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Telecom - Staff Letter addressed to Philippe Gauvin (Bell Canada)

Gatineau, 9 June 2026

Reference: 8000-C12-201909780

BY EMAIL

Philippe Gauvin
Assistant General Counsel
Bell Canada
160 Elgin Street, Floor 19
Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 2C4
bell.regulatory@bell.ca

Subject: Request for Information - Bell Canada Service outage on 28 April 2026 in Manitoba

Dear Philippe Gauvin,

This letter concerns the service outage experienced by Bell on 28 April 2026, which affected voice, Internet, transport, and 9-1-1 services in Manitoba. Outages affecting these services have significant public safety and economic implications, and the Commission treats such incidents with the utmost seriousness.

On 12 May 2026, Bell submitted a post-outage report indicating that the outage resulted from failures affecting several network components and systems, and describing the actions taken to restore service. While informative, the report does not provide enough information for the Commission to fully understand the incident or assess whether Bell’s measures are sufficient to prevent recurrence. Accordingly, Bell is requested to provide comprehensive responses to the questions set out in the Appendix by 30 June 2026.

This letter and any subsequent correspondence will be placed on the public record. As set out in section 39 of the Telecommunications Act and in Broadcasting and Telecom Information Bulletin CRTC 2010-961, Procedures for filing confidential information and requesting its disclosure in Commission proceedings, Bell may designate certain information as confidential. In doing so, Bell must provide a detailed explanation on why the designated information is confidential and why its disclosure would not be in the public interest, including why the specific direct harm that would be likely to result from the disclosure would outweigh the public interest in disclosure. If Bell designates information as confidential, it must either file an abridged version of the document omitting only the information designated as confidential or provide reasons why an abridged version cannot be filed.

Note that, in accordance with its normal practices, the Commission may disclose or require the disclosure of information designated as confidential if its disclosure is in the public interest, i.e., where the specific direct harm does not outweigh the public interest in disclosure.

Given the public interest in understanding the circumstances of the outage, Commission staff expects Bell to disclose information on the public record to the maximum extent possible.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Aysha Omar
Director, Broadband and Network Engineering
Telecommunications Sector

c.c.: Étienne Robelin, CRTC, etienne.robelin@crtc.gc.ca
James Ndirangu, CRTC, james.ndirangu@crtc.gc.ca

Appendix:

NG9-1-1 Network Failover

  1. In its post-outage report dated 12 May 2026, Bell stated, “9‑1‑1 calls originating from IP‑capable originating network providers (ONPs) operating in the NG environment, which were expected to route to the 9‑1‑1 safety net during the outage, did not do so due to a lack of failover response from the NG9-1-1 network”

    1. Explain the root cause of the failover failure, including why this scenario had not been previously identified or tested. Provide supporting analysis.
    2. Describe whether Bell has reviewed the testing, validation, and assurance processes that were in place before the outage, including any gaps identified and the actions taken to address them.
    3. Confirm whether Bell has conducted, or plans to conduct, a comprehensive end-to-end resiliency review of the NG9‑1‑1 network, including interconnection with ONPs, to identify any additional untested scenarios or failure points.
    4. Provide details of any corrective actions implemented to prevent recurrence, including any enhanced testing frameworks.

Monitoring, Surveillance, and Alarm Reliability

  1. Bell indicated that the ‘primary surveillance tool for environmental and generator telemetry was not functioning at the time of the incident. Some downstream equipment alarms were generated, but critical environmental indicators were unavailable, limiting early detection’.

    1. Describe Bell’s operational procedures, monitoring architecture, and testing protocols for ensuring the availability and reliability of environmental and power telemetry systems.
    2. Explain how Bell validates the effectiveness of primary and secondary surveillance systems, including the failover of the monitoring systems themselves.

  2. Provide details on Bell’s proposed corrective actions, including:

    1. Environmental alarm modernization initiatives, including scope, objectives and implementation timelines; and
    2. Any interim or permanent manual monitoring procedures to be used when automated alarming is unavailable.

  3. Beyond the stated initiatives, identify additional measures being implemented or considered to enhance monitoring resiliency, including but not limited to:

    1. Independent or redundant telemetry systems;
    2. Battery and backup power visibility (e.g., alarms indicating exclusive reliance on battery power);
    3. Increased capacity or diversification of backup power systems.

Power Systems and Generator Failure

  1. Bell reported that the generator failed due to a generator cooling system issue that was caused by a loss of commercial power.

    1. Explain the dependency of the generator cooling system on commercial power, including whether independent or redundant power sources were available or required by design.
    2. Describe the failure mechanism in detail, including how the loss of commercial power resulted in cooling system impairment and backup generator failure.

  2. With respect to remediation and broader risk management:

    1. Detail the design changes implemented or planned to eliminate or mitigate dependencies on commercial power for generator support systems.
    2. Confirm whether Bell is considering the use of backup batteries in this scenario?
    3. Explain how these changes improve overall site resilience and help prevent similar cascading failures.

    4. Confirm whether similar generator and cooling system configurations exist at other critical sites (e.g., central offices). If so:

      1. Describe the review process underway to identify comparable vulnerabilities; and
      2. Outline the remediation plan, implementation timelines, and prioritization approach across Bell’s network.
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