be.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11703             MR. JANIGAN:  Once again, this may be theoretical, but if you have the ability to raise rates without limit, could you not in theory raise prices high enough that customers will stop purchasing the service?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11704             MR. BIBIC:  I don't think ‑‑ that is really an unrealistic example.  I don't accept the premise.  I don't think that would happen.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11705             MR. JANIGAN:  Couldn't the companies, for example, adjust prices to migrate customers from relatively low‑priced basic services to higher‑priced bundles?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11706             MR. COLLYER:  From a marketing point of view, we would always have a stand alone service available.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11707             MR. JANIGAN:  But if that stand alone service was increased and priced to the point where it was uneconomical to purchase, when you are attempting to migrate people to higher‑priced bundles, you could do that, couldn't you?  You will say, we don't plan to do that, we don't want to do that, I know that, but in theory you could do that.  Right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11708             MR. COLLYER:  To answer your question, in theory, yes, we could do that, but I think the competitive forces in the marketplace would hold us not to doing that.  So, I agree with the theory of your assertion.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11709             MR. JANIGAN:  I want to briefly examine your rate deaveraging proposal.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11710             Would I be correct in saying the rate deaveraging proposal applies to all services in a rate band where a forbearance has not been granted and rates have not been uncapped pursuant to your proposal?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11711             MR. BIBIC:  Could you unbundle that a little bit for me, Mr. Janigan?

‑‑‑ Laughter


LISTNUM 1 \l 11712             MR. JANIGAN:  There has to be the pre‑condition, if you have already uncapped services presumably there is no need for rate deaveraging.  Am I correct on that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11713             MR. BIBIC:  No, that is not correct.  Even in uncapped areas, we would have to respect the prohibition against the averaging to the extent that they were not removed by the Commission.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11714             If the prohibition were to be removed all together, then we could rate de‑average clearly in an uncapped area and we could de‑average in a capped area.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11715             If the prohibition were only to be removed in uncapped areas, then we could do it in one, but not in the other.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11716             MR. JANIGAN:  But if a service is uncapped, you have the ability to raise rates or lower rates within that particular exchange, without reference to any other part of the rate band, do you not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11717             MR. BIBIC:  Even if an area were uncapped, if the prohibition on the averaging were to remain in place, we would have to respect that.  So, no, we couldn't do that if the prohibition were to remain in place.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11718             MR. JANIGAN:  Deaveraging assumes that there is a particular cap that is applicable across the band, does it not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11719             MR. BIBIC:  I think deaveraging requires that the price be uniform across the band.  So you could have rate band B uncapped, rate band B capped, and if the prohibition were to remain in place, I believe it would be the case that we would have to keep the prices uniform.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11720             MR. JANIGAN:  So let's say you do not get rate deaveraging.  If you uncap a service in a local exchange area and you wish to reduce prices, you would still have to reduce prices across the entire band.  Is that what you are saying?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11721             MR. BIBIC:  If the rule were to remain in place, I believe that would be the case.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11722             MR. JANIGAN:  What is the exact size of the area that we are talking about with respect to rate deaveraging?  Is there a particular geographic area or is it something that pertains just to customer identification?  Is there any particular parameters associated with who gets de‑averaged?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11723             MR. BIBIC:  You mean in principle or in any particular case?  We are proposing that the prohibition be removed in its entirety so it would allow deaveraging on a number of levels.  It could be customer groupings based on identifiable characteristics.  It could be all the way down to the individual customer.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11724             So, in principle, we are advocating the removal of the prohibition all together.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11725             MR. JANIGAN:  Mr. Koch, I believe, went through the examples that are contained in appendix 8 in paragraph 19 with you and some of the differential pricing strategies, that it might be the company's intention to offer discounts to students, senior citizens, differential prices for men and women, discounts to new customers, that sort of thing?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11726             MR. HARITON:  Mr. Janigan, I think these were examples of price differentiation that we find or differential pricing we find out there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11727             I don't think, subject to check with my marketing colleagues, I don't think it is the intent of the company to offer different prices for men and women.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11728             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.  Or discounts to students or senior citizens?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11729             MR. HARITON:  That I can't rule out.  I mean, I am certainly not privy to the company's strategies, but they would certainly make sense to me.  But they should speak for themselves.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11730             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11731             MR. COLLYER:  Basically family segmentation is important to us.  So, looking at life cycle management in the sense of consumer growth.  So, starting out adopting as students, moving into families, recognizing double income couples or, you know, mature single earners, they all have different telecommunication needs that we would propose to address.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11732             Additionally, we have interaction with other services, you know, sort of looking down the future, and also having customized packages to the small office/home office segment, which is in the top end of the residential market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11733             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Janigan, if I may, just to complete an answer from before where you were asking if deaveraging would be permitted in uncapped areas.  There was a bit of hesitation in my answer, and my colleague pointed out to me that paragraph 456 of decision 2002‑34 confirms that today, there are obviously services today that are uncapped, and the rule against deaveraging must be respected.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11734             The Commission indicated in paragraph 456 that:


"Should an ILEC seek to further deaverage rates for uncapped services, it should provide the rationale in its application."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 11735             The same would go under our proposal to the extent that the prohibition against deaveraging were not lifted.  So, the previous answer was correct, but there is a bit more detail now.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11736             MR. ROWE:  Mr. Janigan, I won't belabour the point on the business side, but just to reinforce that business customers certainly do enjoy deaveraged prices today and look more and more to have that kind of an approach.  Those same business customers turn into consumers when they go home.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11737             MR. JANIGAN:  Just following up on the point made earlier with respect to the fact that rate deaveraging does not mean that if rates are reduced in one part of the band, that rates can be increased in another part of the band.  Am I correct on that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11738             MR. BIBIC:  Under our proposal?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11739             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11740             MR. BIBIC:  You will have to run that one by me again.  I just want to make sure I answer it correctly.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11741             MR. JANIGAN:  If you reduce rates in one area of the band, assuming the band is still in place, then effectively, you will not be increasing rates in another part of the band to match up?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11742             MR. BIBIC:  You are presuming that the prohibition is lifted?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11743             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11744             MR. BIBIC:  Correct.  Of course, if you are talking about two areas within a band, one is capped and one is uncapped, and the rule against deaveraging is lifted, we could adjust pricing in the uncapped area to respond to competition in that area, but that wouldn't allow us to increase prices in the capped areas given the constraints that would remain in place in those areas.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11745             MR. JANIGAN:  I am sorry, could you run that by me again?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11746             MR. BIBIC:  You have two areas both in rate band B, one is capped, one is uncapped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11747             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11748             MR. BIBIC:  And the deaveraging rule is lifted so we could deaverage.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11749             MR. JANIGAN:  Okay.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11750             MR. BIBIC:  We could lower our price in the uncapped area, for example, to respond to competition, the premise being that the reason we are uncapped is there is competition.  That doesn't mean, however, that we could raise prices in the capped areas.  In fact, we wouldn't be able to raise prices in the capped areas given that in the capped areas there would be two constraints, one at the basket level and then the individual rate element constraint of 5 per cent.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11751             So, those would operate to prevent ‑‑ it would delink the capped and uncapped areas in fact because constraints would apply in the capped areas.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11752             MR. JANIGAN:  Let's say if you were dealing with two capped areas within a band and you lowered rates, deaveraging was allowed, wouldn't you be able to lower the index within that band so that rates could be increased up until the service band limit?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11753             MR. BIBIC:  Yes, all subject, however ‑‑ and I think what you are suggesting is you have two areas, both are capped?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11754             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11755             MR. BIBIC:  You lower prices in one of the areas and you get head room under the price cap constraints, and, therefore, there would be an incentive to increase rates in other areas of the capped zone so as to fill up the head room.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11756             Again, there are kind of two points to that.  One is, and I wouldn't presume automatically that there is no competition in the capped area; it is just not competition that meets our test.  But secondly, again, there would be an individual rate element constraint of 5 per cent.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11757             So the basket constraint would certainly be respected in our hypothetical, but we wouldn't be able to raise rates in any given area by more than 5 per cent.  Keep in mind that that 5 per cent increase would be on top of rates which are already among the lowest in the world.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11758             MR. JANIGAN:  So, reducing rates in one part of the band could give rise to head room that would enable rates to increase up to the 5 per cent level in another part of the band?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11759             MR. BIBIC:  Right.  So, it is not at all certain, and probably unlikely, that all that head room could be used up, depending, of course, on the level of the price decrease in the other part of the capped band.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11760             MR. JANIGAN:  Would it be the intention of Bell or the companies to introduce time‑of‑day pricing as a potential differential pricing alternative?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11761             MR. BIBIC:  Do you mean that you would pay a different rate depending on the time of day you called?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11762             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11763             MR. BIBIC:  I don't know how that would work without local measured service I suppose, but the answer ‑‑ Mr. Collyer says no.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11764             MR. JANIGAN:  In the case of fixed wireless services which I believe are identified as a competing service, most of these services include time‑of‑day pricing, do they not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11765             MR. ROWE:  Sorry, can you define "fixed wireless?"  Are you talking about conventional cellular or mobility?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11766             MR. JANIGAN:  I am talking about what is recognized to be a viable alternative that would enable services to be uncapped in the circumstance of wireless or of facilities‑based wire alone provider.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11767             MR. BIBIC:  Mobile wireless or what Mr. Rowe referred to as kind of the traditional concept of cellular service wouldn't be one of the services that would qualify under our test for uncapping or would allow us to qualify for uncapping.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11768             MR. JANIGAN:  What kind of wireless ‑‑ the fixed wireless service that you described earlier?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11769             MR. BIBIC:  I think it was probably our ‑‑ we did refer to fixed wireless in our submission more probably as a matter of principle, which we see the potential for local service providers entering with kind of fixed wireless loops, and there is no reason in principle that that kind of operator couldn't qualify, given that they would be facilities‑based.  But as I sit here today, I can't think of one that I know of that is in the marketplace, although there may be.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11770             MR. JANIGAN:  Carrying on with appendix 8, looking at paragraph 32 of appendix 8, it is stated that:

"With large fixed costs the firm will not break even even with marginal cost pricing and will not remain economically viable.  At least some prices will have to exceed marginal or incremental costs."  (As read)

LISTNUM 1 \l 11771             Am I correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11772             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes, that's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11773             MR. JANIGAN:  Would it be true that because of the need to recover fixed costs and to remain economically viable, the companies must seek out all opportunities to set price above marginal cost?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11774             MR. KRAUSE:  In order to recover the fixed cost available, the company will seek to price in such a way that they do recover that fixed cost based on the demand conditions, or at least that would be the optimal way to do so.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11775             MR. JANIGAN:  In effect, the drive is to seek the opportunities to price above marginal cost in order to meet these extensive large fixed costs?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11776             MR. KRAUSE:  I think you definitely need a margin to cover fixed costs, yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11777             MR. JANIGAN:  Carrying on, in paragraph 33 of appendix 8, there is a discussion of a theory of differential pricing and economic efficiency.  The discussion indicates that price inelastic customers face higher prices than price elastic customers.  The paragraph goes on to identify Ramsay pricing as the method associated with accomplishing this objective.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11778             If the companies gain permission to engage in differential pricing, will the companies apply a Ramsay pricing approach?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11779             MR. HARITON:  Mr. Janigan, I don't think anybody actually applies pure Ramsay pricing in practice for a number of reasons, chief of which is that nobody knows exactly what those price elasticities are.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11780             But over and above that, I think that as shown in the three objectives set out by the companies in this price cap proceeding an important consideration is affordability.  Affordability being an important consideration does place an additional limit over and above other limits on top of what can be charged.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11781             That said, I think that you do have to look at Ramsay pricing in terms of what consumer's opportunities are, including switching to competitors of course and every other substitute that is around.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11782             But again, there is the additional consideration in this industry not found in other industries that affordability is a concern.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11783             MR. JANIGAN:  Well, would you agree that it is a necessary condition for Ramsay pricing that the firm has market or monopoly power?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11784             MR. HARITON:  No, I don't, Mr. Janigan.  We did touch on this briefly before, earlier I think with Mr. Engelhart.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11785             It is true that the economic literature often says this, but there is a school of thought from practitioners such as myself and I think increasingly being recognized in the economic literature in journal articles, that the lack of market power is perfectly consistent with differential pricing and indeed with Ramsay pricing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11786             Otherwise nobody would recover their fixed costs and we would all go bankrupt.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11787             MR. JANIGAN:  The article that you reference on Footnote 14, "Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies, a discussion of Ramsay pricing", does that article set out the debate?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11788             MR. HARITON:  The article I was thinking of ‑‑ and again I'm giving the reference off the top of my head ‑‑ is an article by Michael Levine ‑‑ that is L‑E‑V‑I‑N‑E ‑‑ in the Yale Journal of Regulation ‑‑ again, I am hesitant on the year, but I do believe it was 2002, although it may have been 2001 or 2003.  I think it was 2002 ‑‑ which discussed why in fact Ramsay pricing was quite consistent with workably competitive markets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11789             In that article there are a number of footnotes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11790             That said, I would turn to my colleague Dr. Krause and ask him whether there is anything in this present article on that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11791             MR. KRAUSE:  The article listed in the footnote does not talk about the issue that has been raised.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11792             MR. JANIGAN:  I'm just curious, it has "Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies".  It would seem to bear out the supposition that Ramsay pricing and monopolies sort of go hand‑in‑hand.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11793             MR. HARITON:  Yes.  I believe there is a typo in the footnote.  The footnote gives the date as 1997.  My recollection ‑‑ I mean, I bought my copy of that handbook sometime in the early 1990s and I think it was probably 1987 or 1989, Volume 2 at least.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11794             MR. JANIGAN:  You must have taken the last one at the book store, Mr. Hariton.

‑‑‑ Laughter / Rires

LISTNUM 1 \l 11795             MR. HARITON:  This is a pretty big brick, sir.  I don't think many people carry this one away.

‑‑‑ Laughter / Rires

LISTNUM 1 \l 11796             MR. HARITON:  But the thing is, the literature has evolved since then.  The literature I'm talking about in fact ‑‑ well, 2002 is certainly later than 1997 or 1987, but I believe it was 1987 not 1997.  I think that is a typo.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11797             MR. KRAUSE:  If I may add to Mr. Hariton's response, the context in which that footnote was used was that that particular paper does a very good job of explaining the technical foundations of Ramsay pricing.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11798             MR. JANIGAN:  I believe you went through with my friend Mr. Engelhart he issue of efficient and inefficient competitors, but I take it under your theory of price umbrella, once the alleged umbrella is eliminated through a grant of pricing flexibility to the incumbent, then competition will reveal whether the entrants are inefficient.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11799             Is that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11800             MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11801             MR. JANIGAN:  At that time prices can be reduced at the incumbent's discretion and entrants will respond to the extent they can.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11802             If an inefficient entrant has been artificially sustained by the price umbrella, then he will exit the market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11803             MR. HARITON:  That's correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11804             MR. JANIGAN:  In that circumstance, where the inefficient competitor exits the market, what happens to your capping plan?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11805             MR. HARITON:  I'm sorry, can you repeat that?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11806             MR. JANIGAN:  Well, if we have had a competitor enter the market your capping plan ‑‑ or uncapping plan I suppose is probably better ‑‑ has been approved by the Commission, what happens in that circumstance where there has been uncapping and the pricing flexibility has driven that competitor from the market, what happens?  Do the services go back to being capped again?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11807             MR. BIBIC:  No, our proposal would not be that the services automatically go back to being capped.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11808             First, we think it is hypothetical to think that the type of competitor that is in the marketplace today will be driven away, but even if they were, in theory the facilities that they were using remain in the ground and available to be deployed by another new entrant who could acquire those assets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11809             So without evidence of a competitive issue, we wouldn't propose that there be automatic recapping so to speak.  However, if there were an issue raised by a particular party, by yourselves for example, the Commission could certainly have a look at the competitive situation and determine whether or not re‑capping would be advisable, but we don't think it should be an automatic trigger point between uncapping and recapping.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11810             MR. JANIGAN:  In that circumstance there would be another category, sort of virtual competition, as it were?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11811             MR. BIBIC:  I don't think that is fair, Mr. Janigan.  I think you have to keep in mind here that our test is conservative in the sense that it focuses only on facilities‑based competitors.  It excludes a whole bunch of other competitors that could continue to discipline the incumbent's pricing.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11812             Of course, if the incumbent were to try to take advantage of the fact that a particular competitor had exited the market and sought to raise rates, I suspect that that would induce entry given the facilities would still be in the ground.  Were that not the case, then certainly it could be examined and the Commission could make a ruling, given that these areas would not be forborne.  If they were forborne in the meantime, that would be a completely different issue.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11813             MR. JANIGAN:  On page 7 of Appendix 8, paragraph 24, it is stated that:


"A uniform pricing rule can decrease the extent of competition within a market segment.  Uniform pricing rules provide a disincentive to incumbents to lower prices and meet competition in specific market segments given the large revenue losses that will occur elsewhere."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11814             For this statement to hold true, isn't it true that some market segments face conditions which The Companies believe will deserve price reductions and other market segments do not face conditions which The Companies believe deserve price reductions?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11815             MR. BIBIC:  Every geographic market may exhibit different competitive conditions and some pricing may be lower to a greater degree than others, depending on the competitive conditions in that particular geographic market.  So in those situations, certainly without a uniform pricing rule, different customers would be paying different pricing given their different market conditions.  That is, in our view, not inherently unjust or unfair.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11816             MR. JANIGAN:  I wonder if you could turn up Consumer Groups Interrogatory No. 9.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11817             MR. HARITON:  I have that, Mr. Janigan.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11818             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11819             In that answer The Companies describe a pricing relationship as follows, that:

"The railways enter into individual contracts with shippers with prices that reflect both demand and costs.  Indeed the railways ask some shippers, particularly mines, to open their books so that a railway rate can be determined in light of the cost of production of the commodity, the expected market price at destination and the shipper's need for a reasonable return on investment.  This is very close to first degree price discrimination with its well‑known properties of maximizing the output and total welfare."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11820             With regard to the use of the term "reasonable return on investment", will the reasonable return on investment be affected by the degree of competition facing the shipper?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11821             MR. HARITON:  These examples of individual contracts were drawn from situations where ‑‑ I'm sorry, the shipper or the carrier ‑‑ the carrier.  I'm sorry, you said the shipper.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11822             Let me go back.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11823             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11824             MR. HARITON:  The shipper will face competition in the destination market.  Presumably it is operating a mine in upper British Columbia and it is shipping ore, metal ore of some kind to Chicago or the Chicago market.  So it is obviously not facing any competition in British Columbia but it is facing quite fierce competition at its destination in the Chicago area which may come from producers of that ore anywhere in North America, usually in the U.S. southeast.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11825             So at that point what happens is that the price that the shipper can charge in Chicago for his delivered commodity is a function of what other shippers are charging for their delivered commodity in Chicago and that is a competitive price in a competitive market.  The railway then backs out what it can charge as a railway rate from that price to see what is left over for the shipper, looks at the costs of operations in its books, allows for a reasonable return or else the mine is going to go out of business and sets a rate like that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11826             MR. JANIGAN:  Well, I'm puzzled because this is very close to a first degree price discrimination and, as I understand it, to get very close to first degree price discrimination monopoly power or market power is required, is it not?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11827             MR. HARITON:  There is certainly ‑‑ what you have here is the railway is facing the shipper and the shipper has no choice but to deal with that railway as its carrier.  So as far as transport services are concerned, the carrier ‑‑ I'm sorry, let me clear ‑‑ the carrier has a monopoly.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11828             What we are looking at here, is it is operating on derived demand curve of the shipper.  The shipper's derived demand curve is in turn a function of competitive conditions, in my case in Chicago.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11829             I thought you were asking about the shipper, but if you are talking about the carrier, then indeed the carrier has monopoly power for the transport service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11830             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11831             And the welfare enhancement that you describe here is based on that presumption of monopoly power?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11832             MR. HARITON:  It is based on that presumption of monopoly power and the fact that under first degree price discrimination the carrier and the shipper have an incentive to ship as much in terms of output as in a competitive market, albeit it at a much higher price, therefore a higher total revenue for freight, thereby transferring a lot of money from the shipper to the carrier.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11833             MR. JANIGAN:  Now in terms of the use of the concept of total welfare, would you agree that that concept says nothing about the distribution of that welfare?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11834             MR. HARITON:  That's quite right, although as you know there are some economists who have tried to come up with tests, Samuelson and Hicks and Calder are examples who say that if there is enough to be distributed, then it should go through, but in total it does not say what is actually going to happen to that welfare, you are quite right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11835             MR. JANIGAN:  A firm with monopoly power, for example, would get the overwhelming majority of the benefits?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11836             MR. HARITON:  Under first degree discrimination it would get it all.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11837             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11838             As a general rule, the greater the market power of the firm, discrimination is likely to result in a greater share of the welfare, of the total surplus?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11839             MR. KRAUSE:  I think you are going to have to repeat that question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11840             MR. JANIGAN:  Sorry, I think I mixed up a few of the nouns there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11841             MR. KRAUSE:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11842             MR. JANIGAN:  The greater the market power of a firm, that discrimination is likely to result in greater shares of the total surplus being captured by the firm?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11843             MR. KRAUSE:  The allocation of total surplus, I guess my short answer to you is that it depends.  It is going to depend on the demand conditions, the slope of the demand curve, and the cost conditions on how that will be allocated.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11844             In the context of first degree price discrimination or perfect price discrimination, it does lead to sort of the perfectly competitive outcome with respect to pricing, but the informational constraints on that are horrendous in order for it to work in practice.  Essentially, every individual would have to walk around with their willingness to pay somewhere on their body so that we can figure out exactly where they are going to be on the demand curve.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11845             After that, when you have to start making generalities and start classifying consumers into a particular segment, whether it is an observable characteristic or you offer a menu of prices in which consumers can self‑select, those consumers, there may be particular consumers in there which will achieve surplus and so their allocation of surplus will depend on their own willingness to pay.  So it really depends on a number of factors.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11846             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes, but the greater the market power, the greater the surplus that is going to be captured by the firm?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11847             MR. KRAUSE:  But I'm not sure relative to what.  Like are you saying relative to consumers, relative to other producers?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11848             MR. JANIGAN:  Relative to consumers.  Let's put it ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11849             MR. KRAUSE:  I guess if you have two firms operating in a market you may see greater price competition, which would transfer the benefits ‑‑ or more consumer surplus due to the lower price to consumers.  So in that sense, as you move away from those competitive dynamics I guess you could say that producer of surplus would be increasing.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11850             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11851             MR. KRAUSE:  I'm just not sure relative to consumers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11852             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11853             Let me turn to your proposal to uncap rates for discretionary services, including local optional services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11854             First of all, are any discretionary services sold on a stand‑alone basis that you are aware of?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11855             MR. COLLYER:  To rephrase your question, could you buy call display absent anything else?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11856             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11857             MR. COLLYER:  No, you cannot.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11858             MR. JANIGAN:  Effectively, your rationale for allowing the companies to price these services how they see fit is, first of all, that they are discretionary.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11859             MR. BIBIC:  At a very high level that is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11860             MR. JANIGAN:  Second, they have been treated in a slightly different fashion in the past in the price gaps?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11861             MR. BIBIC:  They have, but that wouldn't be the fundamental basis of our proposal to uncap them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11862             MR. JANIGAN:  Third, you believe there is public support for the proposition that you should be able to charge what you like for local optional services?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11863             MR. BIBIC:  It comes down to the reason why you would regulate a service which isn't so essential to the economic and social welfare of kind of the population as a whole that you would be concerned about things like accessibility and affordability.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11864             That is kind of the principle behind our proposal.  They are not of that essential nature, you know, such a social and economic importance that we would need to have heavy regulatory rules associated with the pricing of those services.  I think the facts bear that out.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11865             For Bell Canada, in no case does any individual discretionary feature approach 50 percent of our local exchange service base.  In other words, less than 50 ‑‑ in all cases for Bell Canada, less than 50 percent of our local exchange service subscribers subscribe to one of these services and sometimes it is in the single digits.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11866             In the case of Bell Aliant, I believe there is one service ‑‑ and it is referred to in our submission ‑‑ has a 60 percent penetration rate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11867             So customers don't view these services to be of such an essential nature that they feel they need to subscribe to them to the same extent as they subscribe to primary exchange service.  So in that respect we don't believe that the same pricing rules should apply to them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11868             Customers have the ultimate choice, as you know.  They can choose not to subscribe, as many have done, and in many cases of course today we have competitive providers who are offering those services as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11869             So if they weren't happy with our pricing for those features, they could simply take the entire package of local exchange and discretionary services over to our competitors.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11870             MR. JANIGAN:  What we are talking about effectively here, though, are areas where The Companies still possess market power.  Isn't that correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11871             Competition hasn't reached a level where it is effectively workable pursuant to the forbearance issue.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11872             MR. BIBIC:  There may be areas, correct, that don't pass our competitive networks test and hence would remain capped.  And we are still suggesting that discretionary services would be uncapped.  That is correct.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11873             MR. JANIGAN:  Let's leave aside your capping test.  Let's just look at what is in existence right now: forbearance which determines whether or not you have market power.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11874             If you have market power, you remain regulated; if you don't have market power, you are forborne from regulation.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11875             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11876             MR. BIBIC:  If I am not answering your question, then please stop me.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11877             I think the main point you are getting at is if an area is not competitive, you are still suggesting that you have pricing flexibility for discretionary services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11878             The answer to that is yes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11879             As I said before, there is no virtue in regulation itself.  Many firms in Canada have market power in their various industries, and we don't regulate them.  Here we don't feel that for discretionary services there is the same public policy rationale as there is for connectivity services to regulate them the same way.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11880             So customers, if they have a choice, they can exercise that choice.  And if they don't, the ultimate choice is to not subscribe.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11881             MR. JANIGAN:  Is there a percentage of take‑up that you would find persuasive in terms of whether or not the service should be regulated?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11882             MR. BIBIC:  I think the facts display that the customers view them as discretionary, and as I mentioned before, they are simply not subscribing for these services to the same extent.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11883             That mere fact alone indicates that they are discretionary and shouldn't be regulated the same way.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11884             MR. JANIGAN:  Can you turn up the response of the Consumer Groups to CAC/MOS Interrogatory No. 6, which contains as an attachment a Polara survey.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11885             I would like to refer you to that survey and in particular to Question No. 2 of that survey.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11886             You will note, in terms of the question itself, that we used the dreaded word CRTC in the question rather than being vague in terms of government or regulation or some other neutral term.  We actually used the CRTC term, which in some quarters that object to things like advertisements being eliminated from Super Bowls causes a particular reaction.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11887             So we wanted to be quite, quite specific with respect to this question, that:

"As well, right now the CRTC must approve the rates for services such as Call Answer, Call Display and Call Waiting, which are available with local service through your local telephone company.


Again using the same scale, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, have no opinion, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement:  My local telephone company should be able to charge customers what it wants for monthly rates for local options such as Call Answer, Call Display and Call Waiting without having to have them approved as reasonable by the CRTC."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11888             As you can see, a substantial majority of the respondents disagreed with that proposition that The Companies would not have to require approval by the CRTC.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11889             Doesn't that seem consistent with the idea that the customers seem to value these services somewhat more than The Companies seem to think they value them?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11890             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Janigan, a lot has to do with the way you frame your question.  I suspect you would have had a different answer had you simply said:  Should the local telephone company ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11891             Well, if you look at the question, which is:

"My local telephone company should be able to charge customers what it wants..."

LISTNUM 1 \l 11892             There is a certain connotation to the question which probably led to these results.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11893             I mean, we can look at the server.  We can look at the actual facts.  The actual facts are that customers aren't subscribing to these services anywhere near to the same level of penetration as they are subscribing to our local exchange services, and that is not surprising to me.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11894             It is because of the issues of essentiality or concerns about essentiality and affordability and accessibility to local telephone services that I suppose Parliament saw fit to impose regulation on local exchange services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11895             We don't believe the same policy should underpin pricing restrictions with respect to discretionary services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11896             MR. JANIGAN:  But the take‑up of services doesn't necessarily mean that these services aren't important to the people who will take them up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11897             Wouldn't you agree?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11898             MR. BIBIC:  Would you repeat the question, please.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11899             MR. JANIGAN:  The overall take‑up of these services doesn't necessarily mean that they aren't important to the people that take them up.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11900             MR. BIBIC:  Those people who take them up perceive a value at the particular price.  If the price were lowered, perhaps more people would subscribe to them.  If the prices were increased, fewer people would subscribe to them.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11901             But there is not that element of essentiality associated with them.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11902             I would also point out, Mr. Janigan, that you took part with us, your organization under your direction took part with us and TELUS in 2005 in a consumer research survey done by Decima where consumers were surveyed about the role government should play in the setting of prices, and 74 percent of respondents stated that government should only regulate the more essential services people need and only 23 percent stated that the government should regulate prices for all telephone services, including optional services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11903             You were involved in the development of that question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11904             MR. JANIGAN:  That is correct.  I suppose we can argue which is the better question for gauging the public perception of these optional services and what should be done in relation to it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11905             I leave that Decima Research survey, which also contained some interesting information concerning ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 11906             MR. BIBIC:  Mr. Janigan, if I may, before you move on to your next line of questioning, you had asked me earlier about fixed wireless services, and I couldn't think of any.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11907             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11908             MR. BIBIC:  My colleague again pointed out to me that at paragraph 30, page 10, of our submission we have a couple of footnotes which identify a few fixed wireless service operators.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11909             These would be the types of operators which would qualify under our test.  I had indicated that I wasn't aware of any.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11910             MR. JANIGAN:  I would note also in passing with respect to the Decima Research survey that it also found that approximately 91 percent of the respondents believe that the federal government had a role in ensuring reasonably priced services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11911             Would you agree with me?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11912             MR. BIBIC:  I will pull up the Decima survey and we can have a look.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11913             MR. JANIGAN:  Under "Federal Responsibilities".

LISTNUM 1 \l 11914             I don't want to dissect it endlessly.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11915             MR. BIBIC:  Which page?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11916             MR. JANIGAN:  Under "Federal Responsibilities".  It is the first question.

‑‑‑ Pause

LISTNUM 1 \l 11917             MR. BIBIC:  I have that.  Which of the elements there?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11918             This question asks consumers whether or not they feel that it is important for the federal government to have a role in the policy and regulation of particular services or aspects of it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11919             MR. JANIGAN:  And one of those results is "ensuring reasonably priced services" comes out 91 percent under that particular segment.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11920             MR. BIBIC:  That is correct and that is certainly disaggregated between local exchange services and discretionary services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11921             MR. JANIGAN:  All right.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11922             This was done in June 2005, I take it?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11923             MR. BIBIC:  That is correct.  This was done in June 2005 and filed certainly by us ‑‑ I can't remember if you had filed it as well ‑‑ with the Telecom Policy Review Panel.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11924             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes, we did, I think.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11925             I wonder if I could skip ahead to pay phones, your proposal with respect to pay phones.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11926             As I understand it, pay phones continue to be regulated by the Commission, meaning that the Commission believes The Companies still have the market power to fix prices.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11927             Would that be correct?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11928             MR. BIBIC:  They continue to regulate pay phones.  I don't know ‑‑


LISTNUM 1 \l 11929             MR. JANIGAN:  You are not forborne.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11930             MR. BIBIC:  We are not forborne.  I don't know the basis for the regulation.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11931             Certainly we are regulated.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11932             MR. JANIGAN:  And there is no financial information, as I am aware of, that accompanies this request to increase the charge for pay phone services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11933             We don't have any information about your revenues and expenses, anything of that nature?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11934             MR. BIBIC:  No, we did not file that information.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11935             MR. JANIGAN:  You are requesting a doubling of the rate.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11936             MR. ROWE:  We are requesting that the rate increase to 50 cents for basic pay phone and that we introduce a charge for operator assistance for information at a pay phone to 25 cents.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11937             MR. BIBIC:  Just to be clear, we are not suggesting that we automatically would raise the rate to 50 cents.  We are seeking the flexibility to do so.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11938             MR. JANIGAN:  And would then be able to effectively increase rates in the areas which were competitive and keep rates the same in the areas that weren't competitive.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11939             Is that effectively what you would be doing?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11940             MR. ROWE:  I don't actually think it would be analyzed based on those merits.  We actually would be looking at the overall market and probably setting some uniform rates across the market.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11941             MR. JANIGAN:  It would be a uniform rate that you would be setting across the market?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11942             MR. ROWE:  I believe, just for the sake of convenience for customers.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11943             MR. JANIGAN:  You wouldn't be deaveraging or discriminating across the base of pay phones.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11944             MR. BIBIC:  It would be possible to do.  Whether or not it would be done is a different question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11945             MR. JANIGAN:  I am curious that no financial information concerning the pay phones has been provided to justify the doubling of the rates.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11946             Are any members of the panel responsible for justifying or administering budgets in Bell Canada?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11947             MR. HARITON:  We all are ‑‑ except for me.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11948             MR. BIBIC:  Except for him, but it has an impact on my budget.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11949             MR. HARITON:  But not big enough.

‑‑‑ Laughter / Rires

LISTNUM 1 \l 11950             MR. JANIGAN:  Would it be standard practice for the company to agree to doubling of expenditures without looking at the background operating and financial results?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11951             MR. ROWE:  Sorry, could you repeat the question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11952             MR. JANIGAN:  In this case, you are requesting a doubling of the pay phone rates without provision of any information as to how you are doing under that circumstance.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11953             Is it standard operating practice within the company that a budget may be increased or doubled without looking at the operating expenses that are associated with the previous year's operation?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11954             MR. ROWE:  Clearly trimming of budgets is one of the elements that we look at when considering a change in budgets.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11955             MR. JANIGAN:  And you would look at financial results.  Wouldn't that be correct?


LISTNUM 1 \l 11956             You wouldn't go forward with a proposal to double the budget unless you had looked at the financial results.  Would I be correct on that?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11957             MR. ROWE:  Sorry, could you repeat the question.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11958             MR. JANIGAN:  You wouldn't go forward with a proposal to double the budget for an individual expense item unless you had seen the financial results.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11959             MR. ROWE:  I mean, clearly we have seen the financial results for this portfolio.  The results of that financial performance indicate several things.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11960             First of all, the rates for pay phones have not changed since 1981.  In real terms, the rate for pay phone is about 13 cents.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11961             Our costs for pay phones have been increasing.  As a matter of fact, the margins on pay phone services have decreased over the last several years.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11962             We have seen at the same time a higher penetration of mobile phones, which are a clear competitor and substitute for pay phones.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11963             All of these factors together really put us in a position where roughly 40 percent of our pay phones are not generating enough revenue to actually fund their own replacement cost.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11964             MR. JANIGAN:  What about the other 60 percent?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11965             MR. ROWE:  Clearly they are above that level.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11966             MR. JANIGAN:  I guess it is difficult to adjudicate your need for an increase without having the actual financial data.  I guess that is the point I was getting at.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11967             Do you believe that the Commission, acting responsibly, would double the pay phone rates without getting that data?

LISTNUM 1 \l 11968             MR. ROWE:  I think the market information that I just talked to in terms of pay phones are simple facts which are the kind of indicators which would allow us the flexibility that we have asked for here.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11969             MR. JANIGAN:  Finally, my last area deals with the calculation of the productivity dividend that was derived by Bell in CRTC Interrogatory 1102.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11970             As well, I would like you to briefly comment on the TFP analysis that was derived by Dr. Raycroft on behalf of the Consumer Groups in this proceeding.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11971             As I understand your response to Interrogatory 1102, The Companies do not believe that a TFP analysis at this time is possible to be able to be inserted in the price cap.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11972             MR. HARITON:  That is correct, Mr. Janigan, and let me explain why.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11973             The concept of TFP, total factor productivity, is well defined at the total company level. It is not well defined at sub‑company level, and as you go farther down it becomes more and more ill defined.  So when you get down to individual services, it is quite meaningless.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11974             The reason for that is that when you look at the company as a whole, there are certain activities and certain things which are done which benefit the company as a whole.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11975             Over and above that, total company productivity comes from many sources.  And when it comes from many sources, what happens is that you may be seeing large productivity gains from some activity which is totally unrelated to the activity which you are concerned with.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11976             For example, in our case you may well be seeing large productivity gains hypothetically coming from wireless or mobile wireless activities, which are almost completely unrelated to wireline activities.  There are some trunking and switching that is shared, but that is really de minimis.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11977             If you are looking at the company‑wide productivity, is not very meaningful when you are trying to figure out what to expect for a given service.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11978             Similarly, what is happening is that if you try to drive productivity down, the farther down you get, the less meaningful it gets because you get into a series of quite arbitrary allocations and things of that sort.  Indeed, I think the results would not be very meaningful.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11979             We did try to get TFP for the utility segment in 2001.  We did it for the years which you showed us earlier today, and that was quite an unsatisfactory exercise.  We did put it forward because the Commission wanted to see it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11980             I believe at the time I cautioned the Commission against using those numbers, because in my view they were not meaningful.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11981             So I would not use a TFP number.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11982             I think you will find that if you look at just the mathematics of it, using a unit cost trend will actually capture the expected changes in output prices ‑‑ sorry, I should say that unit cost trend combined with what is happening in the rest of the economy.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11983             Unit costs for the company under consideration relative to a unit cost trend for the economy as a whole, the difference between those two will capture both the change in productivity for the company versus the change in productivity for the economy as a whole.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11984             It will also capture input price changes for the company, versus input price changes for the economy as a whole, because the unit cost for either entity will capture productivity and input price changes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11985             So by subtracting the two sets of unit costs, I will have implicitly subtracted both the two TFPs and the two input prices, giving me an implicit price differential.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11986             So, in that sense, the unit cost trend will be specific to the service or services for which I have a trend, or any that can be easily approximated by them, and it will give me the proper result.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11987             So this approach, in my mind, is equivalent to the TFP approach, except that it is tailored to the actual services which we are considering.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11988             Let me add one more thing, because you gave me a very open‑ended question, so I am profiting from it.

‑‑‑ Laughter / Rires

LISTNUM 1 \l 11989             MR. JANIGAN:  Lucky me!

LISTNUM 1 \l 11990             MR. HARITON:  The third thing is something which I think is very important, which is giving proper incentives.  Not only is it inappropriate to use productivity which can be achieved in other services, because it may simply not be achievable in the services you are looking at, but setting a productivity target based on productivity for services that are not regulated will, in fact, start to blunt some of the incentives for efficiency in the regulated sector, and, more particularly, in the unregulated sector, because neither sector bears the complete consequences of what is happening there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11991             It is a little bit like rate‑based rate of return.  The Commission went to a split rate base, and rightly so, to isolate the results happening in the utility segment from the results in the competitive segment, so that the companies would be at will to do whatever they wanted in competitive markets.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11992             If they made out well, that was fine, they kept it.  If they messed up, their shareholders would eat it.  And the utility customer would be isolated from that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11993             That separation of incentives was carried over into the price cap regime, in that, if you have de‑regulated services or uncapped services, if the company messes up, the shareholder eats it, and if the company does well, the shareholder keeps it.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11994             That is why, in fact, not having earnings sharing was a very important feature of the two price cap plans.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11995             Now, if you are going to look at productivity for the entire firm, and try to look at just the subset of regulated services, you are back into trying to span the two parts of the business, and all of the problems that you have been solving before, through the split‑rate base and through price caps, will come back through the back door.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11996             MR. JANIGAN:  But you would agree that the economies of scope that are captured, for example, by the operation of residential PES, because these economies are in unregulated services, won't be reflected in your final rate analysis or productivity factor, even though they are contributing enormously, potentially, to the productivity of the company as a whole.


LISTNUM 1 \l 11997             MR. HARITON:  No, I'm sorry, I beg to differ with you on this one.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11998             Economies of scope certainly are captured.  There are economies of scope in the unit cost trend for res PES.

LISTNUM 1 \l 11999             Let me give you a couple of examples, so that we can be clear on that.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12000             Let's look at wireless as an example.  To the degree that the wireless services are using the same network, which they do for part of their service ‑‑ some trunking and some switching ‑‑ what you get is, you get more traffic over the interoffice routes, which allows you to get larger trunk groups and more efficient use of the trunk groups you have, and those efficiencies will be benefiting all of the traffic that goes through that trunk group, whether it be wireless traffic or res PES traffic or long distance traffic ‑‑ whatever it is that goes through there, it will all benefit from that economy of scope.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12001             Similarly, in a switch, what you can do is, because you have added some services which use the same switch ‑‑ long distance is a good example.  You have long distance and local using the same Class 5 switch.  The Class 5 switch may be designed and operated more efficiently because you have more traffic.


LISTNUM 1 \l 12002             To that extent, both the costs of long distance will be affected and the cost of local will be affected, and they will both get a benefit.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12003             So in that sense, yes, you do capture economies of scope.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12004             MR. JANIGAN:  There will be reductions in costs, and there will be reductions in inputs, but you won't be measuring any increases in outputs based on revenues in unregulated services.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12005             MR. HARITON:  No, that's correct, and I think that is right, because I am looking at ‑‑ in this case res PES, actually, and I am looking at bus PES as well.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12006             But let's take res PES.  I am looking at res PES, and what I am looking at is the productivity which would be applied to res PES.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12007             So, in fact, what I am looking at is res PES on a standalone basis, and that includes, on the one hand, increases in output, which is how many lines I have, and that goes into the denominator of the unit costs, and I am looking at what I can do about the costs of producing that output, which is, of course, the numerator of the unit cost.  Dividing the two gives me the proper measure.


LISTNUM 1 \l 12008             MR. JANIGAN:  I am curious, given the approach of attempting to segregate the inputs and outputs at the level of residential PES and not extending the analysis to the revenues that are additionally generated, why you would make adjustments at any given time, which are basically being driven by the new revenue sources, such as wireless or DSL or VoIP on DLS, that are effectively reducing the use of the copper line facilities in residential PES.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12009             MR. HARITON:  I'm sorry, I may have missed a beat there.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12010             You are saying that we are not looking at the impact of outputs in these other services, even though they reduce the number of lines for PES?

LISTNUM 1 \l 12011             Is that right?

LISTNUM 1 \l 12012             MR. JANIGAN:  No, I am contrasting ‑‑ what you have done is, after you have done that analysis with respect to unit costs, you have also then made a series of adjustments that are based on ‑‑

LISTNUM 1 \l 12013             MR. HARITON:  We have made a series of adjustments based on line loss.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12014             MR. JANIGAN:  Yes.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12015             MR. HARITON:  That's correct.


LISTNUM 1 \l 12016             MR. JANIGAN:  And that line loss is driven, in large part, because of the rise of the alternate services in wireless and DSL and VoIP and whatever, and you have explicitly shut them out from being considered as part of the TFP from the residential PES, but at the same time their presence has led you to make adjustments to the unit cost measure that you initially derived.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12017             It seems to be that it is unfair.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12018             MR. HARITON:  I am not sure that fairness has a lot to do with it, but let's try to trace it through.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12019             First of all, I think it is important to note that a lot of the line loss we are talking about is due to competitive losses to facilities‑based carries ‑‑ end‑to‑end facilities‑based carries like the cable companies.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12020             We see a line loss because the customer has gone to a cable line.  So we have one active loop less.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12021             That is a very important line loss, and one which affects our costs.  We are basically on a rising cost curve instead of a declining cost curve, if you will, in terms of economies of density.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12022             If you look at, for example, a wireless migration, which also will reduce our copper loops, what you get is an increased cost.


LISTNUM 1 \l 12023             Now, whether that customer has gone to a competitor or whether that customer has gone to a mobile wireless who is a competitor of Bell Mobility or whether it has gone to Bell Mobility, the impact on the residential costs of providing res PES is the same.  It doesn't matter where their customer has gone, the relative thing is, he is gone.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12024             Now you are saying:  Well, he is gone.  Some of those customers may well have gone to wireless services within your very own company.  What do you do with those things?

LISTNUM 1 \l 12025             The answer is:  If it turns out that wireless is a better product, for whatever reason, for that customer's needs ‑‑ it better matches the customer's needs, for whatever reason, and he goes there, as far as res PES is concerned he is a lost customer the same way as he is a lost customer for anything else.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12026             MR. JANIGAN:  What about migration to VoIP?


LISTNUM 1 \l 12027             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Mr. Janigan, I have made a commitment to an employee, who was otherwise going to start charging us double time to run the webcast back at the CRTC.  It was my impression ‑‑ and I realize that we can make mistakes in this regard ‑‑ that you would have finished.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12028             Would it be a major inconvenience for you to continue tomorrow morning?

LISTNUM 1 \l 12029             MR. JANIGAN:  No.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12030             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Great.  Thank you very much.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12031             Thanks for your participation and your attention, ladies and gentlemen.  We will adjourn until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12032             THE SECRETARY:  Mr. Chair, I would like to read, for the record, the exhibits that were filed today.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12033             The Companies Exhibit No. 1:  Opening statement submitted by the Companies in the matter of Price Caps Regulations, Public Notice CRTC 2006‑5.

EXHIBIT NO. COMPANIES‑1:  Opening Statement Submitted by Bell Aliant, Bell Canada, and Saskatchewan Telecommunications (The Companies) in the matter of Price Caps Regulation, Public Notice 2006‑5, dated 10 October 2006

LISTNUM 1 \l 12034             THE SECRETARY:  TELUS Exhibit No. 1:  Opening statement of TELUS Communications Company.


EXHIBIT NO. TELUS‑1:  Opening Statement of TELUS Communications Company dated October 10, 2006

LISTNUM 1 \l 12035             THE SECRETARY:  MTS Allstream Exhibit No. 1:  Excerpt of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel, Final Report, 2006.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12036             MTS Allstream Exhibit No. 2:  Excerpt of the Telecommunications Decision CRTC 2005‑27.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12037             MTS Allstream Exhibit No. 3:  Excerpt of the Telecom Decision CRTC 2006‑15.

EXHIBIT NO. MTS‑2:  Excerpt of Telecom Decision CRTC 2005‑27, Review of price floor safeguards for retail tariffed services and related issues, dated 29 April 2005

EXHIBIT NO. MTS‑3:  Excerpt of Telecom Decision CRTC 2006‑15, Forbearance from the regulation of retail local exchange services, dated 6 April 2006

LISTNUM 1 \l 12038             THE SECRETARY:  Thank you very much.

LISTNUM 1 \l 12039             THE CHAIRPERSON:  Thank you, Madam Secretary.


LISTNUM 1 \l 12040             We will see you tomorrow at nine o'clock.

‑‑‑ Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1731, to resume

    on Wednesday, October 11, 2006 at 0900 / L'audience

    est ajournée à 1731, pour reprendre le mercredi

    11 octobre 2006 à 0900

 

 

                      REPORTERS

 

 

 

 

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Johanne Morin             Lynda Johansson

 

 

 

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Jean Desaulniers          Fiona Potvin

 

 

 

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Sue Villeneuve           

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