Appearance before the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology

In 2015, the CRTC mandated the implementation of a disaggregated wholesale high-speed access (HSA) services regime for Bell Canada, Cogeco, Rogers and Vidéotron. It was decided that the regime would first be implemented in Ontario and Québec, as those regions had significant competitor demand for Internet services. At the time, the CRTC also decided that aggregated services would no longer be required and be phased out in conjunction with the implementation of the disaggregated service.

In 2016, the CRTC set certain revised interim rates for aggregated HSA services for Bell Canada, Cogeco, Bell MTS, Rogers, SaskTel, Shaw, Telus and Videotron. Eastlink’s rates were also revised in 2016. At the time, the CRTC was of the view that the rates proposed by certain of the large companies were not reasonable and needed to be revised.

Following the 2016 decision, the CRTC stated that revisions to the proposed rates were required in order to ensure that the interim rates are not based on overstated costs. Therefore, CRTC staff directed wholesale providers to file revised cost studies for these wholesale high-speed access services.

Following a comprehensive review of the applications, the CRTC identified issues related to costing and the cost models. As a result, the CRTC made adjustments to the proposed rates and set final rates in 2019, which were set retroactively to March 2016 (except for Shaw’s rates which was set to be retroactive to January 2017).

The final rates were subject to a number of appeals, petitions to Cabinet and review and vary applications. The Order was stayed by the Federal Court of Appeal on November 22, 2019. Subsequently, on August 13, 2020, the Governor in Council declined to vary, rescind or refer the Order back to the Commission for reconsideration. On September 10, 2020, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the Order. As for the applications submitted to the Commission to review and vary the Order, a decision to stay the Order pending the outcome of the review and vary application was published on September 28, 2020.

On May 27, 2021, the CRTC published its decision regarding the applications to review and vary Telecom Order 2019-288.

During the review of wholesale rates for aggregated HSA services, the information provided on the record caused the CRTC to doubt the correctness of certain aspects of its August 2019 decision, and the Commission decided to approve the 2016 interim rates on a final basis for the wholesale aggregated HSA service, with certain modifications. The final rates will be applied retroactively.

This decision was made to help transition from the aggregated HSA service to the disaggregated HSA service across Canada. The disaggregated service will increase facilities-based competition by giving smaller Internet service providers a greater degree of control over the services they offer to Canadians and encourage them to invest in their own facilities.

• Since 2016, the CRTC’s objective has been to complete the transition to a disaggregated wholesale high-speed access model. This decision will allow the Commission and the industry to focus on that goal.
• The CRTC is working towards finalizing the disaggregated wholesale high-speed access services across Canada, including configurations, rates, terms, and conditions as quickly as possible.
• The disaggregated model will enable competitors to access the large companies’ fibre-to-the-home networks and offer their customers faster Internet speeds.
• During the review of wholesale rates for aggregated high-speed access services, the information provided on the record caused the CRTC to doubt the correctness of certain aspects of its August 2019 decision.
• The CRTC is resolving a long-standing dispute over the aggregated wholesale high-speed access rates by adopting the interim rates, with adjustments, as the final rates. Today’s decision will bring certainty and stability to the marketplace, which is important to Internet companies as they prepare business plans and make investment decisions.
• The aggregated wholesale HSA service rates will be applied retroactively as applicable.
• Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index shows that the rates for broadband service rose by 29% between 2010 and 2015. Since the CRTC began working on wholesale rates in 2015, the price has been more or less flat, while numerous consumers are buying packages with higher speeds and more data.
• The CRTC has an ongoing proceeding to review how rates are set for wholesale telecommunications services.

Decision on applications to review and vary the final rates for wholesale aggregated HSA services

1. Why did the CRTC approve the interim rates from 2016 on a final basis, rather than the rates established in 2019?
   • The Commission approved interim rates modified by determinations.
   • After reviewing the information submitted on the record, the Commission determined that there was substantial doubt in the rates for aggregated wholesale high-speed access (HSA) services that were set in 2019.
   • Our objective is to transition ISPs to a new wholesale model, known as disaggregated HSA service.
   • The new wholesale model will encourage more competition by giving competitors more control over the services they offer Canadians and encourage them to invest in their networks.
   • Undertaking a more fulsome review of the rates set in August 2019 would only serve to further delay this transition. In addition, even if the Commission were to set new rates for the aggregated HSA service, they would likely be close to what the interim rates are now.
   • Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index shows that the rates for broadband service rose by 29% between 2010 and 2015. Since the CRTC began working on wholesale rates in 2015, the price has been more or less flat, while numerous consumers are buying packages with higher speeds and more data.
   • The aggregated HSA service is an interim step to the disaggregated model. This decision will also bring regulatory certainty and stability for ISPs as they prepare business plans and make investment decisions.
2. Why did it take so long for the CRTC to publish its decision on the review and vary applications?
   • The final rates for aggregated wholesale HSA services were published in August 2019 (Telecom Order 2019-288), and were subject to a number of appeals, petitions to Cabinet and review and vary applications. All of these steps required time to get processed and analyzed by the relevant parties.
   • The CRTC takes applications to review and vary its decisions seriously and has carefully considered the issues raised by parties.
   • The decision comes as the result of the review of an extensive record that included cost studies and other documents submitted in the process (estimated to be over 150 models, over 15,000 pages of record, and 100 rates).
3. What impact will this decision have on the price Canadians pay for their Internet services?
   • Setting retail prices for broadband Internet services is a business decision that takes into account a number of factors, only one of which is the wholesale rate.
   • In effect, most large companies have been charging their competitors the interim wholesale rates since 2016.
   • Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index shows that the rates for broadband service rose by 29% between 2010 and 2015. Since the CRTC began working on wholesale rates in 2015, the price has been more or less flat, while numerous consumers are buying packages with higher speeds and more data.
   • The CRTC’s objective is to foster more competition by giving competitors more control over the services they offer Canadians and encourage them to invest in their networks.
4. ISED recently published a report that shows prices for broadband services are rising and that Canadians pay some of the highest rates in the world for higher speeds. Why are prices rising and what is the CRTC doing about it?
   • The CRTC’s objective is to transition ISPs to a new wholesale model, known as disaggregated high-speed access (HSA) service.
   • Moving to a disaggregated wholesale HSA service framework will better support the sustainability of competition and can be expected to provide improved benefits, such as better prices and innovative services, to consumers.
   • The Competition Bureau undertook a year-long study of broadband services and concluded that the CRTC’s approach was an effective model, but observed that setting the right rates is critical.
   • Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index shows that the rates for broadband service rose by 29% between 2010 and 2015. Since the CRTC began working on wholesale rates in 2015, the price has been more or less flat, while numerous consumers are buying packages with higher speeds and more data.
   • We cannot comment on the data published in the Wall report, including data showing a price increase or decrease for any service. Questions about the Wall report should be directed to ISED.
   • Based on the latest data from the Communications Monitoring Report, between 2015 and 2019, competitors who make use of the aggregated wholesale high-speed access service increased their share of broadband Internet subscribers by 1.8% and revenues by 1.1%.
5. Does the CRTC believe that a facilities-based competition model is the best option for Canada’s Internet services market? What is the impact of such a model on the market?
   • Under ideal conditions, market forces should provide sufficient competition such that consumers have sufficient choice in terms of service offerings and prices to protect their interests and suit their individual needs.
   • Typically, this includes a blend of both facilities-based and service-based competition within a given market, based on what would be appropriate for that given sector.
   • In instances where competition has begun developing, but is not yet at a sustainable level, regulatory intervention is often required to help promote and incent competition and innovation to the benefit of Canadians.
   • The Commission’s general approach in instances where competition is developing has been to introduce wholesale regulation with a goal of promoting facilities-based competition wherever possible.
   • Facilities-based competition, in which competitors primarily use their own telecommunications facilities and networks to compete instead of leasing them from other carriers, is typically regarded as the most sustainable form of competition.
   • Supporting facilities-based competition helps ensure that the Commission renders decisions which foster increased reliance on market forces for the provision of telecommunications services, while ensuring that regulation, where required, is efficient and effective.
   • In the end, sustainable competition, as a general rule, results in lessening competitor dependence on regulation, gives competitors more control over their cost structure, and results in benefits in the market by encouraging competition and investment and enabling innovation in telecommunications services, including new technologies and differentiated service offerings.
6. Why does the CRTC want to transition from aggregated HSA to disaggregated HSA services?
   • The CRTC’s objective is to transition ISPs to a new wholesale model, known as disaggregated high-speed access (HSA) service.
   • The disaggregated service will help increase competition, give smaller Internet service providers a greater degree of control over the services they offer to Canadians and encourage them to invest in their own networks.
   • One of the main drawbacks of the aggregated wholesale HSA service is the higher cost for competitors to transport large amounts of traffic over the large companies’ facilities.
   • In addition, the aggregated wholesale HSA service requires competitors to rely almost entirely on a large company’s network; therefore, the framework depends on the Commission to set the correct rules and rates.
   • Consequently, an important benefit of moving to a disaggregated wholesale HSA service is to lessen competitors’ dependence on price regulation and give competitors more control over their cost structure.
   • With a disaggregated service, competitors acquire only the access service on a wholesale basis, since they can provide transport by themselves or lease transport network facilities from other service providers. Through investments in facilities, competitors can compete to a greater extent than under the aggregated wholesale HSA service framework.
   • Moving to a disaggregated wholesale HSA service framework will better support the sustainability of competition and can be expected to provide improved benefits, such as better prices and innovative services, to consumers.
7. Why did the CRTC change the final rates after the courts and Cabinet rejected the large companies’ appeals?
   • The CRTC makes decision on its own and is not influenced by the Federal Court or Governor in Council rulings.
   • The CRTC completed its review taking into consideration the record leading to today’s decision as well as the determinations in Order 2019-288 and found that there was substantial doubt to certain determinations that led to the final rates.
   • The Telecom Act explicitly allows for multiple types of reviews of a decision to happen at the same time. Each decision-maker is looking at the decision from a different perspective, based on their own area of expertise.
   • The Court examined only whether the Commission had made an error of law or jurisdiction and the Governor in Council considered whether the decision was in line with government policy.
   • The Commission, on the other hand, was looking at a different question – whether it had made an error in fact. By reviewing the record before it and using its expertise in setting just and reasonable rates, the Commission determined that there was substantial doubt as to the correctness of the decision.
8. In light of this decision, how can the public still have confidence in the CRTC’s ability to set wholesale rates?
   • Setting cost-based wholesale rates is a lengthy and complex process. The Rules of Procedure affords parties the ability to identify areas of concern relating to Commission determinations and request a review and possible vary to those determinations.
   • While concerns had led to doubt regarding the correctness of the rates, those concerns are being addressed using the standard procedural process in place.
9. When the CRTC set the final wholesale rates in August 2019, some ISPs immediately lowered the prices of their retail services. Was this not the CRTC’s goal?
   • The companies that make use of the wholesale high-speed access services make business decisions regarding the retail rates they charge their customers.
   • The CRTC’s goal was to set final rates that will facilitate sustainable competition and promote innovative services and more affordable prices for consumers.
10. The pandemic has shown the vital importance of Internet services. If the CRTC is not lowering the wholesale rates, what else is it doing to ensure Canadians have access to affordable services?
    • The CRTC is committed to ensuring Canadians have access to affordable services and choices in service providers.
    • The CRTC is dedicated to advancing affordable Internet services and, with the forthcoming migration to disaggregated wholesale service, the Commission will contribute to meeting this goal.
    • For example, the CRTC is continuing to improve access to broadband Internet access services across Canada under the CRTC’s $750 million Broadband Fund. This funding will help ensure that Canadians, particularly those in rural and remote areas of Canada, can access affordable, high-quality fixed and mobile broadband Internet access services. The CRTC is committed to working with all levels of government, where appropriate, to achieve this goal.
11. Where does the Commission consider that it erred in its 2019 decision?
    • The Commission built a complex record over three years, and made a series of determinations after reviewing the cost studies submitted by the service providers. It then made significant adjustments to the proposed rates, and determined that these final rates would be applied retroactively to the date they were made interim (which varies depending on the provider).
    • The CRTC identified several errors made to the proposed service provider’s specific costs. These errors ranged from incorrectly adjusting costing inputs to applying invalid assumptions. In addition to these errors, the CRTC also identified concerns that required further information to assess. These items are discussed in detail in the decision.
12. Why is the CRTC not setting new rates and is instead reverting back to the interim rates from the 2016 decision?
    • The CRTC’s objective is to transition ISPs to a new wholesale model, known as disaggregated high-speed access (HSA) services.
    • The disaggregated service will help increase competition, give smaller Internet service providers a greater degree of control over the services they offer to Canadians and encourage them to invest in their own networks.
    • Even if the Commission were to set new rates for the aggregated HSA service, they would likely be close to what the interim rates are now.
    • In order to set new rates, the Commission would have had to conduct a fulsome review of all the cost studies submitted by the companies during the proceeding.
    • This process would require more information, and would prolong the period of market uncertainty that has been in place since 2016. The Commission considers this would be detrimental to the industry, and is counter to its objective to foster competition in the market.
    • The latest data available in the Communications Monitoring Report shows that competition in the Internet market has continued to grow under the interim wholesale rates. Between 2015 and 2019, competitors who make use of the aggregated wholesale high-speed access service increased their share of broadband Internet subscribers by 1.8% and revenues by 1.1%.
    • The Commission decided to approve the interim rates, with adjustments, on a final basis in order to transition from an aggregated to a disaggregated HSA model.
13. Why is the CRTC making the final rates retroactive to the date they were made interim?
    • By making the final rates retroactive, the CRTC is ensuring that the final rates are just and reasonable throughout the process to set rates.
    • It is one method used to reduce the impact of the length of a proceeding, preventing any party from being penalized for how long the proceeding takes to come to a conclusion.
    • It also helps to correct any underpaying or overpaying by the parties using or selling the service while the proceeding is ongoing.
14. Given that the final rates are retroactive to when they were made interim, can subscribers of certain companies expect to receive a refund?
    • Any retroactivity will be applicable to the companies that have obtained wholesale high-speed access services from the large companies.
    • These competitors, in turn, will decide what to do with the funds they will receive. For example, they could invest further in their networks, introduce new packages or services in the market, or rebate their customers, among other options.
    • There is no requirement for competitors to provide benefits or refunds to their end-users from any potential retroactive payments received.
15. What is the amount of retroactive payments the large companies will have to make?
    • The large companies will largely be required to make some retroactive payments as a result of the decision. In general, the retroactive payments will be lower than those that would have been paid under the rates announced in 2019.
    • Making the final rates retroactive is not intended to be punitive, harm investments, or lead to loss of revenue for the industry. It is rather intended to compensate for the delays that came with the appeals process, including the time the Commission took to review the applications to review and vary the decision.
16. The Commission introduced a 100 Mbps speed cap on wholesale aggregated services as an incentive for competitors to migrate to the disaggregated service. Is the Commission concerned this speed cap might lessen competition in the retail Internet market?
    • The Commission continued the suspension of the speed cap, as stated in a letter dated June 11, 2020.
    • The implementation of the speed cap will continue to be suspended until the Commission makes sets the final tariffs for wholesale disaggregated HSA services tariffs.

Impacts on the ongoing proceeding on disaggregated HSA services

17. Will this decision affect the ongoing proceeding on disaggregated services?
    • The CRTC notes that the review and vary applications to Telecom Order 2019-288 and the Notice of Consultation 2020-187 are two separate and distinct processes.
    • However, by establishing the rates for aggregated wholesale HSA services on a final basis, the CRTC is transitioning to the disaggregated wholesale HSA service, which will help increase competition and investments in facilities for Internet services across Canada.
18. What happened to the announcement on final rates and terms and conditions for disaggregated HSA services that you were supposed to make in 2019? Why did you not make an announcement as planned?
    • In light of the call for comments published in June 2020, the Commission suspended the proceeding to set final rates, terms and conditions for disaggregated HSA services in Ontario and Quebec until a later date.
    • Certain measures may be required to facilitate deployment of these services across the country and to minimize any negative effects on competition that might be occurring in the market for wholesale HSA services.
    • The CRTC’s goal is to provide Canadians with a variety of innovative and affordable options in the marketplace.
    • Ensuring competitors have wholesale access to these networks and more control over their retail services and packages will contribute to this goal.
19. What happens to the current regime in Ontario and Quebec? Is the disaggregated HSA services regime still available to providers?
    • The current disaggregated regime remains available to competitors in Ontario and Quebec, with existing interim rates and terms and conditions.
20. When will the regime for disaggregated wholesale high-speed access services be available in the rest of Canada?
    • In June 2020, the Commission launched a consultation on the appropriate level of disaggregation and service configurations for the disaggregated wholesale HSA service framework for all wholesale providers across the country.
    • The record of that proceeding will help us consider when disaggregated HSA services will be made available outside of Quebec and Ontario.
    • As the matter is currently before the Commission, we cannot provide further comments.

Background information

21. What’s the difference between “aggregated” and “disaggregated” high-speed access?
    • The main difference between the two regimes is how competitors connect to the large companies’ networks.
      • Aggregated wholesale high-speed access service:
        • Competitor connects its network to a small number of points of interconnection (POI) and has access to all end users connected to the incumbent’s network.
        • Incumbent’s network provides transport of end user traffic for the competitor between all head ends or central offices and POI. These transport costs are included in the costs for the service.
        • Competitor provides or leases transport facilities to the POI.
        • Aggregated services provide fibre to the node (FTTN) access but not fibre to the premises (FTTP) access.
      • Disaggregated wholesale high-speed access service:
        • Competitor has to connect its network to POI per individual head end or individual central office (CO) with access limited to all end users connected at the particular head end or CO.
        • No incumbent transport is included in service.
        • Competitor provides or leases transport to each head end or CO it wishes to serve.
        • At this time, Bell Canada, Rogers, Cogeco and Videotron in Quebec and Ontario are required to provide the disaggregated service.
22. What difference does separating the transport component make for competitors for the disaggregated service in comparison with the wholesale aggregated services?
    • By separating the transport component, the competitor does not typically have to pay a monthly charge for use of the telephone or cable companies’ transport facilities.
    • The transport-related charges, which are included in the aggregated service’s capacity rate, are directly proportional to the level of traffic the competitor’s end customers generate. Instead, the competitor would lease or build its facilities.
23. What’s the difference between FTTN and FTTP access?
    • The difference is the amount of fibre used to connect to a home.
    • For FTTP access:
      • Fibre facilities are used to connect from a central office or head end all the way to the end-customer.
    • For FTTN access:
      • The telephone company connects to an end-customer premise through both fibre and copper facilities.
        • Typically fibre from a central office is connected to equipment located in a neighbourhood. Then existing copper lines that are used also for telephone service are connected from that equipment to the end customer premises.
      • The cable companies connect to an end customer through both fibre and coaxial cable.
        • Fibre from a cable head end is connected to equipment in a neighbourhood. The equipment then connects to coaxial cable that is connected to end customer premises.

In 2015, the CRTC published its framework for wholesale wireless services that, among other things, required the national wireless carriers (Bell Mobility, Rogers and Telus) to introduce a wholesale roaming service and make it available to wireless competitors at prescribed rates. The CRTC had decided, however, not to mandate wholesale MVNO access.

To give the market time to grow and adapt to the new framework, the CRTC indicated that it would wait at least five years before making changes to the framework.

In early 2017, the CRTC finalized the terms and conditions of the wholesale roaming service. As part of that decision, it was determined that to be eligible for mandated wholesale roaming, a wireless service provider must be a carrier with its own network facilities. This stemmed from a dispute between Ice Wireless (and its subsidiary Sugar Mobile) and Rogers over the inappropriate use of the wholesale roaming tariff.

In June 2017, citing concerns over the affordability of wireless services, the Governor-in-Council directed the CRTC to reconsider certain elements of that decision in order to permit certain service providers (such as “Wi-Fi first” providers that do not have traditional wireless networks) to make use of the wholesale roaming tariffs.

In March 2018, the CRTC maintained its definition of wholesale roaming, but took steps to respond to the Governor-in-Council’s concerns over the state of the wireless market and in particular those about affordability. As a result, the national wireless providers introduced a variety of lower-cost data-only plans that were not previously available in the Canadian market. Since then, some competitors have also introduced similar plans, providing Canadians with even more options. Providers such as Virgin, Lucky, Fido, Chatr, Public Mobile and Koodo have committed to offering plans that range from $15 for 250 MB to $30 for 1GB on a prepaid and postpaid basis.

In a separate decision issued in February 2019, the CRTC had to intervene again with respect to the appropriate use of wholesale roaming, in order to settle a dispute between a small wireless company (TNW) and a national wireless carrier (Telus).

Based on prior filings, the CRTC determined that there was virtually no competition from MVNOs serving retail customers. This lack of competition, coupled with the recent disputes over wholesale roaming, may be symptomatic of a larger problem – namely, that a sustainable MVNO market has failed to develop on its own.

In light of all this, and given that nearly five years had passed since its last major wireless review, the CRTC initiated a broad review of mobile wireless services in February 2019, with the goal of ensuring that the market meets the needs of Canadians now and in the future.

The review commenced on February 28, 2019, with a Notice of Consultation, followed by a public hearing in February 2020.

On April 15, 2021, the CRTC published its decision on mobile wireless services, which includes measures to foster competition and more affordable options for Canadians.

• Although competition is driving prices down, certain providers continue to dominate the mobile wireless market. As more needs to be done, the CRTC is putting measures in place that will help accelerate competition and promote better prices for consumers.

Wholesale measures

• The CRTC is acting to help competitors establish themselves in the marketplace, which in turn will foster greater competition and better prices, as well as encourage further investment in infrastructure, such as 5G.
• For the first time, the Commission is introducing a mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) model that will enable regional companies to offer additional competitive wireless services to millions of Canadians.
• This model is intended to primarily benefit companies who are already invested players in the marketplace and have been contributing to greater competition and increasingly lower prices.
• The mobile wireless providers who possess market power in each province or territory will be required to grant wholesale access to their networks under terms and conditions approved by the CRTC:
  • The three national wireless carriers (Bell Mobility, Rogers and Telus) in all areas across Canada, except in Saskatchewan and the territories
  • SaskTel in Saskatchewan, and
  • Bell Mobility in the three territories.
• Additionally, regional providers will be able to roam on the national providers’ 5G networks as they are rolled out.
• The CRTC based its decision on interventions filed during the proceeding, and the proposed transaction between Rogers Communications and Shaw Communications did not play into the timing nor the outcome.
• The CRTC is monitoring developments related to the transaction and we have no further comments on the matter at this time.

Retail measures

• By July 14, 2021, Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel will be expected to offer low-cost and occasional-use wireless plans that will benefit Canadians, especially seniors and low-income earners.
• The providers will also be expected to promote the plans on their websites, as well as by their customer service representatives, so consumers are fully made aware of their options.
• Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel will also be required to file semi-annual reports to the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability to the public. The Commission is prepared to take further action if the desired effects are not achieved.

MVNOs, roaming and 5G

1. How will Rogers’ bid to purchase Shaw affect the outcome of this decision? Did the CRTC make any changes to its policy after the proposed transaction was announced?
   • The CRTC based its decision on interventions filed during the proceeding which did not include submissions with respect to the proposed transaction between Rogers Communications and Shaw Communications. The proposed transaction did not play into the timing nor the outcome of the Commission’s decision.
   • The decision provides some certainty to the marketplace, which is important to carriers as they prepare business plans and make investment decisions.
   • The proposed transaction between Shaw and Rogers involves the entirety of its communications portfolio, whereas this decision is focused on the mobile wireless services market. 
   • The portion of the transaction involving telecommunications services is subject to the Telecommunications Act and does not require the CRTC’s prior approval.
   • The CRTC will be reviewing the portion of the transaction subject to the Broadcasting Act.
   • Please note that this proposed transaction is also subject to review by other regulatory bodies, for example from the Competition Bureau and ISED. We are monitoring developments related to these approvals.
2. Now that Rogers has made a bid to purchase Shaw Communications, what will stop the other national carriers from buying other regional telecom carriers so that they don’t have to grant them access to their wireless networks, thereby reducing competition even more?
   • Any such mergers would be dealt with in due time by the regulatory authority responsible.
   • Acquisitions of that sort are typically subject to different approvals, including by ISED and the Competition Bureau.
   • They are not automatically granted; they can be approved, denied or approved with conditions, which could include divesture from some assets to address competition concerns.
   • For instance when Bell acquired MTS Allstream, the company had to divest some of its wireless customers to Telus and Xplornet.
3. Will the decision help ensure all Canadians have access to affordable mobile wireless services? How soon can Canadians expect to see the benefits of your decision regarding MVNOs?
   • The measures introduced in the current decision will provide Canadians with more affordable options for their mobile wireless services.
   • The CRTC is fostering the investment in and expansion of wireless networks to urban and rural areas by introducing a facilities-based mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) service in key markets across the country. This in turn will help foster greater competition in the mobile wireless market, which will lead to better choices and prices for consumers in the years to come.
   • The national carriers and SaskTel must file, for CRTC approval, proposed terms and conditions for the new MVNO service by mid-July, 2021. This will be followed by a tariff approval process. Once the terms and conditions are approved, carriers can begin negotiating rates.
4. What are “mobile virtual network operators” or “MVNOs”?
   • Mobile virtual network operators are mobile operators that do not typically own spectrum or radio access networks (RAN). However, MVNOs could possess other facilities or infrastructure such as fibre transport, switching and interconnection facilities, and billing and customer care systems.
   • Instead they rely on arrangements with wireless carriers to access these network components in order to offer service to customers.
5. What led the CRTC to determine that a facilities-based MVNO model is the best option for Canada’s mobile wireless services market now?
   • The CRTC was concerned about a lack of competition in the retail market.
   • In a competitive market, there should be a mix of competitors using different strategies and business models. The fact that MVNO competition has not emerged as expected can be symptomatic of a larger problem with the state of competition.
   • The CRTC has determined through its decision that a facilities-based MVNO model, applied to key markets and providers, would best help competitors grow while encouraging providers to continue to invest in networks and infrastructure.
   • That is because the evidence shows that competition is increasingly stronger and prices are lower in areas with established regional competitors.
   • Providing wholesale access to regional carriers, on a temporary basis, in areas where they have spectrum but have not yet deployed network infrastructure is one way to accelerate competition in these areas. Regional competitors can enter new areas before they might otherwise in order to build a customer base prior to deployment.
6. Why did the CRTC decide not to mandate a full MVNO model?
   • During its review, the CRTC considered the impacts such a model would have on investment and innovation, and came to the following conclusions:
     • It would have a negative impact on price over the long term; and
     • It would have a very negative impact on the regional wireless providers and the competition and investment they bring to the market.
   • Given the potential negative impact on regional carriers and the competition they bring to the retail marketplace, the CRTC concluded that mandating a broad-based MVNO service would not be in the best interest of Canadians at this time.
   • That being said, regional providers that have invested in networks and purchased spectrum have been contributing to greater competition in the market and helping to lower prices.
   • The CRTC’s decision will enable them to expand in new areas faster than would have otherwise and to grow their customers and revenues.
   • Additionally, regional providers may resell the service to smaller players, bringing even more competition to Canadians.
7. Which providers will benefit from the facilities-based MVNO model the CRTC is introducing, and where will they be offering mobile wireless services?
   • Regional wireless carriers will have access to the service in areas where they have purchased a spectrum licence at a tier between 1 and 4 (tier 4 or higher). The Commission considers that investment in spectrum demonstrates that a wireless carrier is committed to maintaining and expanding its operations, including its networks.
   • However, it is up to those carriers to decide whether they want to use the facilities-based MVNO service or not.  
   • Tier 4 areas are defined and mapped by ISED and resemble regional markets – a city and its surrounding area, or a regional municipality. Some tier 4 areas in more rural areas may contain several smaller communities across a large geographic area. There are 172 tier 4 areas in Canada, and we expect that one or more regional carriers will be eligible for the service in most of them.
   • Based on those criteria, the following carriers would likely be eligible for a facilities-based MVNO service:
     • Eastlink
     • Videotron
     • Xplornet
     • Ice Wireless
     • SSi Micro
     • TBayTel
   • More information on service areas for competitive licensing:
     • Service areas for competitive licensing
   • More information on providers who have purchased spectrum:
     • 600 MHz Auction — Final Results
     • National Holdings for Commercial Mobile Spectrum Licences
8. The CRTC initiated a review of telecommunications services in Northern Canada on November 2, 2020. Will the MVNO service the CRTC is introducing as part of its mobile wireless review decision be available in the three territories, even while there is another ongoing proceeding for that region?
   • Yes, the MVNO service will be available to eligible providers in all three territories. The ongoing proceeding on telecommunications services in Northern Canada does not prevent eligible providers from accessing the service.
   • As the review of telecommunications services in Northern Canada is currently underway, we cannot comment further on that proceeding.
9. In July 2020, the CWTA reported that mandating MVNOs would have a significant negative impact on Canada’s economy, according to a study by PwC. In addition, Telus claimed that allowing MVNOs would force it to cut jobs and investments. What is the CRTC’s view on the potential impacts of its decision?
   • The Commission carefully considered the potential negative impacts associated with its decision to mandate MVNOs, and has identified a model that it believes promotes competition while also supporting continued investments.
10. How will the wholesale rates, terms and conditions for the MVNO service be determined?
    • The CRTC will be responsible for determining terms and conditions. The national wireless carriers and SaskTel have to file proposed terms and conditions within 90 days of the date of the decision.
    • Wholesale rates for the service are to be negotiated between carriers, and they may apply to the Commission for arbitration if they cannot come to an agreement.
    • The tariffs should be based on the roaming tariffs, and should include provisions for resale of the service by regional carriers to smaller players.
11. The CRTC is mandating the facilities-based MVNO model on a temporary basis. Why did the Commission choose to include a phase out period for the MVNO model? How did it determine that seven years was the best amount of time to allot for the use of the service?
    • The framework is meant to provide an incentive for regional competitors to expedite their deployment plans while they temporarily use the network of another carrier to offer service and build a customer base, but is not intended to replace their planned investments by providing a permanent wholesale solution.
    • Including a set phase-out period provides some certainty to the marketplace, which is important to carriers as they prepare business plans and make investment decisions.
    • The Commission determined that seven years is a reasonable amount of time to allow MVNOs to build out their networks and for the CRTC to evaluate the effectiveness of the service.
12. If a carrier acquires spectrum in the tier 4 group (or higher) between the date of the decision and the end of the seven-year phase out period for the MVNO service, will they have access to the service?
    • Yes. Under the framework, a carrier that purchases new spectrum would be eligible for the service.
13. What happens if a regional carrier has not been able to build out their networks by the time the phase out period arrives? Are there provisions to prevent them from losing part of the market share they might acquire during the time when the MVNO service is available?
    • To mitigate the risk of this occurring, the CRTC is giving regional providers a seven-year window to expand their network coverage.
    • Regional carriers are also required to meet network build-out targets set by ISED, as a condition of their spectrum licences.
    • Unless there are significant developments in the marketplace, the Commission does not intend to conduct a review of the framework within the next five years.
    • When the Commission does review the framework, it may assess whether additional measures are required to support competition in the mobile wireless market.
14. How will the CRTC measure the success of the facilities-based MVNO model? When does the CRTC plan to conduct another review to assess whether its policy is having the desired effect?
    • The CRTC’s objective is to foster more competition, which provides Canadians with more choice and better prices. The CRTC’s annual Communications Monitoring Report tracks a number of indicators that will enable to monitor the market’s evolution.
    • In addition, regional wireless carriers who use the MVNO service will have to file annual progress updates with the Commission, starting one year after they subscribe to the service.
    • Unless there are significant developments in the marketplace, the Commission does not intend to conduct a review of the framework within the next five years.
    • The mandated facilities-based MVNO access service is meant to be a temporary measure to increase regional competition and expedite network deployment until market forces can take hold.
    • The wholesale service is subject to a seven-year phase out period from the date terms and conditions are finalized.
15. Why didn’t the CRTC mandate or regulate rates for MVNO access in 2015 even though it determined that it is an essential service?
    • The CRTC was concerned that doing so would undermine investment in wireless networks, particularly by new wireless entrants and in rural areas.
    • Investments by wireless carriers are important to ensure that Canadians have access to high-quality mobile wireless networks and services in all regions of Canada.
    • It was made clear during the 2015 proceeding that the carriers, including wireless competitors, have made and are planning to make significant investments in spectrum and their wireless networks.
    • The CRTC also expected MVNO competition to develop naturally as competition grew.
16. What does “facilities-based competition” mean?
    • Facilities-based competition is a competitive model in which competitors primarily use their own telecommunications facilities and networks to compete instead of leasing from other carriers. Facilities-based competition is typically regarded as the most sustainable form of competition.
17. What is spectrum?
    • Spectrum refers to the radio frequencies used by mobile wireless service providers to offer wireless services in Canada.
    • The department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) is responsible for auctioning spectrum in Canada, as well as issuing spectrum licences and administrating spectrum licence fees.
    • Find out more about spectrum management and telecommunications in Canada.
18. What is “radio access network” (RAN)?
    • The RAN consists of spectrum, towers, and related facilities and equipment located at tower sites.
    • It enables the carrying of wireless signals to and from devices and radio towers.
    • Any service provider – whether it is a facilities-based carrier or a virtual operator – requires access to a RAN to offer mobile wireless services, whether that RAN is their own or that of another carrier.
    • Since MVNOs are virtual operators that, by definition, do not own RAN components such as spectrum, towers, and sites - without access to a carrier’s RAN, they would not be able to operate.
    • In a full MVNO model, all other facilities and equipment required by an MVNO beyond the RAN would be supplied by the MVNO itself, including the core network, billing systems, customer care, and handsets.
19. What is the difference between wholesale roaming and wholesale MVNO access?
    • Roaming requires temporary access to the network on a national basis, whereas MVNO access requires permanent access on a regional basis.
    • In the case of wholesale roaming, the service is used by smaller wireless carriers that do not have national coverage to enable their customers to temporarily connect to a national carrier’s network when they travel.
    • This enables the smaller carriers to better serve their customers by offering services that are similar with national carriers in terms of coverage.
    • In the case of wholesale MVNO access, the service enables a company that does not own network facilities to provide a retail service where its customers are permanently hosted on an incumbent carrier’s network. 
20. When will 5G be readily accessible to mobile subscribers in Canada?
    • 5G deployment is in the early stages in Canada. The wireless service providers building the networks are responsible for determining when they will start offering this technology.
    • This proceeding has examined the challenges carriers face when deploying network infrastructure (including the equipment needed for 5G networks).
    • Through its decision, the CRTC is confirming that the current wholesale roaming tariffs also apply to 5G wireless services.
    • The Commission also looked at ways to reduce and minimize barriers to network deployment to ensure Canadians continue to have access to world-class wireless networks. Some of these issues, such as competitors gaining efficient access to poles, are being looked at in other ongoing proceedings.
21. Will this decision hinder the roll out of 5G in Canada?
    • The CRTC expects that mobile wireless providers will continue to invest in their networks, and does not anticipate that this decision will impact their plans to roll out 5G.

Retail measures

22. Why did the CRTC decide not to regulate retail rates for wireless services?
    • The situation is improving in such a way that the Commission determined it was not necessary to regulate wireless retail rates at this time:
      • Prices for retail mobile wireless services have been coming down over the last few years;
      • Regional carriers are having an impact on the market in terms of disciplining the national wireless carriers up to a certain extent; and
      • Regional carriers have also been growing their consumer base, expanding their coverage and they have introduced innovative plans and features that have led to new offerings in the market such as unlimited data plans and plans that allow data to be carried over month to month.
    • Nonetheless, the national carriers and SaskTel were found to have and use market power. To protect the interest of consumers, we have set an expectation that Bell Mobility, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel offer and promote low-cost and occasional-use mobile wireless plans to all their customers in those areas where they possess market power.
23. Why is the CRTC setting expectations and not a requirement for wireless providers regarding the offering and promotion of low-cost and occasional-use mobile wireless plans?
    • The mobile wireless market is rapidly changing and evolving; it is moving in the right direction as prices are coming down and innovative services are being introduced in the market.
    • The record of the proceeding demonstrated that there are a wide array of plans, including low-cost plans, available to customers. However, some options, in particular more economical options on premium brands, are not always easy to find. In addition, many consumers do not see flanker brands, owned by the national wireless carriers, as a reasonable substitute for a premium brand.
    • The Commission determined that mandating the provision of defined plans is unnecessary at this time. However it determined that some immediate action would be appropriate to support consumer choice.
    • In order to ensure transparency and accountability, the national carriers, as well as SaskTel, must report back to the CRTC every six months on their low-cost and occasional-use plan offerings. The Commission will make these reports available on its website.
    • We will continue to monitor how the providers offer and promote those plans to ensure that affordable access to high-quality telecommunications services is available in all regions of Canada.
24. What devices are covered under those plans?
    • Only cellular devices are included in the decision. Other devices, like tablets, are not included.
25. When the measures take effect, some consumers may be in a locked plan for up to two years, which would be compliant with the Wireless Code. What will happen to those consumers? Can they switch plans to take advantage of the newly offered low-cost and occasional-use plans?
    • Nothing in the Wireless Code requires companies to “lock” their customers into a given term, but does include protections for consumers where this is the case.
    • If their plan is subject to an early cancellation fee, consumers would have to pay that cancellation fee to avail themselves of a competitive offer.
26. How will the CRTC ensure that providers will follow through with the expectations to offer and promote low-cost and occasional-use plans?
    • The CRTC is currently reviewing the wireless providers’ offers and how they compare to the expectations set out in our decision.
    • Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel are required to file semi-annual reports to the Commission, starting in September, to ensure transparency and accountability to Canadians; these reports will be published on the CRTC’s website.
    • Further regulatory action may be considered should the carriers not deliver on the expectations set out in the decision.
27. Does the CRTC consider the current plans offered by wireless providers to be meeting the needs of Canadians?
    • We work to ensure all Canadians have access to a wide variety of high-quality telecommunications services, at affordable prices.
    • The record of the proceeding showed that there are a wide array of plans, including low-cost and occasional-use plans, available to customers, but some options, in particular more economical ones on premium brands, are not always easy to find.
    • With the measures put in place to address the offering and discoverability of those plans, we expect Canadians to be better served by the mobile wireless providers.
    • We will continue to monitor the offering and promotion of those plans to ensure that affordable access to high-quality telecommunications services is available in all regions of Canada.
28. It is often reported that Canadians pay among the highest prices in the world for wireless services. Do you expect that this will change further to your decision?
    • The evidence analyzed in this review demonstrated that wireless prices are high in Canada compared to international prices, even after factors such as investments, spectrum cost and network quality are taken into account. Furthermore, prices in Canada, although declining, have not fallen as much as international prices and remain above what one might expect in a market subject to vigorous competition.
    • The introduction of mandated MVNO access and of low-cost and occasional-use plans in this decision should have a positive impact on choice and affordability in the wireless market.
    • We will continue to monitor the offering and promotion of those plans to ensure that affordable access to high-quality telecommunications services is available in all regions of Canada.
    • Additionally, facilities-based wireless competitors such as Eastlink, Freedom, TbayTel and Videotron are investing in wireless networks. Evidence shows that prices are generally lower in areas where there are several facilities-based providers operating.
    • Through this decision, the CRTC is introducing a facilities-based framework for mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) in markets across the country, which will help foster greater competition, as well as stimulate continued investments in networks and infrastructure.
    • We can expect an increasing number of Canadians to have access to better choices for their wireless services in the years to come.
29. Why is there a difference in price charged by retail providers depending on the province/territory? Shouldn’t prices be more or less the same across Canada?
    • The CRTC does not set the retail rates service providers charge for their retail services. That price is set by the providers themselves.
    • The CRTC has observed that prices tend to be lower in areas where there are more than three service providers, which is not uniform across all of Canada. In other words, competition tends to lead to lower prices and this is occurring in many, but not all, markets.
    • The introduction of the facilities-based MVNO model is expected to increase competition in areas where there are providers eligible to access the mandated service. This in turn should lead to lower prices for consumers. 
30. In your 2018 decision on lower-cost data-only plans, you concluded that there were gaps in the mobile wireless market. You came to the same conclusion in the current decision on mobile wireless services. Why were the gaps not properly addressed in 2018?
    • The evidence submitted in the proceeding that led to the CRTC’s decision on lower-cost data-only plans in 2018 showed that there was a gap in the wireless market for those plans. The Commission addressed this gap to ensure Canadians across the country have access to affordable and innovative choices.
    • As a result, the national wireless providers introduced a variety of lower-cost data-only plans that were not previously available in the Canadian market. Since then, some competitors have also introduced such plans, providing Canadians with more options.
    • In the current decision, the Commission concluded that there is no gap per se with respect to low-cost plans options in the market, but that they appear to be generally only offered and promoted on the national wireless carriers’ flanker brands. It also found that there is a sizable section of the population that is reluctant to sign up for typically cheaper flanker brands. This likely makes it harder for consumers to find a low-cost plan that meets their needs on the service brand of their choice.
    • That is why we expect Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel to offer, on their premium brands, and prominently promote low-cost plans on their websites, as well through their customer services representatives’ in-person, online or over the phone.
31. In 2018, PIAC filed a part 1 application to request that the CRTC direct the national wireless providers to make occasional-use plans more available to consumers. What is the status of this application? Is it addressed in this decision?
    • In 2018, the Commission determined that consideration of the application would be suspended until a later date. The application remains suspended to this day.
    • The issue of occasional-use plans was considered as part of this review. The decision includes the expectation that Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel will offer and promote two different occasional-use plans by July 14, 2021.
32. You are setting expectations for the offering of low-cost and occasional-use plans on the 3G network. However, Canadians need access to LTE in order to receive emergency alerts on their mobile phones. Can you explain how this decision is consistent with your efforts to protect all Canadians with the Emergency Alert System?
    • The Commission is actually not setting any conditions as to what network these plans should be offered on; it is up to Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel to determine what is more appropriate in that regard. The expectation is that they will offer a low-cost plans and two different occasional-use plans on their premium brands, which typically run on their more advanced networks.
    • That said, the Commission determined that should those carriers decide to offer these plans on their 3G network, it would not prevent the user from navigating the web and using most applications.
    • The carriers are required to include, in their semi-annual report, on what network these plans are offered.
    • This means that some phones, including those operating on the 3G network, will not be compatible with the wireless public alerting system, and therefore will not receive alerts on their mobile wireless device. They will however be able to hear or see the alerts broadcasted on the radio or television.
    • Canadians who are concerned about receiving emergency alerts on their wireless phones should contact their mobile wireless provider for more information.
    • Find out more about emergency alert messages and the National Public Alerting System.
33. Some service providers only offer customer service online, via their website, or charge a fee to assist customers via phone or in person. Can the CRTC mandate the provision of customer service by phone or in person, free of charge to the subscribers?
    • The CRTC does not regulate how service providers interact with their clients, nor whether they charge for their customer service. That is a business decision made by the service providers.
    • The CRTC is aware that some service providers announced they would start charging for customer support interactions, and is currently examining this new business practice.
    • Any question or concern related to a subscriber’s service should be communicated directly to the service provider.
34. As a Canadian wireless customer, I am not satisfied with the service I am getting. What can the CRTC do to help me?
    • The CRTC’s role is to regulate the telecommunications industry in the best interest of Canadians. Find out more on what we are doing to protect you.
    • Service providers, on the other hand, are responsible for establishing their own retail rates, terms and conditions, as well as customer service.
    • If you are not satisfied with the service you are getting from your mobile wireless provider, you should first contact your provider directly to address the issue.
    • If you are unable to resolve the issue directly with your provider, you may contact the Commission for Complaints for Telecom-television Services (CCTS). The CCTS is an independent organization that works with you and your service provider to resolve complaints relating to your services. You may submit your complaint directly to them by using their interactive questionnaire at https://ccts-cprst.ca/complaints/complaint-form.
    
    

    You may also contact them using the following methods:

    • Online: http://www.ccts-cprst.ca
    • By email: response@ccts-cprst.ca
    • By telephone: Call, toll free, 1-888-221-1687
    • By toll-free TTY: 1-877-782-2384
    • By fax: 1-877-782-2924
    • By mail: CCTS, P.O. Box 56067 - Minto Place RO, Ottawa, Ontario  K1R 7Z1
    
    
    • Find out more on how to make a complaint about your mobile wireless service.
    • We welcome Canadians’ views on various issues when a proceeding is open for comments. Find out more on how to participate in CRTC proceedings.

Wholesale measures and competition

35. What is the state of competition in the wireless retail market today?
    • Wireless competitors such as Freedom Mobile, Eastlink, and Videotron have been investing in wireless facilities, and evidence shows that prices are generally lower in areas where there are several facilities-based carriers operating. Xplornet launched its wireless service in Manitoba last year.
    • For instance, the average monthly cost of a mobile wireless package dropped by 13.8% between 2018 and 2019, according to the CRTC’s Communications Monitoring Report: Year-End Monthly Prices.
    • While these are positive developments, the CRTC found that the mobile wireless market remains highly concentrated in every province and territory, and that Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel have and use market power. More needs to be done to foster increased competition and affordable options for Canadians.
    • The CRTC is requiring the national wireless providers, as well as SaskTel, to provide access to their networks to regional telecommunications service providers in certain circumstances.
    • This will help foster greater competition in the mobile wireless market, as well as stimulate continued investments in networks and infrastructure. We expect an increasing number of Canadians to have access to better choices for their wireless services in the years to come.
36. Why aren’t there more competitors entering the wireless market? How is the CRTC helping smaller players to enter the market?
    • The decision to enter the wireless market belongs to individuals businesses. The CRTC cannot force anyone to offer wireless services, nor can it direct a wireless provider to offer services in a specific area, or invest in infrastructure to expand its services. Service providers are responsible for making those business decisions.
    • That being said, the CRTC has put a number of measures in place over the years to foster competition in the mobile wireless market.
    • In 2015, the Commission introduced a framework for wholesale wireless services which, among other things, required the national wireless carriers (Bell Mobility, Rogers and Telus) to introduce a wholesale roaming service and make it available to wireless competitors at prescribed rates.
    • Through the current decision, the CRTC is implementing additional measures to facilitate and accelerate competition in the Canadian wireless market:
      • the Commission is introducing a facilities-based MVNO model, which will enable regional providers to access the wireless networks of the national carriers and SaskTel;
      • it is also mandating seamless roaming, which will help competitors in offering a high-quality service that avoids dropped calls and data sessions when a customer moves from one network to another, and
      • it is also confirming that the wholesale roaming policy applies to 5G networks, which will ensure competition continues to grow as the wireless market evolves to 5G.
    • Additionally, other MVNOs may gain access to the service by entering into a resale agreement with either one of the national carriers, SaskTel, or one of the regional carriers who already have access to the service.
    • The government also plays a role in encouraging mobile wireless competition, by establishing its spectrum policy, for example.
37. In light of its decision, is the CRTC also hoping the upcoming spectrum auction, to be held in June, will help foster greater wireless competition?
    • The implementation of the spectrum policy and the upcoming spectrum auction are the responsibility of ISED, not the CRTC.
38. Why are foreign mobile wireless providers not operating in Canada? Are they subject to the same regulations as Canadian mobile wireless service providers?
    • The Telecommunications Act permits foreign companies to operate in Canada so long as they do not earn more than 10% of total revenues of the Canadian market when they enter the market.
    • Given permission, it is up to a foreign company to decide whether or not they would like to enter the Canadian market.
    • A foreign company providing telecommunications services in Canada would be subject to the Telecommunications Act and any relevant CRTC rules made pursuant to it.

Market power

39. How did the CRTC conclude that Bell, Rogers, Telus and SaskTel possess market power in the Canadian mobile wireless market? More specifically:
    1. How does the CRTC evaluate the market and determine whether regulatory action is necessary?
       • When the CRTC initiated its review of mobile wireless services, which led to the current decision, it indicated that it was concerned that retail market concentration remained high (due in part to a series of acquisitions) and that it had been repeatedly required to intervene in the retail market.
       • As part of this review, the Commission conducted a thorough analysis of the state of the retail wireless market, and collected evidence related to a large number of market indicators.
       • As a result of its analysis, the Commission found that Bell, Rogers Telus and SaskTel have and use market power.
       • Market power is generally defined as the ability to sustainably raise prices above what they would be in a competitive market.
       • Having found market power means that Canadians are paying more than they would in a fully competitive market for their wireless services.
    2. What tests or analysis did the CRTC conduct?
       • The market power analysis is conducted on a case-by-case basis, based on the market power framework established in Telecom Decision 94-19. In this case, the Commission analyzed retail mobile voice, text, and data services sold to individuals and small businesses on a provincial/territorial basis.
       • In its analysis, the Commission found that:
         • In every province, except Saskatchewan, there is joint market power as Bell Mobility, Rogers and Telus account for a combined market share of at least 65%.
         • In Saskatchewan, SaskTel has unilateral market power; and
         • For the three territories, Bell Mobility has unilateral market power for each of them.
    3. What did the CRTC conclude from those tests/analysis?
       • There remains a significant number of wireless subscribers that have limited access to substitutes if they are faced with rising prices. Despite growing since they entered the market, the regional competitors’ networks are not as broad as those of the national carriers.
       • Moreover, the costs to switching providers are significant enough to prevent some customers from switching. Barriers can include:
         • Costs, such as repayment of outstanding device balances and one-time fees for new customers (such as connections and SIM card fees).
         • The perception that switching is complex.
         • The lack of clarity and transparency on the offer and promotion of all available mobile wireless plans.
         • The amount of research necessary for consumers to be in a position to make informed decisions.
       • Barriers to entry into the mobile wireless industry for smaller providers remain high. Those barriers mainly consist of a lack of available spectrum and the capital-intensive nature of the industry, particularly given the time it takes to build out a network and see profits. There is a negative impact on regional or other carriers to enter the market or expand.
       • While the situation is generally improving across Canada, rivalry between the national and regional carriers in the mobile wireless market is still generally limited in all provinces and territories.
    4. What does it mean in terms of regulation?
       • In light of the findings regarding market power, the Commission is putting in place measures to foster competition in the Canadian mobile wireless market to ensure Canadians benefit from a wide range of high-quality choices and services.
       • Through its decision, the Commission has introduced a number of measures in order to accelerate the development of sustainable competition across Canada, as well as ensure Canadians looking for low-cost options can easily find mobile wireless plans that meet their needs.
40. Is your assessment of market power still valid now that the market risks changing significantly if the proposed transaction between Rogers Communications and Shaw Communications is approved?
    • The CRTC based its decision on interventions and a significant amount of evidence filed during the proceeding. The market share the carriers possess is one of many elements taken into consideration during the analysis.
    • While this transaction could change the landscape of the Canadian wireless market, should it go ahead, it will likely take some time before a decision is made and the Commission is able to assess its impact on the market.
    • The proposed transaction between Rogers Communications and Shaw Communications did not play into the outcome of our decision.
    • That being said, the assessment of market power included in the decision is indicative of the current state of competition (prior to any industry consolidation) and led to the development of the regulatory measures implemented to improve the state of competition in the Canadian mobile wireless market.

Legal and political implications

41. What happens if the decision is appealed? How long would an appeal process take?
    • When parties disagree with a Commission decision, they can bring matters to Cabinet and to the courts, and ask us to review our decision. These avenues are provided through the Telecommunications Act.
    • The Telecommunications Act requires Cabinet to issue any decision changing the Commission’s decision within one year of the Commission’s decision being published.  It also requires anyone who wants to challenge the decision to file a motion for leave to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal within 30 days of the date of the decision, although the timelines to obtain a court decision are different in every case.
    • CRTC decisions apply until Cabinet or a court decides otherwise, or the CRTC decides to change it further to an application or policy review proceeding.
42. Will this decision help achieve the government objective of lowering wireless prices by 25%?
    • The CRTC operates at arms’ length of the government, and did not take the government’s objective into account when establishing its framework.
    • However, through this review, the Commission found that retail wireless prices in Canada are trending down.
    • For instance, the average monthly cost of a mobile wireless package dropped by 13.8% between 2018 and 2019, according to the CRTC’s Communications Monitoring Report: Year-End Monthly Prices.
    • The CRTC expects that wireless retail prices will continue to decline in the future, as competitors expand their networks, continue to grow their subscriber base, and introduce more innovative options to consumers in the market.

Background

43. Why did it take so long for the Commission to publish its decision?
    • In February 2019, the CRTC initiated a broad review of mobile wireless services to ensure that the needs of Canadians are met. The last major mobile wireless review was conducted in 2015.
    • The first phase of this consultation started with the publication of a Notice of Consultation on February 28, 2019. The Commission then built a record by seeking interventions from interested persons and by sending requests for information to various parties on a wide range of issues.
    • In December 2019, the Commission conducted public opinion research by way of telephone and online surveys to better understand the needs, habits and behaviours of Canadian wireless consumers.
    • A public hearing then followed from February 18 – 28, 2020. Shortly after, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent. As such, the Commission delayed its regulatory proceedings, in order to provide participants greater flexibility.
    • In total, 18,726 interventions were received during this proceeding; 42 parties appeared in front of the Commission during the two-week hearing; and over 3,000 documents were filed on the record of the proceeding. The record closed on July 15, 2020.
44. What were the major conclusions and objectives of the 2015 wireless framework decision?
    • In 2015, the CRTC held an important public proceeding to examine whether the wholesale wireless services market was sufficiently competitive and, if not, what regulatory measures were required.

Main decisions:

• The CRTC decided to regulate the rates that Bell Mobility, Rogers and Telus charge other Canadian wireless carriers for domestic wholesale wireless roaming services.
• The CRTC decided not to mandate the provision of MVNO access services, given concerns that mandating such a service could negatively impact investment in wireless networks.
• The CRTC decided, however, to take action to reduce barriers, such as removing certain restrictions in wholesale roaming agreements, faced by MVNOs to give them more flexibility in their commercial negotiations with wireless companies.
• The CRTC concluded that its existing processes were sufficient to address tower- and site-sharing issues related to rates, terms and conditions.



Main objectives:

• Continued innovation and investment in high-quality telecommunications facilities
• Sustainable competition that provides benefits, such as reasonable prices and innovative services, to Canadians, and
• Implementing efficient regulatory measures for wholesale wireless arrangements along with continued reliance on market forces where appropriate.

In 2018, the United States Congress introduced an Act to require the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to study the feasibility of designating a simple, easy-to-remember dialing code (three-digit number) to be used for a national mental health crisis and suicide prevention hotline.

In 2019, the FCC announced the implementation of 9-8-8 as the three-digit number for a national mental health crisis and suicide prevention hotline. The FCC has required United States telecommunications carriers and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) providers to make necessary modifications for implementation of the three-digit number by July 16, 2022. On April 23, 2021, the FCC launched a proceeding on whether providers should be required to support text messages sent to 9-8-8, and on the types of messages that would be supported.

In late 2020, there was a petition in Canada advocating for the launch of 9-8-8, or another 3-digit number, for mental health crisis and suicide prevention services in Canada. The petition garnered over 30,000 signatures.

A motion to establish a national suicide prevention hotline that consolidates all suicide crisis numbers into one easy to remember three-digit number hotline accessible to all Canadians was passed unanimously in the House of Commons on December 11, 2020.

Currently, the Canada Suicide Prevention Service (CSPS), which can be reached at 1-833-456-4566, offers bilingual voice support 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and text support provided through a short code (45645) in English from 4 pm to 12 am ET. Short codes allow wireless service subscribers to send text messages to an abbreviated number (generally made up of five or six digits). In Canada, short codes are administered by the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association. Note that when residents of Quebec call the CSPS, they are automatically re-routed to the Quebec’s provincial suicide prevention line 1-866-APPELLE. 1-866-APPELLE is available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and offers an online chat service.

This pan-Canadian service does not replace existing mental health crisis and suicide prevention services; rather it collaborates with existing crisis centres to support improved access to mental health crisis and suicide prevention services.

On June 3, 2021, the CRTC launched a consultation on whether a national three-digit number for a mental health crisis and suicide prevention service should be established. The consultation also seeks to identify the barriers to the establishment of such a service and, if necessary, how they can be overcome. The Commission also wants to know how much time it would take providers to implement the three-digit number, what are the costs associated with it, and which entities should bear those costs.

Because the Commission does not have jurisdiction over the organizations that would provide mental health crisis and suicide prevention services via a three-digit number, certain matters will not be considered in this proceeding. As such, matters related to the governance and coordination of organizations providing mental health crisis and suicide prevention services, as well as the funding of those organizations will not be considered in this proceeding.

In August 2021, the Commission received a procedural request from the Deafness Advocacy Association Nova Scotia, the Newfoundland and Labrador Association of the Deaf, and the Ontario Association of the Deaf (collectively, the DHH [Deaf and Hard of Hearing] Coalition) in which it requested that the Commission amend its procedure. Specifically, the DHH Coalition requested that the Commission:

• issue Telecom Notice of Consultation 2021-191 in sign language format;
• modify this proceeding to allow interested parties to submit their interventions and replies in sign language;
• provide interested parties sufficient time to create videos in sign language and ensure that all parties have the opportunity to review the transcripts of these videos; and,
• modify the deadlines for Interventions and Replies to Interventions accordingly.

Consequently, on 30 November 2021, the Commission issued Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2021-191-1, providing key messages of the original Notice of Consultation in ASL and LSQ videos and allowing Canadians to present their comments on the issues under consideration in ASL or LSQ. The revised deadline for interventions is now 31 January 2022.

• The CRTC is inviting comments on a three-digit number for mental health crisis and suicide prevention services by January 31, 2022. Sign language videos with key information on the consultation about a three-digit phone number for suicide prevention are now available on the CRTC’s website.
• The information received from Canadians and other interested parties will help the Commission better understand the challenges and solutions, advantages, and costs associated with implementing a three-digit number for mental health crisis and suicide prevention services.
• The Commission does not have authority over the organizations that would provide mental health crisis and suicide prevention services via a three-digit number. Consequently, this consultation will not examine matters related to the governance and coordination, nor the funding of mental health crisis and suicide prevention organizations and services.
• All comments submitted will form part of the public record and will inform the CRTC’s decision.

1. Is there currently a dedicated three-digit number people in mental distress can use in Canada?
   • There is no dedicated three-digit number for mental health and suicide prevention services in Canada. However, in this consultation, the CRTC is seeking comments to establish the need for implementing such a number.
   • There are a number of organizations that provide crisis management services on a regional or national basis, for example https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/mental-health-services/mental-health-get-help.html
   • Additionally, there is currently a national, toll-free Canada Suicide Prevention Service, which can be reached at 1-833-456-4566. This service was established in 2017, is 24/7/365, bilingual, and is run by the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. 
   • People residing in Quebec can call the provincial suicide prevention line at 1-866-APPELLE, available 24/7/365. Alternatively, people residing in Quebec can call the national toll-free number for the Canada Suicide Prevention Service, at which time they will automatically be re-routed to 1-866-APPELLE.
2. By what date will Canada finally have an operational three-digit suicide prevention hotline?
   • As part of this proceeding, the CRTC requested parties to indicate how much time would be required to make the necessary network modifications and upgrades for implementing the three-digit code.
   • Parties have until 31 January 2022 to submit their intervention; replies are due on 17 March 2022. The CRTC intends to issue a decision on the matter in 2022.
   • Should the CRTC require the implementation of a three-digit code, it will set a deadline for telecommunications services providers to make the requisite changes to their networks and implement process changes.
   • The CRTC’s role for the implementation of the three-digit number is limited to administering phone numbers and requiring that telecommunications service providers implement a three-digit number across Canada.
   • Collaboration with other entities will be required to implement a three-digit number, including the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, the Canadian Mental Health Association, Crisis Services Canada, territorial and provincial governments, and the organizations that provide mental health crisis and suicide prevention services.
3. Why is the CRTC taking so long to issue a decision about the three-digit number?
   • Given the importance of suicide prevention, it is imperative that a three-digit code for mental health crisis and suicide prevention be implemented correctly and efficiently. The establishment of such a number is a complex issue that would require telecommunications services providers to make modifications to their networks, which may include replacing equipment.
   • Some areas in Canada still use seven-digit local dialing. This is an issue to the implementation of a three-digit code. In some cases, the system cannot recognize a three-digit code for different technical reasons.
   • Another issue is determining how to route calls to the mental health crisis and suicide prevention service that is the most appropriate to the caller, and make sure that the system is properly implemented to ensure that contingencies are in place to avoid overload.
   • To address these and other issues, the CRTC has launched a public consultation. The CRTC is proceeding as expeditiously as possible to review all the submissions to ensure that the Commission's determinations best reflect the needs of all parties that would be served by such a number.
   • The CRTC has published key information relating to the proceeding in sign language, and has modified its procedures to accept interventions in sign language. Parties have until 31 January 2022 to submit their intervention; replies are due on 17 March 2022. The CRTC intends to issue a decision on the matter in 2022.
   • As the CRTC does not have jurisdiction over the provision of mental health crisis and suicide prevention services, the availability of services through a three-digit code will depend on collaboration with other entities. These entities include the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, the Canadian Mental Health Association, Crisis Services Canada, territorial and provincial governments, and the organizations that provide mental health crisis and suicide prevention services.
4. Why would we need ten-digit local dialing to implement the three-digit number? How long would it take to implement ten-digit local dialing?
   • All three-digit numbers ending with 1-1 (N-1-1 numbers) have already been assigned and repurposing one of these numbers would likely be a lengthy process.
   • The United States chose the non-N11 number 9-8-8, which has not yet been used as an area code, for a suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline in that country. 
   • As discussed in its NoC, the challenge with non-N11 numbers is that in seven-digit dialing areas, a three-digit number such as 9-8-8 cannot be used as a CO code (central office code, i.e. the three digits following the area code), since the telephone system is programed to receive an additional four digits after dialing 3 digits. Calls dialed with less than seven digits will not complete. This problem does not occur with 10-digit dialing.
   • Seven-digit local dialing is still used in New-Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Northern Ontario and the territories.
   • Moving to ten-digit local calling is complex and would require telecommunications services providers to make modifications to their networks, which may include replacing equipment. In addition, moving to ten-digit local calling would also require a transition phase to inform Canadians about the change.
   • As part of this proceeding, the Commission is looking at advantages, challenges, costs, and timelines associated with the transition to ten-digit local dialing.
   • The Commission is also looking at whether the three-digit number should be made available across Canada at the same time or whether it should be phased in. A phased deployment may permit Canadians in certain areas to access the three-digit code sooner, for example those in ten-digit local dialing areas, but could disproportionally impact Canadians living in areas without 10-digit local dialing, including in the North, where suicide rates are relatively higher, ranging from five to twenty times higher than the national average.
   • Through this proceeding, the Commission is seeking to ensure that a three-digit code would aid all Canadians in effectively reaching the help that they need.
5. Why did it take the CRTC so long to launch this consultation?
   • In its Departmental Plan, the CRTC indicated that it would initiate a consultation on the potential use of a three-digit number for mental distress and suicide prevention services during the 2021-2022 exercise which it did.
   • The CRTC needed to take the necessary time to conduct research and to identify the technical issues that should be explored as part of this consultation.
   • The CRTC is monitoring the developments in the United States to better understand the challenges that could arise in implementing a three-digit number in telecom networks, which would be used as input to determine if the use of such a number would be appropriate on a Canada-wide basis.
6. Why does the establishment of a three-digit number have to go through a regulatory consultation?
   • All three-digit numbers ending with 1-1 have now been assigned for public or social services, and no other abbreviated numbers are available to be assigned for mental health crisis and suicide prevention services.
   • In order to implement such a number, the Commission has to assess certain issues, such as: which three-digit number should be used and, whether there are any technical impediments to its implementation, and how these challenges can be overcome.
7. What is the CRTC’s role for the implementation of a three-digit mental health assistance phone line in Canada? Are other organizations involved?
   • The CRTC’s role for the implementation of the three-digit number is limited to administering phone numbers and requiring that telecommunications service providers implement a three-digit number across Canada. 
   • The CRTC does not have the jurisdiction over the organizations that would ultimately provide the services that would be accessed using the three-digit code. 
   • Organizations that are involved with the development of a Canadian suicide prevention service includes the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, the Canadian Mental Health Association, and Crisis Services Canada. 
   • In addition, implementation would require close collaboration with provincial and territorial governments. 
   • CRTC staff regularly meet with their counterparts at the Public Health Agency of Canada to collaborate on the implementation of the three-digit number.
8. If the CRTC approves the implementation of a three-digit number for mental distress in Canada, will every Canadian have access to the service?
   • The CRTC can require telecommunications service providers to implement a three-digit number across Canada.
   • Implementing a three-digit number would require telecommunications service providers to implement certain changes within their networks, which may include replacing equipment. As part of this consultation, the CRTC will explore the technical challenges associated with the deployment of the three-digit number. Also, it will look into other related issues such as whether the three-digit number should be made available across Canada at the same time or whether it should be phased in.
   • The CRTC does not have the jurisdiction over the organizations that would ultimately provide the services that would be accessed using the three-digit code, or the services themselves. 
   • The Commission is not responsible for the provision of mental health crisis and suicide prevention services using the three-digit number. The availability of the service would depend on collaboration with other entities, including the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, the Canadian Mental Health Association, Crisis Services Canada, territorial and provincial governments, and the organizations that provide mental health crisis and suicide prevention services.
9. The FCC estimates that it will cost $570 million in the first year to establish the 9-8-8 number in the U.S. Does the CRTC expect that it will cost a similar amount in Canada? Who will pay for these start-up costs?
   • Through this consultation, the CRTC wants to collect information on the technical requirements for service providers to implement a three-digit number to be used for mental health crisis and suicide prevention services, as well as the service providers’ costs to implement that number. The CRTC will also consider how the service providers’ costs could be recovered as part of this consultation. 
   • The Government of Canada is providing funding to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health to implement a pan-Canadian suicide prevention service.

Reference documents

• Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2021-191-1
• Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2021-191
• 9-1-1 Services
• Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-182 – Next-generation 9-1-1 – Modernizing 9-1-1 networks to meet the public safety needs of Canadians
• Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2014-342 – 9-1-1 action plan
• Telecom Decision CRTC 2012-167 – Canadian Common Ground Alliance – Application to broaden use of the 8-1-1 dialing code
• Telecom Order CRTC 2007-19 – Bell Canada and Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership – Introduction of 8-1-1 service
• Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-44 – Applications for assignment of the 5-1-1 access code
• Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-39 – Alberta Health and Wellness’ request for code 8-1-1 for non-urgent health teletriage services