



## Telecom Decision CRTC 2026-87

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### **CISC Emergency Services Working Group – Report ESRE0098b – Next-Generation 9-1-1 Reliability, Resiliency, and Security Best Practices and Standards**

#### **Summary**

9-1-1 is a bridge that connects Canadians to emergency services in times of need. Federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments, as well as telecommunications service providers (TSPs) all play a role in ensuring that Canadians can access 9-1-1 services. The Commission's role is to regulate the TSPs that connect 9-1-1 calls to local 9-1-1 call centres.

Next-Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1) is a new and improved 9-1-1 service. Once fully implemented, NG9-1-1 will give Canadians and 9-1-1 call centres tools that will provide quicker and more accessible communication during emergencies. The Commission acknowledges the importance of NG9-1-1 and will continue to support the transition within its mandate.

Because the transition to NG9-1-1 involves TSPs, the Commission has a role in setting certain technical standards. The CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee (CISC) Emergency Services Working Group (ESWG) supports the development of these technical standards. The ESWG is composed of expert groups that play distinct roles in providing 9-1-1 services to Canadians. These groups include first responders, public safety answering points, TSPs, and provincial, territorial, and municipal governments. Once the ESWG has developed recommendations on a technical standard, it submits a report to the Commission. These recommendations support the Commission in decisions on 9-1-1 services within its role of regulating TSPs.

Following Commission requests on the development of an NG9-1-1 service outage notification process, CISC approved and filed with the Commission a follow-up report from the ESWG regarding NG9-1-1 reliability, resiliency, and security best practices and standards. The report provides six recommendations aimed at minimizing the likelihood of NG9-1-1 service outages and ensuring that, should outages occur, their impact on Canadians is mitigated to the maximum extent feasible.

In this decision, the Commission approves five of the ESWG's recommendations on a final basis, and one recommendation, with modifications, on an interim basis.

## Background

1. In Telecom Regulatory Policy 2016-165, the Commission asked the CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee (CISC) Emergency Services Working Group (ESWG) to develop a process for 9-1-1 network providers to notify originating network providers (ONPs) and public safety answering points (PSAPs) of outages on legacy 9-1-1 networks.
2. In Telecom Decision 2017-389, the Commission approved, with modifications, an initial 9-1-1 service outage notification process, and mandated its implementation by 9-1-1 network providers (the legacy 9-1-1 outage process). The Commission also asked the ESWG to review and update, as required, the legacy 9-1-1 outage process to address any new issues and incorporate any new notification tools that may emerge with the implementation of Next-Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1).
3. In Telecom Regulatory Policy 2019-66, the Commission requested the ESWG to assess and make recommendations on a number of technical and operational considerations pertaining to two databases that underpin NG9-1-1 services. These are the Location Information Server (LIS), which ensures that NG9-1-1 calls are delivered to the PSAPs serving the callers' locations, and the Additional Data Repository (ADR), which provides PSAPs receiving the calls with ancillary data about the callers (e.g., phone numbers, locations, etc.).
4. On 4 September 2025, the Commission set out, in Telecom Decision 2025-225, a new regulatory framework for the notification and reporting of major telecommunications service outages. The new framework mandated both 9-1-1 network providers and ONPs to notify PSAPs of any major 9-1-1 service outage, as defined in that decision.<sup>1</sup> The Commission also requested the ESWG to present, by 4 March 2026, an updated outage notification process that both ONPs and 9-1-1 network providers should implement to notify PSAPs of major legacy 9-1-1 and NG9-1-1 service outages.
5. The Commission notes that the ESWG report that is the subject of the present decision was filed prior to the publication of Telecom Decision 2025-225. Therefore, when developing the report's recommendations, particularly recommendation 6 pertaining to NG9-1-1 service outage notification, the ESWG did not have an opportunity to take into account the Commission's determinations and request found in that decision.

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<sup>1</sup> In Telecom Decision 2025-225, the Commission defined a 9-1-1 service outage as an outage that results in a full disruption (i.e., 9-1-1 calls not delivered to PSAPs) or partial disruption (i.e., 9-1-1 calls are delivered, but ancillary data about the callers is not delivered) of 9-1-1 services that originates in either (i) the 9-1-1 networks operated by the 9-1-1 network providers, or (ii) the 9-1-1 service-specific equipment and systems operated by ONPs. Furthermore, the Commission determined that any 9-1-1 service outage, regardless of duration and the number of end-users affected, is to be considered a major 9-1-1 service outage. This definition is broader in scope than the one found in Telecom Regulatory Policy 2016-165, which only applied to 9-1-1 networks, and not to ONPs' 9-1-1 service-specific equipment and systems.

## The report

6. To address the Commission's requests set out in Telecom Decision 2017-389 and Telecom Regulatory Policy 2019-66, the ESWG filed with the Commission its consensus report<sup>2</sup> [ESRE0098b](#), *NG9-1-1 Reliability, Resiliency, and Security Best Practices & Standards*.
7. In the report, the ESWG made consensus recommendations along four themes:
  - (a) establishing reliability and resiliency standards pertaining to the LIS and ADR databases (recommendations 1, 2, and 3);
  - (b) promoting a hybrid approach for processing NG9-1-1 calls without location information (recommendation 4);
  - (c) fostering PSAP cybersecurity readiness (recommendation 5); and
  - (d) formalizing an NG9-1-1 service outage notification process (recommendation 6).

### **Theme A – Establishing reliability and resiliency standards pertaining to the LIS and ADR databases (recommendations 1, 2, and 3)**

8. The first recommendation under this theme sets out a data quality assurance standard for the LIS database, which is critical for accurately delivering NG9-1-1 calls to the appropriate PSAPs.
9. The second recommendation sets out reliability standards for both the LIS and ADR databases. Given the critical role of the LIS database in the delivery of NG9-1-1 calls, the ESWG recommended that the database must maintain or exceed a reliability standard of 99.999%. In contrast, the ESWG ascribed a secondary importance to the ADR database, because the data it contains are provided to PSAPs after the calls have been delivered to them to facilitate the dispatch of first responders. As such, the ESWG considered that a lower reliability standard for the ADR database would be appropriate, namely, that it must be redundant, have no single point of failure, be cybersecure, and provide encrypted data.
10. The third recommendation sets out a data auditing standard for both the LIS and ADR databases.
11. The recommended standards for the LIS and ADR databases reflect the current state of 9-1-1 network providers' hosted services.<sup>3</sup> The ESWG's three recommendations related to this theme

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<sup>2</sup> A consensus report is one in which all members of the submitting working group agree on the content and the recommendations.

<sup>3</sup> In Telecom Regulatory Policy 2019-66, the Commission made ONPs responsible for implementing the LIS and ADR databases, which they may do either by building the databases themselves (self-provisioning) or by leveraging hosted databases provided by 9-1-1 network providers.

primarily affect ONPs that have opted or may plan to self-provision their LIS and ADR databases to ensure consistent reliability and resiliency regardless of the chosen implementation method.

#### **Theme B – Promoting a hybrid approach for processing NG9-1-1 calls without caller location information (recommendation 4)**

12. The ESWG assessed alternative processes for delivering NG9-1-1 calls in the unlikely event of a failure in the LIS database. In that scenario, the location information of affected NG9-1-1 calls would be unavailable or unusable for call-routing purposes. As a result, those calls would not be automatically delivered to the appropriate PSAPs.<sup>4</sup>
13. Saskatchewan has long implemented a best practice where one default PSAP is responsible for all 9-1-1 calls originating in the province, except for two major population centres, which are each served by a dedicated PSAP. These three PSAPs are interconnected for mutual aid purposes (e.g., call-load sharing during mass calling events). Building on that best practice, Saskatchewan indicated that, when transitioning to NG9-1-1, it would implement a hybrid approach for processing NG9-1-1 calls without caller location information. Specifically, calls that ONPs can reasonably guarantee to have originated within the province would go to the default PSAP for triage, while others would go to third-party call centres. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have also indicated their interest in adopting a similar best practice.
14. The ESWG therefore recommended that all provinces and territories transitioning to NG9-1-1 be encouraged to consider designating one or more default PSAPs within their respective jurisdictions.

#### **Theme C – Fostering PSAPs' cybersecurity readiness (recommendation 5)**

15. The ESWG has continued its self-initiated effort to identify cybersecurity best practices and resources for the benefit of PSAPs. Additional PSAP cybersecurity resources identified in the report include the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's [\*Baseline Cyber Security Controls for Small and Medium Organizations V1.2\*](#) framework. The ESWG recommended that PSAPs be strongly encouraged to immediately review and apply the cybersecurity controls and business processes as detailed in [section 2.4](#) and [Appendix C](#) of the report.

#### **Theme D – NG9-1-1 service outage notification (recommendation 6)**

16. In accordance with Telecom Decision 2017-389, the ESWG proposed an NG9-1-1 service outage notification process (the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process) that is built on the legacy 9-1-1

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<sup>4</sup> In Telecom Regulatory Policy 2019-66, the Commission directed ONPs and 9-1-1 network providers to contract third-party call centres to triage this type of call by verbally confirming the caller's location and then manually transferring the call to the appropriate PSAP.

outage process.<sup>5</sup> It recommended that ONPs and 9-1-1 network providers be directed, and PSAPs be encouraged, to implement the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process.

17. The ESWG emphasized that ONPs should be mandated to notify 9-1-1 network providers of originating network outages disrupting 9-1-1 call delivery,<sup>6</sup> pending the conclusion of the Telecom Notice of Consultation 2023-39 proceeding.<sup>7</sup>

### **Commission's analysis**

18. The Commission considers that the ESWG's recommendations 1 through 5, as set out in the report, are appropriate and can be approved without modification. These recommendations are aligned with the Commission's objectives to minimize the possibility of NG9-1-1 calls not being delivered to the appropriate PSAPs, and to provide high-quality information, services, and support to PSAPs, which ultimately enables emergency responders to effectively assist Canadians.
19. The Commission is of the view that the ESWG's recommendation 6, however, requires some modifications, given that the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process is not suitable for approval on a final basis, as discussed below.

### **NG9-1-1 service outage notification (recommendation 6)**

20. The Commission notes that the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process will need to be updated, because it was developed prior to the publication of Telecom Decision 2025-225. Specifically, it will need to incorporate the new definition of a major 9-1-1 service outage and related requirements set out in that decision.
21. Given that the development and approval of an updated process will take some time, the Commission considers it appropriate to establish interim NG9-1-1 outage notification obligations based on subsection 4.1 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process. That subsection sets out requirements pertaining to 9-1-1 network providers, which are generally aligned with the Commission's determinations in Telecom Decision 2025-225. However, the Commission finds that a specific provision that requires outage status updates every hour (the time cap provision) constitutes an unnecessary burden on 9-1-1 network providers and should be removed. Instead, in accordance with the requirements set out in Telecom Decision 2025-225, updates should be provided as soon as possible following a material change to the information provided in the notification.

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<sup>5</sup> The proposed NG9-1-1 outage process is set out in [Appendix B](#) to the report.

<sup>6</sup> There are two types of originating network outages: (i) general outages that disrupt the delivery of all calls, including 9-1-1 calls; and (ii) outages that disrupt the delivery of only 9-1-1 calls, not other calls.

<sup>7</sup> Telecom Decision 2025-225 concluded the Telecom Notice of Consultation 2023-39 proceeding.

22. The Commission is of the view that subsection 4.2 of the proposed NG9-1-1 notification process, which addresses originating network outage notification, should not be adopted at this time in light of the Commission's determinations and outstanding request to the ESWG in Telecom Decision 2025-225.
23. The Commission notes that subsections 4.1 and 4.2 reflect the use of email as a method of mass outage notification from 9-1-1 network providers and ONPs, a method first approved by the Commission in Telecom Decision 2017-389 as part of the legacy 9-1-1 outage process. However, given the widespread adoption of new communication platforms since that time, the Commission questions whether email remains the most efficient and effective tool for time-sensitive mass outage notification. The Commission is therefore of the view that the ESWG should reassess this approach to address a number of considerations as set out in the Commission's determinations in the conclusion to this decision.
24. Subsection 4.3 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process sets out best practices for PSAPs. The Commission notes that these practices are not affected by the determinations set out in Telecom Decision 2025-225 and considers it appropriate to approve subsection 4.3 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process on a final basis.

#### **Matters for further consideration**

25. The report identifies nine matters for further consideration pertaining to the LIS and ADR databases, the third-party call centres that triage NG9-1-1 calls without caller location information, and other NG9-1-1 matters that require ongoing monitoring. [Section 6](#) of the report includes a full list and description of the matters for further consideration. Matter for further consideration #2 is particularly relevant to this decision. It concerns the development of a notification process for breaches or attempted breaches of the LIS and ADR databases. While this work was initially requested in Telecom Regulatory Policy 2019-66 and the ESWG committed to filing a recommended process by the end of 2025, the Commission is of the view that the scope of this matter for consideration should be expanded.
26. The Commission notes that data about 9-1-1 calls and/or callers containing sensitive and personally identifiable information may be processed or stored in systems beyond the LIS and ADR databases, including systems that hold 9-1-1 call recordings. Given the importance of timely notification of breaches or attempted breaches to mitigate potential harm and prevent further unauthorized access, the Commission considers it reasonable to request that the ESWG expand the scope of matter for further consideration #2 to encompass all NG9-1-1 systems, including those operated by PSAPs, that process or store sensitive data about 9-1-1 calls and/or callers. In light of the expanded scope of work, the Commission sets an updated deadline of **13 August 2026** for this request. Further details regarding this request are set out in the Commission's determinations in the conclusion to this decision.

## Conclusion

27. In light of all of the above, the Commission approves the ESWG's recommendations 1 through 5, as set out in the report, without modification, and approves on an interim basis recommendation 6, with some modifications.

28. Accordingly, the Commission:

- directs ONPs and 9-1-1 network providers, as a condition of offering and providing telecommunications services, to implement the requirements stemming from recommendations 1 through 3, as applicable to them, as set out in Appendix 1 to this decision; and
- encourages provincial and territorial governments and PSAPs to consider implementing the best practices stemming from recommendations 4 and 5, as applicable to them, as set out in Appendix 1 to this decision.

29. Regarding recommendation 6, the Commission:

- approves on an interim basis, effective **13 May 2026**, the implementation of subsection 4.1 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process as set out in Appendix 2 to this decision, which has been modified to remove the time cap provision, until the Commission approves an updated NG9-1-1 outage process for 9-1-1 network providers that is aligned with its determinations in Telecom Decision 2025-225 (the interim period);
- directs, as a condition of offering and providing telecommunications services, 9-1-1 network providers to implement subsection 4.1 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process, as set out in Appendix 2 to this decision, during the interim period; and
- approves on a final basis subsection 4.3 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process as set out in Appendix 2 to this decision and encourages PSAPs to implement the best practices it sets out.

## Related issues

30. Regarding the issue of mass outage notification by email, the Commission requests the ESWG, as part of its work to update the legacy 9-1-1 and the proposed NG9-1-1 outage processes in accordance with the Commission's request set out in Telecom Decision 2025-225, to:

- describe any issues, including delayed or missed notifications, that may have been encountered by stakeholders, especially PSAPs, as a direct result of the current method;

- assess the practicability of implementing add-on improvements to the current method, or implementing alternative mechanisms or tools, with a view to increasing the efficiency and efficacy of notifications, including mass notifications;
  - provide a recommendation, along with detailed justifications, as to whether the current method remains the most efficient and effective option available, and, if not:
    - describe how the current method could be improved or replaced; and
    - provide a feasible date by which the recommended improvement or replacement could be implemented.
31. Regarding the time cap provision, the Commission requests the ESWG to ensure the removal of the time cap provision from the updated E9-1-1 and NG9-1-1 service outage notification processes pertaining to both 9-1-1 network providers and ONPs.
32. Regarding the issue of data breach or breach attempt notification, the Commission requests the ESWG to expand the scope of matter for further consideration #2 to:
- document all NG9-1-1 systems, whether under the control of ONPs, 9-1-1 network providers, or PSAPs, that process and/or store sensitive data pertaining to 9-1-1 calls and/or callers; and
  - present to the Commission a notification process pertaining to breaches or breach attempts of such systems by **13 August 2026**.

Secretary General

## Appendix 1 to Telecom Decision CRTC 2026-87

### Requirements and best practices stemming from the recommendations in the Emergency Services Working Group's report ESRE0098b (the report)

#### Requirements for Next-Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1) network providers and originating network providers

##### Recommendation 1

1. The Commission directs all originating network providers (ONPs) that opt to self-provision their Location Information Server (LIS) databases, from inception and on an ongoing basis, to only store locations that have been validated using the location validation function.<sup>8</sup>

##### Recommendation 2

2. The Commission directs 9-1-1 network providers, and all ONPs that opt to self-provision their LIS and/or Additional Data Repository (ADR) databases, from inception and on an ongoing basis, to:
  - ensure that their respective hosted and self-provisioned LIS databases meet or exceed the 99.999% reliability standard; and
  - ensure that their respective hosted and self-provisioned ADR databases:
    - are redundant;
    - have no single point of failure;
    - are secured against cyber threats based on current best practices demonstrably compliant with an industry standard, such as the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology's [Cybersecurity Framework 2.0](#);<sup>9</sup> and
    - provide encrypted data.

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<sup>8</sup> The location validation function is a functional element defined in the National Emergency Number Association i3 architecture standard that ensures that a given location is (i) unique, (ii) suitable to accurately route 9-1-1 calls, and (iii) specific enough to direct first responders to the right locations.

<sup>9</sup> The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology's [Cybersecurity Framework 2.0](#) provides structured guidance to all organizations, regardless of their size or sector, to manage cybersecurity risks. The framework revolves around six core cybersecurity functions, namely, to govern (i.e., establish roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity), identify (i.e., understand where cybersecurity risks may arise), protect (i.e., implement safeguards), detect (i.e., monitor and analyze cybersecurity incidents), respond (contain and mitigate cybersecurity incidents), and recover (i.e., restore operations).

**Recommendation 3**

3. The Commission directs all ONPs that opt to self-provision their LIS and/or ADR databases to, from inception and on an ongoing basis, build an access auditing mechanism into their LIS and/or ADR databases by:
  - adopting a mechanism equivalent to the one currently implemented in Enhanced 9-1-1;<sup>10</sup> or
  - logging additions, deletions, and modifications or updates for auditing purposes.

**Recommendation 6**

4. The Commission directs 9-1-1 network providers to implement subsection 4.1 of the provisionally approved NG9-1-1 outage process, with one modification, as set out in Appendix 2 to this decision, during the interim period.

**Best practices for provinces, territories, and public safety answering points****Recommendation 4**

5. The Commission encourages all provinces and territories implementing NG9-1-1 to consider designating one or more default public safety answering points (PSAPs) for their respective jurisdictions.

**Recommendation 5**

6. The Commission strongly encourages PSAPs to immediately review and apply the cybersecurity best practices set out in [section 2.4](#) and [Appendix C](#) of the report.

**Recommendation 6**

7. The Commission encourages PSAPs to implement subsection 4.3 of the proposed NG9-1-1 outage process, as set out in [Appendix 2](#) to this decision.

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<sup>10</sup> The current Enhanced 9-1-1 system has a logging mechanism to detail what information in the Automatic Location Identification and Automatic Number Identification databases is changed, who changed it, and when it was changed. The logs are available for audit purposes if the need arises to determine who did what, and when.

## Appendix 2 to Telecom Decision CRTC 2026-87

### Provisionally Approved Next-Generation 9-1-1 Outage Notification Process (extracts from ESRE0098b, Appendix B)

#### 4.1 NG9-1-1 Network Provider Notification Responsibilities<sup>11</sup>

- **For Scenario 3 / Severity 1 Incidents:**<sup>12</sup> The immediate notification will be by phone to the impacted stakeholders, unless it is a mass outage (then other means of notification would be required).
- **Email that is Monitored 24x7:** The NG9-1-1 network provider primary method of contact will be a phone call; however, if agreed, email may be used to facilitate mass notification processes and/or the update process.
- **Establishing Stakeholders Contact Information:** The NG9-1-1 network provider will establish the contact information for each of its Wireline and Wireless SPs and for each of its PSAPs, including but not limited to a phone number and email address to be used for notification of a partial or complete network outage.
- **Mechanism of Notification:** Follow-up notification by the NG9-1-1 network provider can be by either phone or email, if email has been provided by the PSAP, Wireline or Wireless SP. An important element of the notification process is the acknowledgment that the outage notification was received by a person at the Wireline or Wireless SP or the PSAP.
  - **Notification by Phone:** If notification is done by phone message, the sender shall confirm that the message was received by a person (vs. voicemail), otherwise the contact to that stakeholder is to be repeated until a person answers the phone. The message will be announced as being an urgent message from the named NG9-1-1 network provider regarding an “UNPLANNED OUTAGE” on <date and time>. The severity of the outage is to be identified. The message should identify the NG9-1-1 network provider Outage Contact and when the next update will be delivered.
  - **Notification by Email:** If notification is done by email, notifications will be sent with “High” or “Urgent” priority, with Delivery and Read Receipt functionality enabled, and include the phrase “UNPLANNED OUTAGE” in the subject line. The email shall contain enough information for the PSAP to determine the impact

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<sup>11</sup> As discussed in paragraphs 21, 29, and 31 of Telecom Decision CRTC 2026-87 (to which this appendix is attached), the provision that places a one-hour time cap between outage status updates is hereby removed.

<sup>12</sup> “Scenario 3 / Severity 1 Incidents” refer to the outage scenarios defined in paragraphs 63 and 64 of *Matters related to the reliability and resiliency of the 9-1-1 networks*, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2016-165, 2 May 2016.

to them (e.g., additional staff may need to be called in). The subject line is to be updated to reflect the applicable type of update (e.g., update will include the word “UPDATE” in the subject line; a Service restoration notification will include the word “RESTORATION” in the subject line). **IMPORTANT:** *NG9-1-1 network providers are expected to monitor the Read Receipt status of any initial outage notification, update or restoration email sent to Wireline or Wireless SPs, or to PSAPs, and if the Read Receipt is not received by the NG9-1-1 network provider within fifteen (15) minutes of successful email delivery, the NG9-1-1 network provider is to contact the stakeholder by phone.*

- **Prompt Notification:** The NG9-1-1 network provider will notify the affected stakeholder(s) by phone call or email as soon as possible,<sup>13</sup> or at least within thirty (30) minutes of becoming aware of a 9-1-1 outage, and will provide a time to restore 9-1-1 services (9-1-1 service estimated time to restore), if possible.
- **Update Interval:** The NG9-1-1 network provider will communicate any material update(s) to affected stakeholder(s) as soon as the update is available. ~~Status update intervals will not exceed one (1) hour, unless mutually agreed upon by the parties.~~ *[modification made by the Commission]*
- **Outage Contact:** The NG9-1-1 network provider will provide the contact name and phone number of the NG9-1-1 network provider’s Incident Manager to the affected stakeholder(s).
- **Escalation Process:** The NG9-1-1 network provider will identify its escalation process and ongoing activities to the affected stakeholder(s).
- **Media Notification:** In the rare event that a major, fully service-impacting outage occurs, there may be a need for the NG9-1-1 network provider and one or more of its stakeholder(s) to coordinate media notification activities. The NG9-1-1 network provider and applicable stakeholder(s), when feasible, should discuss any requirement for media notification and to follow any locally approved procedures for notifying the jurisdiction responsible for issuing media releases pertaining to 9-1-1 outages.
- **Service Restoration Notification:** The NG9-1-1 network provider will notify the affected stakeholder(s) by phone or email, as soon as possible after service restoration from the 9-1-1 outage, to confirm the trouble has been cleared and the affected party(ies) can resume regular operations.

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<sup>13</sup> *Matters related to the reliability and resiliency of the 9-1-1 networks*, Telecom Regulatory Policy 2016-165, 2 May 2016, paragraphs 58, 62, and 63.

- **Post-outage Review:** A post-outage review by the NG9-1-1 network provider and the affected stakeholder(s) is recommended.

#### **4.3 PSAP Notification Responsibilities**

- **For Scenario 3 / Severity 1 Incidents:** The immediate notification will be by phone to the impacted stakeholders, unless it is a mass outage (then other means of notification would be required).
- **Email that is Monitored 24x7:** PSAPs should establish a single email account that is monitored 24x7 by the operational staff at the PSAP. This email is intended to be used by the NG9-1-1 network provider as a method of notification for unplanned outages affecting multiple PSAPs in a province or across a network. It could also be used by PSAPs to notify their respective primary PSAP (or secondary PSAP(s), as applicable) of outages impacting their service delivery. **IMPORTANT:** *PSAPs should be aware that Read Receipt functionality will be enabled for notification messages sent by the sender and is an important “user acknowledgement” that the message was received by a person. PSAPs should instruct staff not to dismiss any email read receipt requests from the NG9-1-1 network provider or from other PSAPs.*
- **Establishing Alternative PSAP Contact Information:** In addition to current phone contact information, PSAPs are encouraged to establish other contact information for their respective Primary and (as applicable) Secondary PSAPs, including but not limited to an alternative phone number and email address to be used for notification of the need to invoke business continuity procedures.
- **Prompt Notification:**
  - **To the NG9-1-1 network provider:** The PSAP will notify the NG9-1-1 network provider immediately or as soon as possible of recognizing a 9-1-1 outage or of the need to invoke business continuity procedures (e.g., request that the NG9-1-1 network provider reroute calls to back-up/alternate PSAP facilities). The PSAP representative calling the NG9-1-1 network provider will identify itself as a PSAP reporting a 9-1-1 outage or problem. Should the PSAP not receive an acknowledgement from a person (if contact is by voice) or Read Receipt (if contact is by email) within fifteen (15) minutes of contacting the NG9-1-1 network provider, then the PSAP must repeat the notification process until such acknowledgement is received.
  - **To the Secondary PSAP(s):** P-PSAPs are encouraged to establish a local procedure for notifying their S-PSAP(s) when business continuity procedures have been invoked (e.g., when the NG9-1-1 network provider has been asked to reroute calls to back-up/alternate PSAP facilities). This notification should occur as soon as possible after the NG9-1-1 network provider has been notified and business continuity procedures have been invoked.

- **To the Primary PSAP:** S-PSAPs are encouraged to establish a local procedure for notifying their P-PSAP when business continuity procedures have been invoked (e.g., when the NG9-1-1 network provider has been asked to reroute calls to back-up/alternate PSAP facilities). This notification should occur as soon as possible after the NG9-1-1 network provider has been notified and business continuity procedures have been invoked.
- **Mechanism of Notification:** Follow-up notification by the PSAP to the NG9-1-1 network provider and Primary or Secondary PSAP(s) (as applicable) can be by either phone or email, if email has been provided. If notification is done by email, notifications will be sent with “High” or “Urgent” priority and include the phrase “PSAP SERVICE IMPACTED” in the subject line. The subject line is to be updated to reflect the applicable type of update (e.g., update will include the word “UPDATE” in the subject line; a Service restoration notification will include the word “RESTORATION” in the subject line). **IMPORTANT:** *PSAPs are expected to monitor the Read Receipt status of any initial outage notification, update or restoration email sent to the NG9-1-1 network provider or PSAP, and if the Read Receipt is not received by the NG9-1-1 network provider or PSAP (as applicable) within fifteen (15) minutes of successful email delivery, the PSAP is to contact the applicable stakeholder by phone.*
- **Update Interval:** The PSAP will communicate any material update(s) to the NG9-1-1 network provider as soon as they are available. For situations where the calls have been rerouted to a backup or alternate site, the PSAP and NG9-1-1 network provider will establish an agreed upon update interval.
- **Media Notification:** In the rare event that a major, fully service-impacting outage occurs, there may be a need for the PSAP, NG9-1-1 network provider, and one or more of its stakeholder(s) to coordinate media notification activities. When feasible, the PSAP should discuss any requirement for media notification with the NG9-1-1 network provider and follow any locally approved procedures for notifying the jurisdiction responsible for issuing media releases pertaining to 9-1-1 outages.
- **Service Restoration Notifications:**
  - **To the NG9-1-1 network provider:** The PSAP will notify the NG9-1-1 network provider as soon as possible of full or partial service restoration from the 9-1-1 outage and provide details as to the level of service restoration (full or partial and in what areas). If business continuity procedures have been invoked, the PSAP will notify the NG9-1-1 network provider as soon as the site is ready to return to normal operations.
  - **To the Secondary PSAP(s):** The P-PSAP will notify their S-PSAP(s) as soon as possible after notification of the NG9-1-1 network provider of a full or partial service restoration. If site business continuity procedures have been invoked, the S-PSAP(s)

are to be advised of the P-PSAP's return to normal operations as soon as possible after the P-PSAP advises the NG9-1-1 network provider.

- **To the Primary PSAP:** The S-PSAP will notify their P-PSAP as soon as possible after notification of the NG9-1-1 network provider of a full or partial service restoration. If business continuity procedures have been invoked, the P-PSAP is to be advised of the S-PSAP's return to normal operations as soon as possible after the S-PSAP advises the NG9-1-1 network provider.
- **Post-outage Review:** A post-outage review by the affected stakeholder(s) is recommended, particularly for large scale or lengthy outages.

## Related documents

- *Mandatory notification and reporting of major telecommunications service outages*, Telecom Decision CRTC 2025-225, 4 September 2025
- *Call for comments – Development of a regulatory framework to improve network reliability and resiliency – Mandatory notification and reporting about major telecommunications service outages*, Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2023-39, 22 February 2023, as amended by Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2023-39-1, 11 September 2023
- *Next-generation 9-1-1 network design efficiencies*, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2019-66, 7 March 2019
- *CISC Emergency Services Working Group – Consensus report ESRE0076 – 9-1-1 Service Outage Notification Processes*, Telecom Decision CRTC 2017-389, 27 October 2017
- *Matters related to the reliability and resiliency of the 9-1-1 networks*, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2016-165, 2 May 2016